- THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER
- A SUMMARY OF MAJOR POINTS
MADE IN THE CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DORN REPORT
- by Vice Admiral, retired,
David C Richardson
- and
-
A CHALLENGE TO ANY
AND ALL TO IDENTIFY WHAT ADMIRAL KIMMEL COULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY THAT
WOULD HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE
DEPUTY SECDEF JOHN
H. DEUTCH LETTER TO SENATOR STROM THURMOND PLEDGED;
- ".— we will examine
the matter without preconceptions so that a judgment can be reached
on the basis of fact and fairness --" and that "Like you,
we seek to arrive at a closure that will be recognized as principled
and fair."
- THE SUBSEQUENT DORN REPORT
FOUND (Inter alia)
- "Responsibility for
the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders
of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; it should be broadly
shared."
- COMMENT:
- The failure of the Dorn
Report to identify errors made by others and to assess the impact
of those errors on errors allegedly made by Admiral Kimmel and
General Short precluded arrival at a "principled and
fair" closure. Nor is a "principled
and fair" closure achievable when highly significant,
pertinent information, for whatever reason, is not taken into
account.
-
- A "fair" closure
is Impossible when assessments are made by individuals who lack
experience in the matter being assessed, command performance in
this case, and do not obtain expert advice or explanation from
acknowledged professionals.
- RISKS TAKEN BY THE
PRESIDENT:
- - Insistence on retaining
the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii at force levels substantially inferior
to those that Japan could bring there.
- - Adoption of hard line
policies toward Japan without adjustment or movement of Pacific
Fleet forces.
- - Issuance of an ultimatum
to Japan (Nov. 26, ‘41) while implementing a strategy change to
beef up air strike forces under MacArthur in the Philippines.
- Transfer of control of
major fleet activity in both oceans to Washington to more closely
manage politically sensitive fleet operations, thereby inhibiting
force movement by fleet commanders in adjustment to their
perception of danger.
- ERRORS COMMITTED
IN WASHINGTON THAT AFFECTED DECISIONS IN HAWAII:
- - In April, 1941, adoption
of an Intelligence distribution policy that in
denial of critically Important Intelligence information
derived held in Washington and needed by Kimmel and Short In Hawaii.
-
- - Unresponsiveness of the
Chief of Naval Operations to the plea by Admiral Kimmel expressed in
writing, with reasons, In June, 1941, that he be kept informed
regarding policies and developments, including intelligence. (This
Kimmel letter is a classic presentation of a major force commander's
need for information for command decision.)
- - Specific failure through
inability from sending patrol aircraft to Britain to fulfill the
120 patrol aircraft commitment to Hawaii needed for air search.
- - Naval Intelligence
failures (1) to assess with any accuracy Japanese air combat
effectiveness, and (2) misadvise the CNO and Kimmel egregiously
regarding Japanese shallow water torpedo capabilities, thereby
precluding provision of torpedo netting defenses.
-
- - Failure to advise Kimmel
or Short specifically of:
- - Pearl Harbor bomb
plot message and subsequent reporting orders,
- - Receipt of winds
execute message Dec. 4th that identified America as the enemy.
- - The sequence of
diplomatic messages that clearly foretold war, including the
14 part message December 6th that caused Roosevelt to exclaim
"This means war" and "We will be at war
tomorrow".
- - Failure of War
Department to correct General Short's interpretation of war
warning message to mean greatest danger was sabotage.
- - Admiral Stark's decision
to "call the president instead" when urged to alert Kimmel
by telephone the morning of Dec.7th.
- ERRORS
ATTRIBUTABLE TO KIMMEL
- - He failed to increase
readiness to the next level by ordering General Quarters, an error
attributable to inadequate intelligence support from Washington.
Dorn Report errors allegedly committed by Kimmel reflect ignorance
of operational realities.
- COMMENT:
- - What Admiral Kimmel did,
and for whatever reasons, the fact is that retaining the fleet in
Pearl Harbor was his only sensible option, since he lacked air
support, his 2 (versus 6 Japanese) aircraft carriers not having
yet returned from reinforcing Wake and Midway. His battleship
speeds were 18 knots, his striking range 15 miles. Japanese
carrier forces speed was 30 knots, striking range 300 miles.
-
- - My challenge to anyone
to identify what Kimmel should have done differently that would
have had a measurable Impact on the outcome stands.
- ERRORS
ATTRIBUTABLE TO SHORT
- - lacking the intelligence
available in Washington, he misinterpreted the Army war warning
message to mean greatest danger was sabotage. He then dismantling
his fighter air combat readiness, and as directed, reported his
actions to the War Dept. who failed to correct him.
- DORN REPORT SUMMARY
WITH REFUTATIONS
- EXHIBIT M
-
- In a meeting conducted by
Senator Strom Thurmond on April 27th, 1995, in response to the
request by members of the Kimmel family, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, John M Deutch, pledged that the proposal to restore their
wartime ranks to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Major General
Walter C. Short would be examined without preconceptions so that a
judgment could be reached on the basis of fact and fairness. The
report found that responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster
should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and
General Short: it should be broadly shared. There was, therefore, a
need to identify errors in judgment that occurred elsewhere and to
determine if the errors of others may have adversely influenced the
Hawaiian commanders or caused the events that occurred. This was not
done.
-
- The report failed to
consider other factors of major import, four of which can be
classified as crucial. There is no identification of nor reference
to highly pertinent, highly classified intelligence information then
available in Washington but not sent Hawaii that only became
available to historians and the general public in recent years. This
deficiency reflects a lack of comprehension by the report preparers
of the essentiality of intelligence in evolving situations so
necessary to wise decision making. No mention is made of
responsibilities for coordinating national policy and military force
application inherent in national level leadership in Washington, nor
of the effects of miscalculations there on what happened at Pearl
Harbor. There is no recognition of the essential interrelationship
that must exist between commanders at seat of government and those
in command of military forces in the field. The report indicates no
comprehension of factors that govern life aboard ship at sea and in
port that relate to maintenance, training and personnel comfort that
bear heavily when specifying conditions of readiness.
-
- 1. DORN: The intelligence
available to Admiral Kimmel was sufficient to justify a higher level
of vigilance than he chose to maintain.
-
- COMMENT: Not so. This is the
old argument that the admiral had not used his reconnaissance
advantageously, an argument disproved by Professor Gannon's
enquiries. Admiral Trost when CNO had adopted the old argument in
his recommendation when responding to a Kimmel family request. Upon
later studying the Gannon inquiry, he wrote the Secretary of the
Navy that he was disavowing his earlier recommendation, and asked
that it be withdrawn. In port state of readiness? Admiral Kimmel's
standing orders placed a high state of readiness for all AAA
batteries on ships when in port. On cruisers and battleships one
half of AAA batteries were to be manned at all times with ammunition
ready, with personnel available to man all when so directed. Few
people then went off base when on liberty. When leaving ship most
people remained on base or at nearby at athletic fields. When the
two carriers left with reinforcements for Wake and Midway, they were
placed on a full war footing. Anti-submarine patrols were maintained
off the entrance to Pearl Harbor. Evidence exists in the form of a
letter from a participant that in an engagement several months prior
to December 7th, a Japanese submarine was sunk off the entrance.
Admiral Inglis has testified that within 4 to 7 minutes of attack
initiation all (repeat, all) shipboard AAA guns were firing.
-
- -1-
- One must keep in mind that Admiral Kimmel's
forces were substantially inferior to those
available to the Japanese, especially in the all important aircraft
carrier category, that his wartime initial mission, assigned by
Washington, was to control the ocean areas along the islands to the
northwest of Hawaii, that given what he knew that war could occur at
any time, his readiness requirements for that mission constrained
his day-to-day force employment prior to war and that defense of
Hawaii was an Army responsibility. Fleet time in port was essential
for maintenance, replenishment (underway logistical support forces
were inadequate), training and recreation.
-
- 2. DORN: He knew that war
was imminent. He knew that Japanese tactics featured surprise
attacks. He knew that the U S had lost track of the Japanese
carriers.
-
- He had the resources to
maintain a higher level of vigilance. He believed that optimum
aerial reconnaissance required covering 360 degrees around Hawaii
for a sustained period. The Navy clearly did not have enough planes
for that. This does not mean, however, that Admiral Kimmel had to
choose between ideal aerial reconnaissance and no aerial
reconnaissance.
-
- The fleet also had cruisers
and destroyers that could have been used as pickets to supplement
air patrol, but were not.
-
- COMMENT: He knew the
Japanese had a three for one advantage in aircraft carriers, and
that he had none available to him due to orders from Washington to
reinforce Midway and Wake the proceeding week. He did not know that
Washington possessed the bomb plot message regarding ships in Pearl
and related follow up messages evincing interest in kinds and
locations of ships in port, the Winds Execute message designating
the U S as the enemy, the sequence of messages in diplomatic code
advising war "sooner than you think" and the 14 part
denouement with delivery instructions to the Secretary) of State that
foretold time and place of the attack. When one examines Admiral
Kimmel's operational options, it is clear that even without the
intelligence available in Washington he did the only sound thing -
remain in port in a state of high readiness. Had he known what
Washington knew, and what key intelligence people in Washington were
urging Admiral Stark and General Marshall to tell him, he could have
implemented his sole remaining option - setting general quarters at
daybreak. Definitive knowledge was needed, was available in
Washington, was not sent to either Admiral Kimmel nor General
Short!.
-
- One can get a sense of
preparedness by reviewing Admiral Kimmel's plans and orders relative
to the Japanese submarine threat in the vicinity of Pearl. The
simple fact is that nothing Admiral Kimmel did could have made a
change in what occurred except, had Washington alerted him, he could
have preset general quarters, which would have reduced ship
vulnerability by increasing its watertight integrity. No one has yet
identified what Admiral Kimmel could have done differently during
the preceding 24 to 36 hours that makes sense other than to pre-set
general quarters.
-
- Insofar as the intelligence
information available in Hawaii was concerned, Sunday, December 7th,
looked neither more nor less dangerous than the previous Sunday,
November 30. The idea that Admiral Kimmel should, or could,
have mounted cruiser/destroyer surveillance, presumably dating from
his
- -2-
- November 27th war warning,
given the distances inherent in achieving contact with the Japanese
force during daylight, December 6th, is off-the-top-of-the-head
stuff. The admiral's logistic support ships were insufficient in
number to support any such sustained deployment. The benefit
probability was negligible. The consequences, delay in implementing
his assigned wartime mission.
-
- 3. DORN: Different choices
might not have discovered the carrier armada and might not have
prevented the attack, but different choices might have reduced the
magnitude of the disaster.
-
- COMMENT: Name one. My
standing challenge to any one is to identify any such choice other
than, given forewarning, to set general quarters, that would have
reduced in any way the magnitude of the disaster. Given the
disparity in strength in the all-important aircraft carrier
category, the only sensible choice, to abandon the Pearl Harbor base
for the West Coast upon receipt of the war warning, was an option
available only to the President.
-
- An error in judgment
occurred within the Army command chain that might have made a minor
difference. General Short interpreted, and so reported to
Washington, his war warning to mean protect from sabotage.
Washington, repositor of highly significant intelligence from
codebreaking that identified the enemy, and time and place of
attack, did not correct the Short interpretation, and so
acknowledged in subsequent inquiries that were held in Washington.
This error was not one within Kimmel's domain, although had he known
what Washington knew, he might have approached General Short with
his concerns. Specifically, it does not reflect a lack of
coordination. Rather, it reflects the then established relationship
between top field level Army commanders and their Army Chief of
Staff.
-
- 4. DORN: In the certain
knowledge that the United States and Japan were moving inexorably
and ever more rapidly toward war but not knowing exactly where, when
or how Japan would strike, what did Admiral Kimmel do to resolve his
uncertainty?
- Admiral Kimmel conducted no
long range reconnaissance out of Oahu. Thus, on December 7th he
could get warning only from Washington.
-
- COMMENT: Resolve His
uncertainty that war would soon come? The record makes clear just
the opposite. Resolution of Kimmel's uncertainty with respect to it's
imminence, time and likely place of first attack was a Washington
capability. Washington held (and withheld from Kimmel) the Pearl
Harbor bomb plot message and follow up messages, the identification
of enemy message and numerous intercepted messages that foretold
time and place of attack, the last of which was in hand about 12
hours prior to the attack. Admiral Stark had assured Admiral Kimmel
that he would be kept informed. This we now know was not done. Also,
as was well known in Washington, Admiral Kimmel's resources for
search were totally inadequate. Navy Department plans specified 100
patrol aircraft for Hawaii area reconnaissance, but by December 7th
had provided none. As to reconnaissance, the two carriers with
reinforcements for Wake and Midway were tasked to reconnoiter the
area west and south of Hawaii, toward the Japanese occupied
Marshalls during return, which direction was thought the more likely
route for any approaching forces.
-
- 5. DORN: This exclusive
reliance on Washington for warning is at the heart of the failure at
Pearl Harbor.
-
- -3-
- COMMENT: No. The single
at-the-heart failure that caused the disaster at Pearl Harbor or was
pursuit of policies in Washington designed to force Japan to modify
it's policies of aggression in China, the South Pacific and possibly
against the Soviet Union while concurrently reducing Pacific Fleet
forces by a fourth in April, ‘41. This reduction in force left the
fleet substantially inferior to the forces available to Japan,
especially in air strike capabilities. By this stance Washington
limited severely the courses of action available to Admiral Kimmel,
and presented Japan with a situation that was uncertain only in the
degree of success that they could achieve in a surprise air attack.
This criticism of Kimmel evades consideration of the essential
interrelationship that must exist between senior command at seat of
government and commanders of forces in the field. Since primary
intelligence functions of necessity reside at seats of government,
senior command have inherent obligations to keep commanders of
forces properly informed. Dorn Report preparers appear unaware of
the essentiality of a commander being kept fully informed regarding
known, pertinent information in evolving situations so that he may
take prudent, timely action. No one
now disputes that
adequate and specific warning was available in Washington. Reference to his
reliance on Washington for warning as an
- Admiral Kimmel error in
judgment reveals a mindset inclined to fault Kimmel despite doctrinal processes
that were not followed.
-
- 6. DORN: Admiral Kimmel had
sought and extracted from Admiral Stark a promise to provide all the
warning available. Thus, as a practical matter, Admiral Kimmel
placed total faith in Washington's ability to obtain and provide him
timely and unambiguous warning from the Magic and other intercepts
alone. This faith was not justified. It was not prudent to depend
exclusively on Washington for timely and unambiguous information.
-
- COMMENT: An act of misplaced
faith? Yes. More to the point, it was a major system malfunction
with it's roots in Washington. Since time immemorial heads of
governments have been obligated to fully inform their admirals and
generals in the field with all pertinent information. As already
noted, Admiral Kimmel's resources were, and were known in Washington
to be, extremely limited and unlikely to detect an approaching
Japanese force bent on achieving surprise. Interestingly, we have
here a major Washington blunder presented as an Admiral Kimmel error
in judgment.
-
- 7. DORN: Admiral Kimmel had
49 Catalina long range patrol aircraft useful for reconnaissance. He
also had a significant force of cruisers with embarked scout
observation planes, destroyers and antiaircraft guns on ships in the
harbor. If the Catalinas had been properly employed in an integrated
and coordinated fashion at a reasonable state of readiness these
resources might have made an enormous and perhaps critical difference
in the events of December 7th.
-
- COMMENT: These statements
reflect the superficiality of inquiry into the nature of the search
problem, the duration of time required dating, presumably, from
receipt of the war warning November 27th, reconnaissance forces
available, logistics support requirements and the readiness for
wartime employment of fleet forces according to war plans. The
recent Gannon research published in Naval Institute Proceedings
portrays accurately this search problem.
-
- -4-
- But let us suppose that his
reconnaissance was successful, and did sight the incoming Japanese
strike force some 500 to 700 miles out on December 6th, what options
did he have? Would he put to sea without air cover, pitting his 18
knot speed battleships with 15 mile gun range offensive capability
against 30 knot carriers with 300
mile air strike capabilities? Surely no. Or would he have remained
in port? In that case his remaining option was to set general
quarters at daybreak; He had no means to in any way turn aside or
deflect the attack.
-
- 8. DORN: The use of
destroyers and cruisers and their float planes in reconnaissance
apparently was not considered.
-
- COMMENT: We don't know. We
do know that the complexity and magnitude of the problem, the
logistical and other costs and the very low probability of success
before radars were placed in small ships and aircraft would have
made that proposal unattractive.
-
- 9. DORN: The air defense
system was not coordinated between the Army and Navy.
-
- COMMENT: Wrong! It was fully
coordinated, including command connectivities and assigned
responsibilities, in the case of Navy to the senior full-time
in-port official, to assure that all navy combat units were in
compliance with the agreed upon joint Army-Navy air defense plan
whenever they entered port.
-
- 10. DORN: Training patterns
could have been altered in response to heightened tensions
-
- COMMENT: Meaning? The
purpose for going to sea was training. Divisions and squadrons of
ships practiced wartime maneouvers and conducted gunnery exercises,
working to improve coordination. A limiting factor in time spent at
sea was the shortage of logistical support, for which ships had to
return to port. Weekends were usually for replenishment,
maintenance, athletic activity and recreation for a portion of the
fleet. This DORN Report observation is intended as a criticism, but
there is no discernable connection to those events.
-
- 11. DORN: Anti-torpedo
baffles or nets could have been used within Pearl Harbor for
protection against torpedo plane attack. These items were not
furnished Admiral Kimmel, but they might have been requested.
-
- COMMENT: An obvious area for
inquiry. But not found was the reply by the CNO, Admiral Stark, to
the Secretary of the Navy, forwarded as information to Admiral
Kimmel, in early 1941 in response to the secretary's concern.
Admiral Stark noted the heights, speeds, distances to arm torpedoes
and depths of water required for successful drops. He concluded that
Pearl Harbor water areas and depths were such as to make use of
torpedoes unreasonable, citing the specific figures thought to
pertain that supported his conclusion. The sad truth is, as we later
learned time and time again throughout the first year of combat
action, Japanese torpedoes, both airborne and ship based, were far
superior to ours, and warrant designation as a secret weapon. Stark
also noted that there were practical difficulties connected with how
cumbersome nets were that would limit their usefulness in Pearl
Harbor. In those circumstances Admiral Kimmel saw no need, and had
no basis, for a request for torpedo nets.
-
- -5-
- 12. DORN: Barrage balloons
could have been used in selected areas to restrict the most
dangerous air approaches to "battleship row".
-
- COMMENT: Air strike
approaches for bombing runs are wind driven for greatest accuracy.
They commence at high altitudes. The prevailing winds in Pearl
Harbor, known as the trade winds, are strong and are from the
northeast. Low pressure atmospheric conditions bring winds and rain
from the south. Usefulness of balloons would have to be tested to be
known. Opinion then held no such defense was needed to protect
against torpedoes when in Pearl.
-
- 13. DORN: Advocates for
Admiral Kimmel argue that the failure of Washington officials to
provide the critical intercepts to the Hawaiian commanders excuses
any errors made in Hawaii. It does not. Placing exclusive reliance
on Washington for warning of air attack was an act of misplaced
faith
-
- COMMENT: Apart from several
peripheral findings of fault, which are refuted herein, there are
two basic criticisms alleged by Dorn. The first is that Admiral
Kimmel should not have placed "exclusive reliance" on
Washington for warning, and the second, and related criticism, that
he failed to employ aerial and ship reconnaissance. Now, had he been
provided the dozen or so critically important (Dorn identifies them.
as well, as critical intercepts) codebroken messages available in
Washington, commencing with the bomb plot message and related follow
up messages plus those translated dating from November 27th, he
would have had the opportunity to insist that Washington authorities
recognize his vulnerabilities and agree to alleviating measures in a
time frame when they would have made sense. He was well aware that
his force in the aircraft carrier category was one third that of the
Japanese, (one half if Enterprise could be returned to Pearl in
time). And , again, we await someone to point out what he could have
done differently during the last 24 or so hours, with or without
reconnaissance information, that would have made any real difference
in the outcome. His sole option was to set general quarters, for
which he needed to know what was known in Washington.
-
- 14. DORN: Admiral Kimmel was
the highest ranking commander at Pearl Harbor; it was appropriate to
subject his actions to closer scrutiny and accountability than those
of his superiors.
-
- COMMENT: Closer scrutiny
initially, but not exclusively, as in this case.. Subsequent to war's end the entire record of mistakes made, given the numerous
loss of lives that was entailed, should have been identified so as
to not foolishly repeat those same mistakes at some future time.
That this did not happen was due to envisioned domestic political
ramifications. Is it still so?
-
- 15 DORN: The decisions
affecting Admiral Kimmel were tailored to his individual situation;
what did or did not happen to others is not an appropriate
consideration.
-
- COMMENT: What did or did not
"happen" to others may not have been an appropriate
consideration, but what others did or did not "do" that
caused or contributed to the disaster certainly merit identification
and consideration.
-
- -6-
|
- A Critical Analysis of the
Report by the Department of Defense Dated December 1, 1995 Regarding
Advancement of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieutenant
General Walter C.
Short on the Retired List
- by
- Vice Admiral David
Charles Richardson, USN(ret)
-
- INTRODUCTION
-
- Acting on the request of the
surviving sons of Admiral Kimmel, Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman,
Senate Armed Services Committee, held a meeting in the Senate Armed
Services Committee Hearing Room on April 27th, 1995 to permit the
Kimmel family to present to the Secretary of Defense reasons why
their father, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, should have his four
star rank restored to him posthumously. Senator Strom Thurmond
conducted the meeting. Representing the Department of Defense were
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John M. Deutch, Secretary of the
Navy, John H. Dalton and Navy General Counsel Steven S. Honigman.
Those present in support of the Kimmel family were former Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer; former Chief
of Naval Operations, James L. Holloway III; Admiral Harold E. Shear,
Rear Admiral Donald M. Showers, Captain Edward
L. Beach, author; John Costello, historian; Michael Gannon,
historian; Mr. Anthony DeLorenzo, representing the Pearl Harbor
Survivor's Association; Counsel for Admiral Kimmel, Edward Hanify;
the sons of Admiral Kimmel, Edward R. and Captain Thomas K., Edward's son, Manning M. IV and
Thomas's son Thomas K. Jr. Navy
General Counsel Honigman presented the case against posthumous
advancement. The attendees accompanying the Kimmel family spoke in
favor of advancement. The Kimmel family spoke in favor of General
Short. The outcome was a pledge by the Deputy Secretary of Defense
to Senator Thurmond to review the matter of posthumous advancement
objectively, and make a report. A transcription of remarks made in
meeting is attached as Exhibit A. [see
document] The report by the Under Secretary
of Defense dated December 1, 1995, (the Dorn Report) is appended as
Exhibit B. [see
document] The executive summary of the Dorn Report is Exhibit C.
-
- Shortly after the meeting in
a letter to Senator Strom Thurmond dated 10 May, 1995, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, John Deutch, stated:
-
"As I pledged at the
meeting, we will examine the matter without preconceptions so that
a judgment can be reached on the basis of fact and fairness and
the right action can be taken without delay. Like you, we seek to
arrive at a closure that will be recognized as principled and
fair."
- COMMENT: In order to arrive
"at a closure that will be recognized as principled and
fair" Secretary Deutch's pledge "that a judgment can be
reached on the basis of fact and fairness" is a pledge to
identify what the errors in judgment were and when and by whom they
were committed. To what extent did errors in judgment that occurred
at seat of government impact on judgment errors that may have
occurred in Hawaii? More specifically, were those that may have been
committed by Kimmel and Short of a severity to affect in any
significant way the outcome of the surprise attack, or warrant
destruction of their reputations?
-
- This paper will reexamine
the events and related information that we now know was then
available in Washington and in Honolulu, present an assessment of
their significance when viewed in an operational context, and
identify errors in judgment by the parties to that disaster. An
additional purpose is to provide for the record information not
previously known or, for whatever reasons, not permitted to be
included in the several inquiries. The intent is creation of a
contextual record of fundamental considerations that should apply in
force commander relationships as revealed by errors committed in the
days, weeks and months prior to Pearl Harbor in order that we not
suffer needless losses in lives in future perilous situations.
- In the Dorn Report an
administration acknowledges for the first time that blame for Pearl
Harbor does not rest solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and
General Short. Others were also to blame. The others remain
unidentified, their blame unexplained. The Dorn Report asserts that
although neither commander is guilty of "dereliction of duty", as initially asserted in the
Robert's Commission Report,
both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were guilty of faulty
judgment. They must therefore continue to bear blame for the
disaster. But then, the Report notes, military commanders serve at
the pleasure of senior command and may be relieved for no reason
other than a loss of faith in their judgment. For this reason alone,
the Report states, posthumous advancement of Kimmel and Short is
inappropriate. The point is made that since the Pearl Harbor
commanders' retirement in their permanent ranks are facts of
history, violate no laws and are in accord with common practice they
should stand.
-
- It is, indeed, true, that
military commanders serve at the pleasure of senior command. They
may be relieved for any number of reasons. But we have here a major
disaster, with enormous military and political consequences, and an
issue of historical significance regarding which we need to set the
record straight in order to not repeat past mistakes. The Dorn
Report also notes the scope and depth of national criticism directed
particularly at Admiral Kimmel. It makes clear that Kimmel's relief
in particular was driven by considerations other than loss of
confidence in his judgment. In this regard the Report states;
-
"It is important to
remember that the state of the allied cause in both the Atlantic
and Pacific was extremely perilous in the dark days of early 1942.
The greatest national need at the time was to prosecute the global
war against both Germany and Japan."
- COMMENT: The implication is
clear. The nation's leaders at that critical juncture quite rightly
feared the loss of confidence that would follow an admission that
Washington authorities were in some degree at fault, an admission
that in the context of the then existing military situation would
have been irresponsible. Nor for several weeks did the extent of
blame attributable to the mishandling of intelligence become
increasingly apparent to those knowledgeable of the contents of that
intelligence. There were needs to both preserve the secrecy of our
codebreaking successes and our national political stability.
-
- The public mood in the
aftermath of the disaster was bitter, frightened. How could this
happen? The view of the general public was that laxity and
inattention by Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had left
the American fleet vulnerable. The public perception of life in
Hawaii contributed to this suspicion. The reality was quite
different, apparent to those of us who served there during 1940-41.
As the war progressed, with victory clearly in sight, military
reasons for blaming Kimmel and Short ceased to exist. But political
reasons remained. Requests for posthumous advancement in rank of the
Hawaiian commanders have been interpreted by some as an attack
against the reputation of President Roosevelt. Is this consideration
valid? While other injustices of that time have since been
rectified, as for example, restitution made to Japanese Americans
who were incarcerated in encampments during the war, the injustice
done Kimmel and Short remains unadmitted. If then in the national
interest to shoulder the Pearl Harbor commanders with the blame,
does that interest apply today? Given that the attack was a Japanese
initiative, and by any known measures American intervention a
prerequisite to Hitler's defeat, is there a valid basis today for
reasoning that the reputation of President Roosevelt would be
tarnished by an admission that blame for the damage inflicted lay in
Washington? The circumstances then existing saw Great Britain, it's
army devastated in it's retreat to and recovery from Dunkirk,
fighting alone for survival against Hitler, Mussolini, Japan and,
until the spring of 1941,
-
- -2-
- Stalin’s Soviet Union in
uneasy alliance with Hitler.
-
- Recorded history accurately
notes the all out effort by President Roosevelt, supported by his
key advisors, to assist Britain and, later, the Soviet Union in
their defense against Hitler's aggression. The American public, on
the other hand, was seemingly determined to avoid involvement,
certainly not in a combat role. The President first initiated a
buildup of our military strength and an increasing supply of
military equipment to Britain. After Hitler's assault on the Soviet
Union, and evidence that Stalin might succeed in his defensive
efforts, Roosevelt initiated economic constraints designed to hold
Japan in check to permit the Red Army to transfer military forces
from Eastern Siberia for defense of Moscow. These constraints
created conditions that the Japanese deemed unbearable. To the
Japanese way of thinking, allied as they were to Hitler, achieving
the Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere and it's promise of economic
freedom made war with America a necessity. On the other hand, the
President knew that if America went to war, that could only occur if
America were first attacked. Now this had come to pass. A well
planned, superbly executed attack by six Japanese aircraft carriers
stunned America and the world by the severity of damage the attacks
achieved. In these circumstances an undermined national leadership
would exacerbate an already dangerous situation. The course of
action to be taken was clear and simple. Let Kimmel and Short
shoulder the blame. This came naturally from pre-war mindsets and
political self interest. Nor was it then clear that they weren't to
blame.
-
- Vice Admiral Frank E Beatty,
ret, Aide to the late Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, in an
interview by U. S. News and World Report, date unknown, (enclosure
X) states:
-
"I can say that prior
to December 7th it was evident even to me, as I was reading the
"magic" messages, that we were pushing Japan into a
corner. I believe that it was the desire of President Roosevelt
and of Prime Minister Churchill that we get into the war as they
felt the allies could not win without us, and all our efforts to
cause the Germans to declare war on us had failed. The conditions
we imposed on Japan - to get out of China, for example
- were
so severe that we knew that nation could not accept. We did not want
her to accept them. We were forcing her so severely that we should
have known that she would react toward the United States. All her
preparations in a military way - and we knew their overall
import - pointed that way."
- Although Admiral Beatty did
not believe that Roosevelt knew of the impending attack, there is
considerable evidence to the contrary. It is not conclusive, but not
all the pertinent information has yet been released into the public
domain. The evidence now known will be summarized, However, the
matter of achieving justice for Kimmel and Short does not depend on
any information beyond that now known. The known evidence is
adequate.
-
- DORN REPORT MAJOR
DEFICIENCIES
-
- The Dorn Report findings
are;
-
1. Responsibility for the
Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral
Kimmel and General Short; it should be broadly shared.
-
2. To say that
responsibility is broadly shared is not to absolve Admiral Kimmel and General Short
of accountability.
-
3. The official treatment
of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was substantially temperate
and procedurally proper.
-
-3-
-
4. History has
not been hostile to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
-
5. There is not a compelling
basis for advancing either officer to a higher grade.
-
- While this presentation is
directed at deficiencies in the Dorn Report, it is only fair and
proper to point out that the Report, while lacking comprehension in
some salient features of military operational life, is nevertheless
exceptional in it's objectivity. While it has failed to include some
highly pertinent and significant information that more thorough
research would have revealed, we are nevertheless especially
indebted for a presentation that permits a point counterpoint
treatment of the case for posthumous advancement in rank for the two
Pearl Harbor commanders. The Dorn Report is commendable also for
recognizing that this subject cannot yet be put to rest. It states:
-
"On the other hand,
sober analysis in the years since the publication of the Joint
Congressional Committee's Report has produced a number of works of
nuanced and balanced scholarship which constitutes the beginnings
of the verdict of history. Those works, based on a careful reading
of the entire record of the Joint Congressional Committee and of
other primary sources that have come to light in the intervening
years, are creating a responsible and increasingly accurate and
just understanding of the tapestry of failure at Pearl Harbor.
Ultimately, in a free society this must be the function of the
academic community, and it is one that the academic community is
performing well in this case."
- COMMENT: An
"increasingly accurate and just understanding" of the
disaster's causes depends upon recognition of the essentiality of
continuous intelligence inputs for effective command functioning and
of the mutuality of command responsibility, one commander to
another, in the command chain. As we shall see, Secretary Dorn
reflects the general inability of non-professionals to distinguish
between strategic intelligence, or statements of general warning
applicable across a span of time, and tactical intelligence which
provides minute-by-minute, hour-by-hour information updates that
indicate change in the likelihood of a specific event occurring.
This facet of the problem was clearly not understood in preparation
of the Dorn Report.
-
- Only recently has the
general public learned from "other primary sources" the
extraordinarily valuable information derived from codebreaking that
inferred both time and place of the forthcoming attack. The
importance of this information to Admiral Kimmel and General Short,
but not provided them, as we shall see, was not comprehended in
preparation of the Dorn Report. There are other basic faults. Given
the risks being taken, both political and military, the President
thought it expedient to take a more direct control of fleet
operations. Dorn failed to take into account the added
responsibility incurred by Washington as a consequence of that
assumption of authority. More importantly, Dorn failed to recognize
the essential relationship that must exist between conduct of
foreign policy and employment of military force if we are to avoid
disastrous consequences. The report's rationale with regard to
important realities that guide and constrain force commanders in
their conduct of operations is seriously flawed. Finally, in an
assessment of fault, one must examine the operational options that
were available to Kimmel and Short before the attack, and whether or
not the arrangements that, they made in the context of the
information available to them reflected either bad judgment or
omissions. That was not done.
-
- Although we now have in the
public domain much of the information available in Washington, but
not in Hawaii, there remains one possibly crucial bit of evidence
not yet released - the secure telephone conversation in which Churchill
called
-
- -4-
- Roosevelt early in the
morning of 26 November, 1941, that may be central to the radical and
sudden change in Roosevelt's attitude toward the then ongoing
negotiations with Japan. Information from Secretary Stimson
concerning Japanese troop movements to the south most likely
accounts for the war warning message sent Kimmel and Short November
27th. The coincidence of timing suggests this Churchill/Roosevelt
conversation may also have played a role. Be that as it may, the
case for restoring the reputations of Admiral Kimmel and General
Short does not depend upon the content of that conversation.
-
- WE MUST UNDERSTAND SOME
BASIC PREMISES AND FUNDAMENTAL OPERATIONAL REALITIES
-
- The commander assigning a
mission to a subordinate commander is obligated to assign forces
required for mission accomplishment. If force availability is deemed
inadequate, the mission should be modified. The practice, and
reality, in peacetime is that a force presence signifies intent, or
will. Relatively small forces placed in harms way, when backed by
clearly discernable national will, enjoy a degree of security and
exercise influence beyond that inherent in the force itself. This
can create a dangerous situation, however, when basic national
interests are at issue, as was then the case with respect to Japan
who imported 90% of it's oil from the United States.
-
- Admiral Kimmel's forces were
inferior to those available to the Japanese, substantially so. His
predecessor, Admiral J. 0. Richardson, was relieved of his command
because of his unwillingness to keep the fleet stationed in Pearl
Harbor because of it's vulnerability to surprise attack. Even so,
several months after replacing Richardson with Kimmel, the President
reduced Pacific Fleet forces a further 25 percent by transferring an
aircraft carrier, three battleships, cruisers, destroyers and
support ships to the Atlantic. Our President's strategy centered on
providing all possible aid to Britain, including warship patrols in
the western Atlantic. Since our military buildup was then in early
stages, the President accepted the additional risk in the Pacific
inherent in the transfer of major forces to the Atlantic.
-
- Military events in the fall
of 1941 caused the President to modify his strategy. The German Army
was notably successful initially in it's invasion of the Soviet
Union. The President foresaw a need to transfer Russian forces
stationed in the Far East westward to assist in defense of
Stalingrad and Moscow. To offset the possibility that Japan might
attack a weakened Russian rear, he directed a strengthening of Army
and Army Air Force forces in the Philippine Islands, diverting some
forces otherwise destined for Britain. The B-17 bombers arriving
Hickam Field, Oahu, the morning of December 7th were enroute the
Philippines. These force movements themselves involved considerable
chance taking by our national high command, since they could
precipitate hostilities in the circumstances. No problem with that.
The point is simply that in event of a miscalculation, a reverse or
a defeat, a substantial amount of responsibility resides with the
political and military leadership at the seat of government, since
only that authority can orchestrate the necessary political and
military interactions to reduce risks. If a miscalculation occurs,
and for various (and good) reasons an admission of responsibility is
unacceptable at the time of a disaster, acceptance is an obligation
when those reasons no longer apply. The Dorn report took no account
of the effect of force inferiority, especially in air power, and it's constraints on the operational options or initiatives that
Kimmel could take. Dorn did not acknowledge that American policies
and actions emphasizing support of Chunking and protection of the
Soviet Union eastern provinces together with constraints on exports
of oil served a strategic purpose, and were deciding factors in
Japan's decision to initiate war with a surprise attack on the
Pacific Fleet.
-
- -5-
- Admiral Kimmel was concerned
at the weakened condition of his forces. He protested the transfer
of the three battleships and the aircraft carrier Yorktown Battle
Group to the Atlantic. Particularly significant was the loss of the
Yorktown, as it left the Japanese navy with six large operational
aircraft carriers a sizeable advantage in air strike power. Only
three remained to Kimmel, the early carriers Lexington and Saratoga,
and the more modern Enterprise. Implicit in this transfer of forces
was the degree of faith, existing in Washington, misplaced as we
later learned, that Japan would not attack the Hawaiian Islands.
Adoption by the administration soon thereafter of hardline policies
toward the Japanese, as events soon proved, placed the Hawaiian
commanders in untenable positions. A commitment further
complicating, if not potentially compromising the President's
domestic political situation, was his promise to the British and
Dutch to come to their aid in event the Japanese initiated attack
against their territories in the South Pacific. These actions were
either miscalculations in Washington regarding the relative
strengths of naval forces in the Pacific, a misplaced faith that the
Japanese would not attack in Hawaii, or the President was willing to
accept the risk of a Japanese attack somewhere in the Pacific.
-
- I repeat for emphasis - the
transfer of three battleships and an aircraft carrier to the
Atlantic in the spring of 1941 left the Pacific fleet appreciably
weaker than the Japanese fleet, especially in the all important
carrier air strike aircraft category. This transfer severely
constrained Kimmel's force employment options from that date
forward.
-
- THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN
THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY FORCE
-
- In all the books I have read
about the disaster I find a common deficiency -they do not reflect
an understanding of the essential interaction between fleet activity
and operational intelligence. This is a major weakness in the Dorn
Report as well. Even in "And I Was There" that interaction
is taken for granted. It is not explained. The reason is that
assessing the significance of intelligence, then exploiting it, is a
commander's responsibility, as is targeting of intelligence
collection resources. The continuous presentation of intelligence,
on the one hand, and exploiting it by redirecting ongoing fleet
activity, on the other, makes clear that an extraordinary intimacy
must exist between operations and intelligence. Smart command
decisions depend upon an inflow of good, timely intelligence
information.
-
- One must understand the
command need for a continuous accumulation of information from many
sources for creation of a fund of knowledge that enhances command
ability to function effectively. Within that information flow there
is a category of time sensitive, operationally significant
information (called opintel) that is pertinent to one's own
situation and status at points in time. This "coin" has
two sides: what one currently knows about a possible threat, and
what one wants or needs to know, but doesn't. New information is
continuously assessed in the light of other related information. A
continuous appraisal is made of evolving situations in light of one's own activity as well as in the context of political
developments and military activity elsewhere. The objective is to
identify what to do in time so as to not lose control over evolving
events, the imminence of which may be measured in minutes and hours.
Often, information seemingly benign to recipients elsewhere, is
viewed as quite significant when weighed in the context of other related information locally available and
one's own activity at the
time. For example: A submarine sighting near a port is interesting.
If warships are about to depart, it is worrisome. In applying this
process force commanders seek to control adversity by modifying
ongoing operational activity to counter new developments. The
demands of this process are why Admiral Kimmel held a meeting of key
staff personnel at 3:00 PM,
-
- -6-
- Saturday, December 6th, and
asked the question about Japanese aircraft carrier locations that
most authors mention.
-
- A military historian whose
name I have forgotten wrote that battles are won by commanders who
make fewer mistakes. Mistakes occur when foresight is inadequate. At
all points in time evolving military situations are characterized by
uncertainty. Knowledge is imperfect. Seemingly minor occurrences are
often seen in retrospect to have set in motion a sequence of events
that heavily influenced the outcome. The antidote to uncertainty is
knowledge. Clearly, and importantly, Admiral Kimmel's 3:00 PM
meeting that Saturday afternoon, December 6th, was in search of a
more perfect knowledge of the current situation, revealed by his
comment about the location of the Japanese aircraft carriers. The
story then unfolding in Washington, viewed in the context of
intelligence from codebreaking during the previous several weeks,
clearly foretold the likelihood of air attack against the fleet in
Pearl Harbor that Sunday morning. But all of that information was
withheld from Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
-
- The central weakness of the
Dorn Report is it's failure to understand the necessary
intelligence/operational intimacy, and the potential consequences
when lacking. Items two to ten, pages 111-7 to 111-11, inclusive,
provide accurately what was known to Kimmel and Short. It does not
identify operationally significant, time sensitive intelligence
known in Washington, but not sent to Hawaii, that indicated both
time and place of likely attack. Nor does it take into account the
responsibilities of the Director of Naval Intelligence to ascertain
and advise regarding possible enemy functional capabilities. Two
quotes from the Dorn Report highlight this weakness.
-
- "Despite
this mass of evidence, the practical difficulties of conducting an
aerial attack may have caused Admiral Kimmel and General Short to
minimize its likelihood." (page 111-10).
- COMMENT: The practical
difficulties referred to in this first quote, and the failure of
naval intelligence to accurately assess the likely effectiveness of
Japanese naval men and materials did, indeed, create an opinion that
an air attack against Pearl Harbor might be damaging but not
disastrous. This failure is attributable to the Director, Naval
Intelligence, in Washington. As to the views of Kimmel and Short,
any force commander is determined to defeat any attack, whether
major or minor. The record is replete with information that neither
Kimmel nor Short minimized the likelihood of an air attack. As to
the "mass of evidence", the evidence that was both valid,
timely and precise remained in Washington in intelligence withheld,
as we shall soon see.
-
- There is no evidence that
any military officer, Army or Navy, minimized the likelihood of a
surprise air attack against Oahu. Throughout the 30's major fleet
exercises drove that point home, and were the basis for the
requirement for 120 B-17s for General Short (12 provided) and 100
naval patrol planes (none provided) for the Commandant, 14th Naval
District. There is implied evidence that our civilian leadership in
Washington minimized that likelihood in establishing national
political and military priorities. All shared the belief that such
an attack would have limited success. For example, of the two air
weapons, torpedoes and bombs, and general recognition that torpedoes
had the greater potential for damage where they could be used, that
specific threat was dismissed. In response to Secretary of the Navy
Knox's concern regarding a torpedo attack similar to that delivered
against the Italian Navy, noting the greater depth of water in the
south of Italy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, in
Washington in early 1941 provided detailed technical advice to the
Pacific Fleet and the Commandant, 14th Naval District as follows:
-
- -7-
-
"Consideration has been
given to the installation of A/T(anti-torpedo) baffles within Pearl
Harbor for protection against torpedo attack. It is considered that
the relatively shallow depth of the water limits the need for
anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition, the congestion and
the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practibility of the
present type of baffles - -. -
a minimum depth of water of 75' may be assumed necessary to
successfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150' of water is desired.
The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes
is 250'. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. The
desirable height for dropping is 60' or less. About 200 yards of
torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed but
this may be altered."
- Given the dimensions of
water in Pearl Harbor, with depths less than 40', it was Washington's assessment that
discounted that danger. Nor was there capability in Hawaii to remedy that
deficiency if Kimmel had reason to think otherwise.
-
- The second Dorn Report quote
states:
-
"This exclusive
reliance on Washington for both tactical and strategic warning is
at the heart of the failure at Pearl Harbor, and of the debate
about the failure. The record suggests that officials in
Washington believed they had provided strategic warning with their
messages of November 27th; neither Admiral Kimmel nor General
Short read the messages that way. The debate over the handling of
Japan's 14-part message on December 6th and the morning of
December 7th is about tactical warning. Admiral Kimmel and General
Short did not get tactical warning."
- COMMENT: This quote captures
succinctly the single most significant area of disagreement in
allocating blame for the disaster and does, indeed, go to the very
heart of the problem. If, in fact, it is true that Washington
thought it's responsibilities discharged by this last of several
strategic warning messages, then we have an example of an egregious
degree of ignorance by senior naval professionals that is hard to
believe, hard to attribute to bureaucratic bungling, especially
given the letter Admiral Kimmel gave Admiral Stark in June, 1941. The
earlier assumption of authority by the Director of War Plans over
distribution of intelligence, then his subsequent failure to assure
that this intelligence went out was a most grievous error the net
effect of which was to mislead Admiral Kimmel, and directly affect
his assessment of the situation in the days and hours preceding the
attack.
-
- A more reasonable
explanation for assertions that providing "strategic"
warning was adequate is that it served the political purpose of
diverting criticism. As to the Dorn Report, this quote also assumes
adequacy of patrol plane resources and other long range surveillance
means that simply were not available to Kimmel or to Short, but
which means were, in fact, available from codebreaking in Washington.
This quote drives home the point that Dorn has no understanding of
the role of tactical intelligence in the operational decision
process, which lack has also appeared in a number of books written
about Pearl Harbor. As will be noted, Admiral King stated a misuse
by Admiral Kimmel of his patrol plane resources in his endorsement
opposing the findings in the report by the Navy Court of Inquiry.
That criticism provided a convenient device to avoid a public
relations debacle while the war was still in progress. It was also
an endorsement Admiral King later retracted. See Exhibit K.
-
- No one has stated the case
better for complete and timely support by Washington regarding
policy and intelligence updates than Admiral Kimmel himself. Having
been informed by Vice Admiral Wilson Brown in February, 1941, that
there was "confusion" in Washington regarding
responsibilities for keeping him advised
-
- -8-
- regarding intelligence, and
having received in personal letters from Admiral Stark information
that could have come only from codebreaking of Japanese message
traffic, Admiral Kimmel handed the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Stark, a letter during his visit in Washington in June,
1941, that contained the following:
-
"The Commander-in
Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. He is far
removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly
changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the
policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval
movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible
effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force
will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically
affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack
of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a
condition that directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and
confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the
conduct of military operations.
-
"It is realized that,
on occasion, the rapid development in the international picture,
both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of
knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate
against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the
present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and
authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even
though necessarily late at times, would enable the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, even
re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current
concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific
situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a
partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the
desirability of interruption of this training by strategic
dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities.
Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the
Department itself is not too well informed as to the local
situation, particularly with regard to the status of current
outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary
that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad
policy and objectives rather than by categorical
instructions."
-
"It is suggested that
it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important
developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means
available."
- Several years later, after
Admiral Kimmel had learned of all the information held in
Washington that could, and should, have been provided him, he
wrote:
-
"The Navy Department
thus engaged in a course of conduct which definitely gave me the
impression that intelligence from important intercepted Japanese
messages was being furnished to me. Under these circumstances a
failure to send me important information of this character was not
merely a withholding of intelligence. It amounted to an
affirmative misrepresentation. - - - . This failure not
only deprived me of essential facts. It misled me."
-
- The stage for the disaster
was set in April, 1941, by the Director of War Plans when he took
control of distribution of any intelligence that might prompt a
fleet commander to move forces. He did this with the concurrence
of the Chief of Naval Operations. It must be noted that this new
arrangement was without precedent. It represented a change in a
procedure that was doctrinal in nature. Nor was any explanation of
the change, or of the reasons therefore, made known to the fleet
commanders. The then subsequent failure to keep Kimmel properly
informed of obviously important intelligence was an error in
judgment of major proportion. This decision increased enormously
the responsibility of authorities
-
- -9-
- in Washington for any
consequent disaster if, as happened, the flow of essential
information ceased. The record is clear that very significant
information from codebreaking, essential to a proper exercise of
command, was denied Kimmel and Short.
-
- Commanders of forces then and
now have no choice but to rely on Washington for wide area
surveillance. During WWI "radio intelligence" first
exploited enemy use of radio transmissions for their control of
forces. This exploitation included codebreaking, which also had
great political import, so collection, analysis, security protection
and prioritization became located at seats of government.
Dissemination of information thus derived became the responsibility
of top level military authority. Since a commander can only make
sense in his force employment if he possesses related intelligence,
top commands at seats of government took on a shared responsibility
for force effectiveness and security. As noted above, this
obligation was ignored by the Director of War Plans and the Chief of
Naval Operations in the months preceding Pearl Harbor. Kimmel and
Short were denied, despite their many complaints, information they
needed to properly employ their forces.
-
- With regard to Kimmel's
state of mind, note that when the carriers Lexington and Enterprise
departed Pearl Harbor in the days preceding the Japanese attack
with reinforcements for Wake and Midway, Halsey placed his forces on
a full wartime basis, with authority to shoot. Every senior force
commander knows that a direction of this sort is done only with the
compliance, or by direction, of the next higher authority. No
complacency there! No indication there of an unlikelihood of attack
mentality!
-
- The Dorn Report criticized Admiral Kimmel for not using his cruiser based amphibious aircraft
to augment his search coverage. Consider the search problem. To
reach the Japanese air strike launch point 275 miles from Pearl
Harbor at daybreak, December 7th, the attacking group would be about
550 miles at sunset December 6th, and 800 miles at sunrise, December
6th. Presumably cruiser searches would have started November 27th.
There were few cruisers, their search capabilities very limited.
This would have presented severe logistical problems, and logistics
support was very limited, an impediment already to even sustained
local operations. The comment does reveal the lack of depth of
inquiry into the limitations that constrained fleet operational
activity represented by the researchers and preparers of the Dorn
Report.
-
- Dorn's assertion that
exclusive reliance on Washington for tactical warning was at the
heart of the failure at Pearl Harbor assumes adequacy of
reconnaissance resources when their availability was but a small
fraction of the requirement. To criticize the admiral for not using
his cruiser aircraft for long range search is reaching for straws.
-
- As to the likelihood of a
Japanese air attack against Pearl Harbor, as distinct from it's
expected effectiveness, throughout 1940 and until departure of
Yorktown in April, 1941, as a fighter pilot in VF-5, the Yorktown
fighter squadron, I personally flew dawn and dusk patrols against
that possibility of an air attack whenever the ship was in Pearl
Harbor. There was never any lack of "strategic warning" in
the sense used in the Report, nor of an awareness of the possibility
of a surprise air attack. An attribution otherwise is uninformed and
unwarranted. This failure, of course, presumes a degree of ignorance
of the intelligence process at top levels of navy command in
Washington that may not be true. There may be another explanation,
one having to do with the degree to which direct control of fleet
operational activity in both oceans was being exercised by
Washington. Given the course of international developments on the
one hand, and domestic political determination to avoid involvement
in the
-
- -10-
- conflict on the other, the
Director of War Plans action is understandable. What is not
understandable is his failure to then discharge the responsibilities
he so eagerly sought. The subsequent severity of the Pearl Harbor
attack made it indiscreet to admit this confused state of affairs.
The Dorn Report neither recognizes nor admits to this.
-
- A long time, common
practice, one that was increased in numbers of units involved in the
weeks before the disaster, was protection from submarine attack
while warships egressed or ingressed Pearl Harbor. Detection
equipment in those days was technically weak, especially as to
reliability of identity of contacts. As a result, more whales than
submarines were reported as submarines and destroyed in the early
days of the war.
-
- There i
|