- THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER
- A SUMMARY OF MAJOR POINTS
MADE IN THE CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DORN REPORT
- by Vice Admiral, retired,
David C Richardson
- and
-
A CHALLENGE TO ANY
AND ALL TO IDENTIFY WHAT ADMIRAL KIMMEL COULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY THAT
WOULD HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE
DEPUTY SECDEF JOHN
H. DEUTCH LETTER TO SENATOR STROM THURMOND PLEDGED;
- ".— we will examine
the matter without preconceptions so that a judgment can be reached
on the basis of fact and fairness --" and that "Like you,
we seek to arrive at a closure that will be recognized as principled
and fair."
- THE SUBSEQUENT DORN REPORT
FOUND (Inter alia)
- "Responsibility for
the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders
of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; it should be broadly
shared."
- COMMENT:
- The failure of the Dorn
Report to identify errors made by others and to assess the impact
of those errors on errors allegedly made by Admiral Kimmel and
General Short precluded arrival at a "principled and
fair" closure. Nor is a "principled
and fair" closure achievable when highly significant,
pertinent information, for whatever reason, is not taken into
account.
-
- A "fair" closure
is Impossible when assessments are made by individuals who lack
experience in the matter being assessed, command performance in
this case, and do not obtain expert advice or explanation from
acknowledged professionals.
- RISKS TAKEN BY THE
PRESIDENT:
- - Insistence on retaining
the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii at force levels substantially inferior
to those that Japan could bring there.
- - Adoption of hard line
policies toward Japan without adjustment or movement of Pacific
Fleet forces.
- - Issuance of an ultimatum
to Japan (Nov. 26, ‘41) while implementing a strategy change to
beef up air strike forces under MacArthur in the Philippines.
- Transfer of control of
major fleet activity in both oceans to Washington to more closely
manage politically sensitive fleet operations, thereby inhibiting
force movement by fleet commanders in adjustment to their
perception of danger.
- ERRORS COMMITTED
IN WASHINGTON THAT AFFECTED DECISIONS IN HAWAII:
- - In April, 1941, adoption
of an Intelligence distribution policy that in
denial of critically Important Intelligence information
derived held in Washington and needed by Kimmel and Short In Hawaii.
-
- - Unresponsiveness of the
Chief of Naval Operations to the plea by Admiral Kimmel expressed in
writing, with reasons, In June, 1941, that he be kept informed
regarding policies and developments, including intelligence. (This
Kimmel letter is a classic presentation of a major force commander's
need for information for command decision.)
- - Specific failure through
inability from sending patrol aircraft to Britain to fulfill the
120 patrol aircraft commitment to Hawaii needed for air search.
- - Naval Intelligence
failures (1) to assess with any accuracy Japanese air combat
effectiveness, and (2) misadvise the CNO and Kimmel egregiously
regarding Japanese shallow water torpedo capabilities, thereby
precluding provision of torpedo netting defenses.
-
- - Failure to advise Kimmel
or Short specifically of:
- - Pearl Harbor bomb
plot message and subsequent reporting orders,
- - Receipt of winds
execute message Dec. 4th that identified America as the enemy.
- - The sequence of
diplomatic messages that clearly foretold war, including the
14 part message December 6th that caused Roosevelt to exclaim
"This means war" and "We will be at war
tomorrow".
- - Failure of War
Department to correct General Short's interpretation of war
warning message to mean greatest danger was sabotage.
- - Admiral Stark's decision
to "call the president instead" when urged to alert Kimmel
by telephone the morning of Dec.7th.
- ERRORS
ATTRIBUTABLE TO KIMMEL
- - He failed to increase
readiness to the next level by ordering General Quarters, an error
attributable to inadequate intelligence support from Washington.
Dorn Report errors allegedly committed by Kimmel reflect ignorance
of operational realities.
- COMMENT:
- - What Admiral Kimmel did,
and for whatever reasons, the fact is that retaining the fleet in
Pearl Harbor was his only sensible option, since he lacked air
support, his 2 (versus 6 Japanese) aircraft carriers not having
yet returned from reinforcing Wake and Midway. His battleship
speeds were 18 knots, his striking range 15 miles. Japanese
carrier forces speed was 30 knots, striking range 300 miles.
-
- - My challenge to anyone
to identify what Kimmel should have done differently that would
have had a measurable Impact on the outcome stands.
- ERRORS
ATTRIBUTABLE TO SHORT
- - lacking the intelligence
available in Washington, he misinterpreted the Army war warning
message to mean greatest danger was sabotage. He then dismantling
his fighter air combat readiness, and as directed, reported his
actions to the War Dept. who failed to correct him.
- DORN REPORT SUMMARY
WITH REFUTATIONS
- EXHIBIT M
-
- In a meeting conducted by
Senator Strom Thurmond on April 27th, 1995, in response to the
request by members of the Kimmel family, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, John M Deutch, pledged that the proposal to restore their
wartime ranks to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Major General
Walter C. Short would be examined without preconceptions so that a
judgment could be reached on the basis of fact and fairness. The
report found that responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster
should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and
General Short: it should be broadly shared. There was, therefore, a
need to identify errors in judgment that occurred elsewhere and to
determine if the errors of others may have adversely influenced the
Hawaiian commanders or caused the events that occurred. This was not
done.
-
- The report failed to
consider other factors of major import, four of which can be
classified as crucial. There is no identification of nor reference
to highly pertinent, highly classified intelligence information then
available in Washington but not sent Hawaii that only became
available to historians and the general public in recent years. This
deficiency reflects a lack of comprehension by the report preparers
of the essentiality of intelligence in evolving situations so
necessary to wise decision making. No mention is made of
responsibilities for coordinating national policy and military force
application inherent in national level leadership in Washington, nor
of the effects of miscalculations there on what happened at Pearl
Harbor. There is no recognition of the essential interrelationship
that must exist between commanders at seat of government and those
in command of military forces in the field. The report indicates no
comprehension of factors that govern life aboard ship at sea and in
port that relate to maintenance, training and personnel comfort that
bear heavily when specifying conditions of readiness.
-
- 1. DORN: The intelligence
available to Admiral Kimmel was sufficient to justify a higher level
of vigilance than he chose to maintain.
-
- COMMENT: Not so. This is the
old argument that the admiral had not used his reconnaissance
advantageously, an argument disproved by Professor Gannon's
enquiries. Admiral Trost when CNO had adopted the old argument in
his recommendation when responding to a Kimmel family request. Upon
later studying the Gannon inquiry, he wrote the Secretary of the
Navy that he was disavowing his earlier recommendation, and asked
that it be withdrawn. In port state of readiness? Admiral Kimmel's
standing orders placed a high state of readiness for all AAA
batteries on ships when in port. On cruisers and battleships one
half of AAA batteries were to be manned at all times with ammunition
ready, with personnel available to man all when so directed. Few
people then went off base when on liberty. When leaving ship most
people remained on base or at nearby at athletic fields. When the
two carriers left with reinforcements for Wake and Midway, they were
placed on a full war footing. Anti-submarine patrols were maintained
off the entrance to Pearl Harbor. Evidence exists in the form of a
letter from a participant that in an engagement several months prior
to December 7th, a Japanese submarine was sunk off the entrance.
Admiral Inglis has testified that within 4 to 7 minutes of attack
initiation all (repeat, all) shipboard AAA guns were firing.
-
- -1-
- One must keep in mind that Admiral Kimmel's
forces were substantially inferior to those
available to the Japanese, especially in the all important aircraft
carrier category, that his wartime initial mission, assigned by
Washington, was to control the ocean areas along the islands to the
northwest of Hawaii, that given what he knew that war could occur at
any time, his readiness requirements for that mission constrained
his day-to-day force employment prior to war and that defense of
Hawaii was an Army responsibility. Fleet time in port was essential
for maintenance, replenishment (underway logistical support forces
were inadequate), training and recreation.
-
- 2. DORN: He knew that war
was imminent. He knew that Japanese tactics featured surprise
attacks. He knew that the U S had lost track of the Japanese
carriers.
-
- He had the resources to
maintain a higher level of vigilance. He believed that optimum
aerial reconnaissance required covering 360 degrees around Hawaii
for a sustained period. The Navy clearly did not have enough planes
for that. This does not mean, however, that Admiral Kimmel had to
choose between ideal aerial reconnaissance and no aerial
reconnaissance.
-
- The fleet also had cruisers
and destroyers that could have been used as pickets to supplement
air patrol, but were not.
-
- COMMENT: He knew the
Japanese had a three for one advantage in aircraft carriers, and
that he had none available to him due to orders from Washington to
reinforce Midway and Wake the proceeding week. He did not know that
Washington possessed the bomb plot message regarding ships in Pearl
and related follow up messages evincing interest in kinds and
locations of ships in port, the Winds Execute message designating
the U S as the enemy, the sequence of messages in diplomatic code
advising war "sooner than you think" and the 14 part
denouement with delivery instructions to the Secretary) of State that
foretold time and place of the attack. When one examines Admiral
Kimmel's operational options, it is clear that even without the
intelligence available in Washington he did the only sound thing -
remain in port in a state of high readiness. Had he known what
Washington knew, and what key intelligence people in Washington were
urging Admiral Stark and General Marshall to tell him, he could have
implemented his sole remaining option - setting general quarters at
daybreak. Definitive knowledge was needed, was available in
Washington, was not sent to either Admiral Kimmel nor General
Short!.
-
- One can get a sense of
preparedness by reviewing Admiral Kimmel's plans and orders relative
to the Japanese submarine threat in the vicinity of Pearl. The
simple fact is that nothing Admiral Kimmel did could have made a
change in what occurred except, had Washington alerted him, he could
have preset general quarters, which would have reduced ship
vulnerability by increasing its watertight integrity. No one has yet
identified what Admiral Kimmel could have done differently during
the preceding 24 to 36 hours that makes sense other than to pre-set
general quarters.
-
- Insofar as the intelligence
information available in Hawaii was concerned, Sunday, December 7th,
looked neither more nor less dangerous than the previous Sunday,
November 30. The idea that Admiral Kimmel should, or could,
have mounted cruiser/destroyer surveillance, presumably dating from
his
- -2-
- November 27th war warning,
given the distances inherent in achieving contact with the Japanese
force during daylight, December 6th, is off-the-top-of-the-head
stuff. The admiral's logistic support ships were insufficient in
number to support any such sustained deployment. The benefit
probability was negligible. The consequences, delay in implementing
his assigned wartime mission.
-
- 3. DORN: Different choices
might not have discovered the carrier armada and might not have
prevented the attack, but different choices might have reduced the
magnitude of the disaster.
-
- COMMENT: Name one. My
standing challenge to any one is to identify any such choice other
than, given forewarning, to set general quarters, that would have
reduced in any way the magnitude of the disaster. Given the
disparity in strength in the all-important aircraft carrier
category, the only sensible choice, to abandon the Pearl Harbor base
for the West Coast upon receipt of the war warning, was an option
available only to the President.
-
- An error in judgment
occurred within the Army command chain that might have made a minor
difference. General Short interpreted, and so reported to
Washington, his war warning to mean protect from sabotage.
Washington, repositor of highly significant intelligence from
codebreaking that identified the enemy, and time and place of
attack, did not correct the Short interpretation, and so
acknowledged in subsequent inquiries that were held in Washington.
This error was not one within Kimmel's domain, although had he known
what Washington knew, he might have approached General Short with
his concerns. Specifically, it does not reflect a lack of
coordination. Rather, it reflects the then established relationship
between top field level Army commanders and their Army Chief of
Staff.
-
- 4. DORN: In the certain
knowledge that the United States and Japan were moving inexorably
and ever more rapidly toward war but not knowing exactly where, when
or how Japan would strike, what did Admiral Kimmel do to resolve his
uncertainty?
- Admiral Kimmel conducted no
long range reconnaissance out of Oahu. Thus, on December 7th he
could get warning only from Washington.
-
- COMMENT: Resolve His
uncertainty that war would soon come? The record makes clear just
the opposite. Resolution of Kimmel's uncertainty with respect to it's
imminence, time and likely place of first attack was a Washington
capability. Washington held (and withheld from Kimmel) the Pearl
Harbor bomb plot message and follow up messages, the identification
of enemy message and numerous intercepted messages that foretold
time and place of attack, the last of which was in hand about 12
hours prior to the attack. Admiral Stark had assured Admiral Kimmel
that he would be kept informed. This we now know was not done. Also,
as was well known in Washington, Admiral Kimmel's resources for
search were totally inadequate. Navy Department plans specified 100
patrol aircraft for Hawaii area reconnaissance, but by December 7th
had provided none. As to reconnaissance, the two carriers with
reinforcements for Wake and Midway were tasked to reconnoiter the
area west and south of Hawaii, toward the Japanese occupied
Marshalls during return, which direction was thought the more likely
route for any approaching forces.
-
- 5. DORN: This exclusive
reliance on Washington for warning is at the heart of the failure at
Pearl Harbor.
-
- -3-
- COMMENT: No. The single
at-the-heart failure that caused the disaster at Pearl Harbor or was
pursuit of policies in Washington designed to force Japan to modify
it's policies of aggression in China, the South Pacific and possibly
against the Soviet Union while concurrently reducing Pacific Fleet
forces by a fourth in April, ‘41. This reduction in force left the
fleet substantially inferior to the forces available to Japan,
especially in air strike capabilities. By this stance Washington
limited severely the courses of action available to Admiral Kimmel,
and presented Japan with a situation that was uncertain only in the
degree of success that they could achieve in a surprise air attack.
This criticism of Kimmel evades consideration of the essential
interrelationship that must exist between senior command at seat of
government and commanders of forces in the field. Since primary
intelligence functions of necessity reside at seats of government,
senior command have inherent obligations to keep commanders of
forces properly informed. Dorn Report preparers appear unaware of
the essentiality of a commander being kept fully informed regarding
known, pertinent information in evolving situations so that he may
take prudent, timely action. No one
now disputes that
adequate and specific warning was available in Washington. Reference to his
reliance on Washington for warning as an
- Admiral Kimmel error in
judgment reveals a mindset inclined to fault Kimmel despite doctrinal processes
that were not followed.
-
- 6. DORN: Admiral Kimmel had
sought and extracted from Admiral Stark a promise to provide all the
warning available. Thus, as a practical matter, Admiral Kimmel
placed total faith in Washington's ability to obtain and provide him
timely and unambiguous warning from the Magic and other intercepts
alone. This faith was not justified. It was not prudent to depend
exclusively on Washington for timely and unambiguous information.
-
- COMMENT: An act of misplaced
faith? Yes. More to the point, it was a major system malfunction
with it's roots in Washington. Since time immemorial heads of
governments have been obligated to fully inform their admirals and
generals in the field with all pertinent information. As already
noted, Admiral Kimmel's resources were, and were known in Washington
to be, extremely limited and unlikely to detect an approaching
Japanese force bent on achieving surprise. Interestingly, we have
here a major Washington blunder presented as an Admiral Kimmel error
in judgment.
-
- 7. DORN: Admiral Kimmel had
49 Catalina long range patrol aircraft useful for reconnaissance. He
also had a significant force of cruisers with embarked scout
observation planes, destroyers and antiaircraft guns on ships in the
harbor. If the Catalinas had been properly employed in an integrated
and coordinated fashion at a reasonable state of readiness these
resources might have made an enormous and perhaps critical difference
in the events of December 7th.
-
- COMMENT: These statements
reflect the superficiality of inquiry into the nature of the search
problem, the duration of time required dating, presumably, from
receipt of the war warning November 27th, reconnaissance forces
available, logistics support requirements and the readiness for
wartime employment of fleet forces according to war plans. The
recent Gannon research published in Naval Institute Proceedings
portrays accurately this search problem.
-
- -4-
- But let us suppose that his
reconnaissance was successful, and did sight the incoming Japanese
strike force some 500 to 700 miles out on December 6th, what options
did he have? Would he put to sea without air cover, pitting his 18
knot speed battleships with 15 mile gun range offensive capability
against 30 knot carriers with 300
mile air strike capabilities? Surely no. Or would he have remained
in port? In that case his remaining option was to set general
quarters at daybreak; He had no means to in any way turn aside or
deflect the attack.
-
- 8. DORN: The use of
destroyers and cruisers and their float planes in reconnaissance
apparently was not considered.
-
- COMMENT: We don't know. We
do know that the complexity and magnitude of the problem, the
logistical and other costs and the very low probability of success
before radars were placed in small ships and aircraft would have
made that proposal unattractive.
-
- 9. DORN: The air defense
system was not coordinated between the Army and Navy.
-
- COMMENT: Wrong! It was fully
coordinated, including command connectivities and assigned
responsibilities, in the case of Navy to the senior full-time
in-port official, to assure that all navy combat units were in
compliance with the agreed upon joint Army-Navy air defense plan
whenever they entered port.
-
- 10. DORN: Training patterns
could have been altered in response to heightened tensions
-
- COMMENT: Meaning? The
purpose for going to sea was training. Divisions and squadrons of
ships practiced wartime maneouvers and conducted gunnery exercises,
working to improve coordination. A limiting factor in time spent at
sea was the shortage of logistical support, for which ships had to
return to port. Weekends were usually for replenishment,
maintenance, athletic activity and recreation for a portion of the
fleet. This DORN Report observation is intended as a criticism, but
there is no discernable connection to those events.
-
- 11. DORN: Anti-torpedo
baffles or nets could have been used within Pearl Harbor for
protection against torpedo plane attack. These items were not
furnished Admiral Kimmel, but they might have been requested.
-
- COMMENT: An obvious area for
inquiry. But not found was the reply by the CNO, Admiral Stark, to
the Secretary of the Navy, forwarded as information to Admiral
Kimmel, in early 1941 in response to the secretary's concern.
Admiral Stark noted the heights, speeds, distances to arm torpedoes
and depths of water required for successful drops. He concluded that
Pearl Harbor water areas and depths were such as to make use of
torpedoes unreasonable, citing the specific figures thought to
pertain that supported his conclusion. The sad truth is, as we later
learned time and time again throughout the first year of combat
action, Japanese torpedoes, both airborne and ship based, were far
superior to ours, and warrant designation as a secret weapon. Stark
also noted that there were practical difficulties connected with how
cumbersome nets were that would limit their usefulness in Pearl
Harbor. In those circumstances Admiral Kimmel saw no need, and had
no basis, for a request for torpedo nets.
-
- -5-
- 12. DORN: Barrage balloons
could have been used in selected areas to restrict the most
dangerous air approaches to "battleship row".
-
- COMMENT: Air strike
approaches for bombing runs are wind driven for greatest accuracy.
They commence at high altitudes. The prevailing winds in Pearl
Harbor, known as the trade winds, are strong and are from the
northeast. Low pressure atmospheric conditions bring winds and rain
from the south. Usefulness of balloons would have to be tested to be
known. Opinion then held no such defense was needed to protect
against torpedoes when in Pearl.
-
- 13. DORN: Advocates for
Admiral Kimmel argue that the failure of Washington officials to
provide the critical intercepts to the Hawaiian commanders excuses
any errors made in Hawaii. It does not. Placing exclusive reliance
on Washington for warning of air attack was an act of misplaced
faith
-
- COMMENT: Apart from several
peripheral findings of fault, which are refuted herein, there are
two basic criticisms alleged by Dorn. The first is that Admiral
Kimmel should not have placed "exclusive reliance" on
Washington for warning, and the second, and related criticism, that
he failed to employ aerial and ship reconnaissance. Now, had he been
provided the dozen or so critically important (Dorn identifies them.
as well, as critical intercepts) codebroken messages available in
Washington, commencing with the bomb plot message and related follow
up messages plus those translated dating from November 27th, he
would have had the opportunity to insist that Washington authorities
recognize his vulnerabilities and agree to alleviating measures in a
time frame when they would have made sense. He was well aware that
his force in the aircraft carrier category was one third that of the
Japanese, (one half if Enterprise could be returned to Pearl in
time). And , again, we await someone to point out what he could have
done differently during the last 24 or so hours, with or without
reconnaissance information, that would have made any real difference
in the outcome. His sole option was to set general quarters, for
which he needed to know what was known in Washington.
-
- 14. DORN: Admiral Kimmel was
the highest ranking commander at Pearl Harbor; it was appropriate to
subject his actions to closer scrutiny and accountability than those
of his superiors.
-
- COMMENT: Closer scrutiny
initially, but not exclusively, as in this case.. Subsequent to war's end the entire record of mistakes made, given the numerous
loss of lives that was entailed, should have been identified so as
to not foolishly repeat those same mistakes at some future time.
That this did not happen was due to envisioned domestic political
ramifications. Is it still so?
-
- 15 DORN: The decisions
affecting Admiral Kimmel were tailored to his individual situation;
what did or did not happen to others is not an appropriate
consideration.
-
- COMMENT: What did or did not
"happen" to others may not have been an appropriate
consideration, but what others did or did not "do" that
caused or contributed to the disaster certainly merit identification
and consideration.
-
- -6-
|
- A Critical Analysis of the
Report by the Department of Defense Dated December 1, 1995 Regarding
Advancement of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieutenant
General Walter C.
Short on the Retired List
- by
- Vice Admiral David
Charles Richardson, USN(ret)
-
- INTRODUCTION
-
- Acting on the request of the
surviving sons of Admiral Kimmel, Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman,
Senate Armed Services Committee, held a meeting in the Senate Armed
Services Committee Hearing Room on April 27th, 1995 to permit the
Kimmel family to present to the Secretary of Defense reasons why
their father, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, should have his four
star rank restored to him posthumously. Senator Strom Thurmond
conducted the meeting. Representing the Department of Defense were
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John M. Deutch, Secretary of the
Navy, John H. Dalton and Navy General Counsel Steven S. Honigman.
Those present in support of the Kimmel family were former Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer; former Chief
of Naval Operations, James L. Holloway III; Admiral Harold E. Shear,
Rear Admiral Donald M. Showers, Captain Edward
L. Beach, author; John Costello, historian; Michael Gannon,
historian; Mr. Anthony DeLorenzo, representing the Pearl Harbor
Survivor's Association; Counsel for Admiral Kimmel, Edward Hanify;
the sons of Admiral Kimmel, Edward R. and Captain Thomas K., Edward's son, Manning M. IV and
Thomas's son Thomas K. Jr. Navy
General Counsel Honigman presented the case against posthumous
advancement. The attendees accompanying the Kimmel family spoke in
favor of advancement. The Kimmel family spoke in favor of General
Short. The outcome was a pledge by the Deputy Secretary of Defense
to Senator Thurmond to review the matter of posthumous advancement
objectively, and make a report. A transcription of remarks made in
meeting is attached as Exhibit A. [see
document] The report by the Under Secretary
of Defense dated December 1, 1995, (the Dorn Report) is appended as
Exhibit B. [see
document] The executive summary of the Dorn Report is Exhibit C.
-
- Shortly after the meeting in
a letter to Senator Strom Thurmond dated 10 May, 1995, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, John Deutch, stated:
-
"As I pledged at the
meeting, we will examine the matter without preconceptions so that
a judgment can be reached on the basis of fact and fairness and
the right action can be taken without delay. Like you, we seek to
arrive at a closure that will be recognized as principled and
fair."
- COMMENT: In order to arrive
"at a closure that will be recognized as principled and
fair" Secretary Deutch's pledge "that a judgment can be
reached on the basis of fact and fairness" is a pledge to
identify what the errors in judgment were and when and by whom they
were committed. To what extent did errors in judgment that occurred
at seat of government impact on judgment errors that may have
occurred in Hawaii? More specifically, were those that may have been
committed by Kimmel and Short of a severity to affect in any
significant way the outcome of the surprise attack, or warrant
destruction of their reputations?
-
- This paper will reexamine
the events and related information that we now know was then
available in Washington and in Honolulu, present an assessment of
their significance when viewed in an operational context, and
identify errors in judgment by the parties to that disaster. An
additional purpose is to provide for the record information not
previously known or, for whatever reasons, not permitted to be
included in the several inquiries. The intent is creation of a
contextual record of fundamental considerations that should apply in
force commander relationships as revealed by errors committed in the
days, weeks and months prior to Pearl Harbor in order that we not
suffer needless losses in lives in future perilous situations.
- In the Dorn Report an
administration acknowledges for the first time that blame for Pearl
Harbor does not rest solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and
General Short. Others were also to blame. The others remain
unidentified, their blame unexplained. The Dorn Report asserts that
although neither commander is guilty of "dereliction of duty", as initially asserted in the
Robert's Commission Report,
both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were guilty of faulty
judgment. They must therefore continue to bear blame for the
disaster. But then, the Report notes, military commanders serve at
the pleasure of senior command and may be relieved for no reason
other than a loss of faith in their judgment. For this reason alone,
the Report states, posthumous advancement of Kimmel and Short is
inappropriate. The point is made that since the Pearl Harbor
commanders' retirement in their permanent ranks are facts of
history, violate no laws and are in accord with common practice they
should stand.
-
- It is, indeed, true, that
military commanders serve at the pleasure of senior command. They
may be relieved for any number of reasons. But we have here a major
disaster, with enormous military and political consequences, and an
issue of historical significance regarding which we need to set the
record straight in order to not repeat past mistakes. The Dorn
Report also notes the scope and depth of national criticism directed
particularly at Admiral Kimmel. It makes clear that Kimmel's relief
in particular was driven by considerations other than loss of
confidence in his judgment. In this regard the Report states;
-
"It is important to
remember that the state of the allied cause in both the Atlantic
and Pacific was extremely perilous in the dark days of early 1942.
The greatest national need at the time was to prosecute the global
war against both Germany and Japan."
- COMMENT: The implication is
clear. The nation's leaders at that critical juncture quite rightly
feared the loss of confidence that would follow an admission that
Washington authorities were in some degree at fault, an admission
that in the context of the then existing military situation would
have been irresponsible. Nor for several weeks did the extent of
blame attributable to the mishandling of intelligence become
increasingly apparent to those knowledgeable of the contents of that
intelligence. There were needs to both preserve the secrecy of our
codebreaking successes and our national political stability.
-
- The public mood in the
aftermath of the disaster was bitter, frightened. How could this
happen? The view of the general public was that laxity and
inattention by Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had left
the American fleet vulnerable. The public perception of life in
Hawaii contributed to this suspicion. The reality was quite
different, apparent to those of us who served there during 1940-41.
As the war progressed, with victory clearly in sight, military
reasons for blaming Kimmel and Short ceased to exist. But political
reasons remained. Requests for posthumous advancement in rank of the
Hawaiian commanders have been interpreted by some as an attack
against the reputation of President Roosevelt. Is this consideration
valid? While other injustices of that time have since been
rectified, as for example, restitution made to Japanese Americans
who were incarcerated in encampments during the war, the injustice
done Kimmel and Short remains unadmitted. If then in the national
interest to shoulder the Pearl Harbor commanders with the blame,
does that interest apply today? Given that the attack was a Japanese
initiative, and by any known measures American intervention a
prerequisite to Hitler's defeat, is there a valid basis today for
reasoning that the reputation of President Roosevelt would be
tarnished by an admission that blame for the damage inflicted lay in
Washington? The circumstances then existing saw Great Britain, it's
army devastated in it's retreat to and recovery from Dunkirk,
fighting alone for survival against Hitler, Mussolini, Japan and,
until the spring of 1941,
-
- -2-
- Stalin’s Soviet Union in
uneasy alliance with Hitler.
-
- Recorded history accurately
notes the all out effort by President Roosevelt, supported by his
key advisors, to assist Britain and, later, the Soviet Union in
their defense against Hitler's aggression. The American public, on
the other hand, was seemingly determined to avoid involvement,
certainly not in a combat role. The President first initiated a
buildup of our military strength and an increasing supply of
military equipment to Britain. After Hitler's assault on the Soviet
Union, and evidence that Stalin might succeed in his defensive
efforts, Roosevelt initiated economic constraints designed to hold
Japan in check to permit the Red Army to transfer military forces
from Eastern Siberia for defense of Moscow. These constraints
created conditions that the Japanese deemed unbearable. To the
Japanese way of thinking, allied as they were to Hitler, achieving
the Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere and it's promise of economic
freedom made war with America a necessity. On the other hand, the
President knew that if America went to war, that could only occur if
America were first attacked. Now this had come to pass. A well
planned, superbly executed attack by six Japanese aircraft carriers
stunned America and the world by the severity of damage the attacks
achieved. In these circumstances an undermined national leadership
would exacerbate an already dangerous situation. The course of
action to be taken was clear and simple. Let Kimmel and Short
shoulder the blame. This came naturally from pre-war mindsets and
political self interest. Nor was it then clear that they weren't to
blame.
-
- Vice Admiral Frank E Beatty,
ret, Aide to the late Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, in an
interview by U. S. News and World Report, date unknown, (enclosure
X) states:
-
"I can say that prior
to December 7th it was evident even to me, as I was reading the
"magic" messages, that we were pushing Japan into a
corner. I believe that it was the desire of President Roosevelt
and of Prime Minister Churchill that we get into the war as they
felt the allies could not win without us, and all our efforts to
cause the Germans to declare war on us had failed. The conditions
we imposed on Japan - to get out of China, for example
- were
so severe that we knew that nation could not accept. We did not want
her to accept them. We were forcing her so severely that we should
have known that she would react toward the United States. All her
preparations in a military way - and we knew their overall
import - pointed that way."
- Although Admiral Beatty did
not believe that Roosevelt knew of the impending attack, there is
considerable evidence to the contrary. It is not conclusive, but not
all the pertinent information has yet been released into the public
domain. The evidence now known will be summarized, However, the
matter of achieving justice for Kimmel and Short does not depend on
any information beyond that now known. The known evidence is
adequate.
-
- DORN REPORT MAJOR
DEFICIENCIES
-
- The Dorn Report findings
are;
-
1. Responsibility for the
Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral
Kimmel and General Short; it should be broadly shared.
-
2. To say that
responsibility is broadly shared is not to absolve Admiral Kimmel and General Short
of accountability.
-
3. The official treatment
of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was substantially temperate
and procedurally proper.
-
-3-
-
4. History has
not been hostile to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
-
5. There is not a compelling
basis for advancing either officer to a higher grade.
-
- While this presentation is
directed at deficiencies in the Dorn Report, it is only fair and
proper to point out that the Report, while lacking comprehension in
some salient features of military operational life, is nevertheless
exceptional in it's objectivity. While it has failed to include some
highly pertinent and significant information that more thorough
research would have revealed, we are nevertheless especially
indebted for a presentation that permits a point counterpoint
treatment of the case for posthumous advancement in rank for the two
Pearl Harbor commanders. The Dorn Report is commendable also for
recognizing that this subject cannot yet be put to rest. It states:
-
"On the other hand,
sober analysis in the years since the publication of the Joint
Congressional Committee's Report has produced a number of works of
nuanced and balanced scholarship which constitutes the beginnings
of the verdict of history. Those works, based on a careful reading
of the entire record of the Joint Congressional Committee and of
other primary sources that have come to light in the intervening
years, are creating a responsible and increasingly accurate and
just understanding of the tapestry of failure at Pearl Harbor.
Ultimately, in a free society this must be the function of the
academic community, and it is one that the academic community is
performing well in this case."
- COMMENT: An
"increasingly accurate and just understanding" of the
disaster's causes depends upon recognition of the essentiality of
continuous intelligence inputs for effective command functioning and
of the mutuality of command responsibility, one commander to
another, in the command chain. As we shall see, Secretary Dorn
reflects the general inability of non-professionals to distinguish
between strategic intelligence, or statements of general warning
applicable across a span of time, and tactical intelligence which
provides minute-by-minute, hour-by-hour information updates that
indicate change in the likelihood of a specific event occurring.
This facet of the problem was clearly not understood in preparation
of the Dorn Report.
-
- Only recently has the
general public learned from "other primary sources" the
extraordinarily valuable information derived from codebreaking that
inferred both time and place of the forthcoming attack. The
importance of this information to Admiral Kimmel and General Short,
but not provided them, as we shall see, was not comprehended in
preparation of the Dorn Report. There are other basic faults. Given
the risks being taken, both political and military, the President
thought it expedient to take a more direct control of fleet
operations. Dorn failed to take into account the added
responsibility incurred by Washington as a consequence of that
assumption of authority. More importantly, Dorn failed to recognize
the essential relationship that must exist between conduct of
foreign policy and employment of military force if we are to avoid
disastrous consequences. The report's rationale with regard to
important realities that guide and constrain force commanders in
their conduct of operations is seriously flawed. Finally, in an
assessment of fault, one must examine the operational options that
were available to Kimmel and Short before the attack, and whether or
not the arrangements that, they made in the context of the
information available to them reflected either bad judgment or
omissions. That was not done.
-
- Although we now have in the
public domain much of the information available in Washington, but
not in Hawaii, there remains one possibly crucial bit of evidence
not yet released - the secure telephone conversation in which Churchill
called
-
- -4-
- Roosevelt early in the
morning of 26 November, 1941, that may be central to the radical and
sudden change in Roosevelt's attitude toward the then ongoing
negotiations with Japan. Information from Secretary Stimson
concerning Japanese troop movements to the south most likely
accounts for the war warning message sent Kimmel and Short November
27th. The coincidence of timing suggests this Churchill/Roosevelt
conversation may also have played a role. Be that as it may, the
case for restoring the reputations of Admiral Kimmel and General
Short does not depend upon the content of that conversation.
-
- WE MUST UNDERSTAND SOME
BASIC PREMISES AND FUNDAMENTAL OPERATIONAL REALITIES
-
- The commander assigning a
mission to a subordinate commander is obligated to assign forces
required for mission accomplishment. If force availability is deemed
inadequate, the mission should be modified. The practice, and
reality, in peacetime is that a force presence signifies intent, or
will. Relatively small forces placed in harms way, when backed by
clearly discernable national will, enjoy a degree of security and
exercise influence beyond that inherent in the force itself. This
can create a dangerous situation, however, when basic national
interests are at issue, as was then the case with respect to Japan
who imported 90% of it's oil from the United States.
-
- Admiral Kimmel's forces were
inferior to those available to the Japanese, substantially so. His
predecessor, Admiral J. 0. Richardson, was relieved of his command
because of his unwillingness to keep the fleet stationed in Pearl
Harbor because of it's vulnerability to surprise attack. Even so,
several months after replacing Richardson with Kimmel, the President
reduced Pacific Fleet forces a further 25 percent by transferring an
aircraft carrier, three battleships, cruisers, destroyers and
support ships to the Atlantic. Our President's strategy centered on
providing all possible aid to Britain, including warship patrols in
the western Atlantic. Since our military buildup was then in early
stages, the President accepted the additional risk in the Pacific
inherent in the transfer of major forces to the Atlantic.
-
- Military events in the fall
of 1941 caused the President to modify his strategy. The German Army
was notably successful initially in it's invasion of the Soviet
Union. The President foresaw a need to transfer Russian forces
stationed in the Far East westward to assist in defense of
Stalingrad and Moscow. To offset the possibility that Japan might
attack a weakened Russian rear, he directed a strengthening of Army
and Army Air Force forces in the Philippine Islands, diverting some
forces otherwise destined for Britain. The B-17 bombers arriving
Hickam Field, Oahu, the morning of December 7th were enroute the
Philippines. These force movements themselves involved considerable
chance taking by our national high command, since they could
precipitate hostilities in the circumstances. No problem with that.
The point is simply that in event of a miscalculation, a reverse or
a defeat, a substantial amount of responsibility resides with the
political and military leadership at the seat of government, since
only that authority can orchestrate the necessary political and
military interactions to reduce risks. If a miscalculation occurs,
and for various (and good) reasons an admission of responsibility is
unacceptable at the time of a disaster, acceptance is an obligation
when those reasons no longer apply. The Dorn report took no account
of the effect of force inferiority, especially in air power, and it's constraints on the operational options or initiatives that
Kimmel could take. Dorn did not acknowledge that American policies
and actions emphasizing support of Chunking and protection of the
Soviet Union eastern provinces together with constraints on exports
of oil served a strategic purpose, and were deciding factors in
Japan's decision to initiate war with a surprise attack on the
Pacific Fleet.
-
- -5-
- Admiral Kimmel was concerned
at the weakened condition of his forces. He protested the transfer
of the three battleships and the aircraft carrier Yorktown Battle
Group to the Atlantic. Particularly significant was the loss of the
Yorktown, as it left the Japanese navy with six large operational
aircraft carriers a sizeable advantage in air strike power. Only
three remained to Kimmel, the early carriers Lexington and Saratoga,
and the more modern Enterprise. Implicit in this transfer of forces
was the degree of faith, existing in Washington, misplaced as we
later learned, that Japan would not attack the Hawaiian Islands.
Adoption by the administration soon thereafter of hardline policies
toward the Japanese, as events soon proved, placed the Hawaiian
commanders in untenable positions. A commitment further
complicating, if not potentially compromising the President's
domestic political situation, was his promise to the British and
Dutch to come to their aid in event the Japanese initiated attack
against their territories in the South Pacific. These actions were
either miscalculations in Washington regarding the relative
strengths of naval forces in the Pacific, a misplaced faith that the
Japanese would not attack in Hawaii, or the President was willing to
accept the risk of a Japanese attack somewhere in the Pacific.
-
- I repeat for emphasis - the
transfer of three battleships and an aircraft carrier to the
Atlantic in the spring of 1941 left the Pacific fleet appreciably
weaker than the Japanese fleet, especially in the all important
carrier air strike aircraft category. This transfer severely
constrained Kimmel's force employment options from that date
forward.
-
- THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN
THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY FORCE
-
- In all the books I have read
about the disaster I find a common deficiency -they do not reflect
an understanding of the essential interaction between fleet activity
and operational intelligence. This is a major weakness in the Dorn
Report as well. Even in "And I Was There" that interaction
is taken for granted. It is not explained. The reason is that
assessing the significance of intelligence, then exploiting it, is a
commander's responsibility, as is targeting of intelligence
collection resources. The continuous presentation of intelligence,
on the one hand, and exploiting it by redirecting ongoing fleet
activity, on the other, makes clear that an extraordinary intimacy
must exist between operations and intelligence. Smart command
decisions depend upon an inflow of good, timely intelligence
information.
-
- One must understand the
command need for a continuous accumulation of information from many
sources for creation of a fund of knowledge that enhances command
ability to function effectively. Within that information flow there
is a category of time sensitive, operationally significant
information (called opintel) that is pertinent to one's own
situation and status at points in time. This "coin" has
two sides: what one currently knows about a possible threat, and
what one wants or needs to know, but doesn't. New information is
continuously assessed in the light of other related information. A
continuous appraisal is made of evolving situations in light of one's own activity as well as in the context of political
developments and military activity elsewhere. The objective is to
identify what to do in time so as to not lose control over evolving
events, the imminence of which may be measured in minutes and hours.
Often, information seemingly benign to recipients elsewhere, is
viewed as quite significant when weighed in the context of other related information locally available and
one's own activity at the
time. For example: A submarine sighting near a port is interesting.
If warships are about to depart, it is worrisome. In applying this
process force commanders seek to control adversity by modifying
ongoing operational activity to counter new developments. The
demands of this process are why Admiral Kimmel held a meeting of key
staff personnel at 3:00 PM,
-
- -6-
- Saturday, December 6th, and
asked the question about Japanese aircraft carrier locations that
most authors mention.
-
- A military historian whose
name I have forgotten wrote that battles are won by commanders who
make fewer mistakes. Mistakes occur when foresight is inadequate. At
all points in time evolving military situations are characterized by
uncertainty. Knowledge is imperfect. Seemingly minor occurrences are
often seen in retrospect to have set in motion a sequence of events
that heavily influenced the outcome. The antidote to uncertainty is
knowledge. Clearly, and importantly, Admiral Kimmel's 3:00 PM
meeting that Saturday afternoon, December 6th, was in search of a
more perfect knowledge of the current situation, revealed by his
comment about the location of the Japanese aircraft carriers. The
story then unfolding in Washington, viewed in the context of
intelligence from codebreaking during the previous several weeks,
clearly foretold the likelihood of air attack against the fleet in
Pearl Harbor that Sunday morning. But all of that information was
withheld from Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
-
- The central weakness of the
Dorn Report is it's failure to understand the necessary
intelligence/operational intimacy, and the potential consequences
when lacking. Items two to ten, pages 111-7 to 111-11, inclusive,
provide accurately what was known to Kimmel and Short. It does not
identify operationally significant, time sensitive intelligence
known in Washington, but not sent to Hawaii, that indicated both
time and place of likely attack. Nor does it take into account the
responsibilities of the Director of Naval Intelligence to ascertain
and advise regarding possible enemy functional capabilities. Two
quotes from the Dorn Report highlight this weakness.
-
- "Despite
this mass of evidence, the practical difficulties of conducting an
aerial attack may have caused Admiral Kimmel and General Short to
minimize its likelihood." (page 111-10).
- COMMENT: The practical
difficulties referred to in this first quote, and the failure of
naval intelligence to accurately assess the likely effectiveness of
Japanese naval men and materials did, indeed, create an opinion that
an air attack against Pearl Harbor might be damaging but not
disastrous. This failure is attributable to the Director, Naval
Intelligence, in Washington. As to the views of Kimmel and Short,
any force commander is determined to defeat any attack, whether
major or minor. The record is replete with information that neither
Kimmel nor Short minimized the likelihood of an air attack. As to
the "mass of evidence", the evidence that was both valid,
timely and precise remained in Washington in intelligence withheld,
as we shall soon see.
-
- There is no evidence that
any military officer, Army or Navy, minimized the likelihood of a
surprise air attack against Oahu. Throughout the 30's major fleet
exercises drove that point home, and were the basis for the
requirement for 120 B-17s for General Short (12 provided) and 100
naval patrol planes (none provided) for the Commandant, 14th Naval
District. There is implied evidence that our civilian leadership in
Washington minimized that likelihood in establishing national
political and military priorities. All shared the belief that such
an attack would have limited success. For example, of the two air
weapons, torpedoes and bombs, and general recognition that torpedoes
had the greater potential for damage where they could be used, that
specific threat was dismissed. In response to Secretary of the Navy
Knox's concern regarding a torpedo attack similar to that delivered
against the Italian Navy, noting the greater depth of water in the
south of Italy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, in
Washington in early 1941 provided detailed technical advice to the
Pacific Fleet and the Commandant, 14th Naval District as follows:
-
- -7-
-
"Consideration has been
given to the installation of A/T(anti-torpedo) baffles within Pearl
Harbor for protection against torpedo attack. It is considered that
the relatively shallow depth of the water limits the need for
anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition, the congestion and
the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practibility of the
present type of baffles - -. -
a minimum depth of water of 75' may be assumed necessary to
successfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150' of water is desired.
The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes
is 250'. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. The
desirable height for dropping is 60' or less. About 200 yards of
torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed but
this may be altered."
- Given the dimensions of
water in Pearl Harbor, with depths less than 40', it was Washington's assessment that
discounted that danger. Nor was there capability in Hawaii to remedy that
deficiency if Kimmel had reason to think otherwise.
-
- The second Dorn Report quote
states:
-
"This exclusive
reliance on Washington for both tactical and strategic warning is
at the heart of the failure at Pearl Harbor, and of the debate
about the failure. The record suggests that officials in
Washington believed they had provided strategic warning with their
messages of November 27th; neither Admiral Kimmel nor General
Short read the messages that way. The debate over the handling of
Japan's 14-part message on December 6th and the morning of
December 7th is about tactical warning. Admiral Kimmel and General
Short did not get tactical warning."
- COMMENT: This quote captures
succinctly the single most significant area of disagreement in
allocating blame for the disaster and does, indeed, go to the very
heart of the problem. If, in fact, it is true that Washington
thought it's responsibilities discharged by this last of several
strategic warning messages, then we have an example of an egregious
degree of ignorance by senior naval professionals that is hard to
believe, hard to attribute to bureaucratic bungling, especially
given the letter Admiral Kimmel gave Admiral Stark in June, 1941. The
earlier assumption of authority by the Director of War Plans over
distribution of intelligence, then his subsequent failure to assure
that this intelligence went out was a most grievous error the net
effect of which was to mislead Admiral Kimmel, and directly affect
his assessment of the situation in the days and hours preceding the
attack.
-
- A more reasonable
explanation for assertions that providing "strategic"
warning was adequate is that it served the political purpose of
diverting criticism. As to the Dorn Report, this quote also assumes
adequacy of patrol plane resources and other long range surveillance
means that simply were not available to Kimmel or to Short, but
which means were, in fact, available from codebreaking in Washington.
This quote drives home the point that Dorn has no understanding of
the role of tactical intelligence in the operational decision
process, which lack has also appeared in a number of books written
about Pearl Harbor. As will be noted, Admiral King stated a misuse
by Admiral Kimmel of his patrol plane resources in his endorsement
opposing the findings in the report by the Navy Court of Inquiry.
That criticism provided a convenient device to avoid a public
relations debacle while the war was still in progress. It was also
an endorsement Admiral King later retracted. See Exhibit K.
-
- No one has stated the case
better for complete and timely support by Washington regarding
policy and intelligence updates than Admiral Kimmel himself. Having
been informed by Vice Admiral Wilson Brown in February, 1941, that
there was "confusion" in Washington regarding
responsibilities for keeping him advised
-
- -8-
- regarding intelligence, and
having received in personal letters from Admiral Stark information
that could have come only from codebreaking of Japanese message
traffic, Admiral Kimmel handed the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Stark, a letter during his visit in Washington in June,
1941, that contained the following:
-
"The Commander-in
Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. He is far
removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly
changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the
policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval
movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible
effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force
will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically
affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack
of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a
condition that directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and
confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the
conduct of military operations.
-
"It is realized that,
on occasion, the rapid development in the international picture,
both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of
knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate
against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the
present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and
authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even
though necessarily late at times, would enable the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, even
re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current
concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific
situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a
partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the
desirability of interruption of this training by strategic
dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities.
Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the
Department itself is not too well informed as to the local
situation, particularly with regard to the status of current
outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary
that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad
policy and objectives rather than by categorical
instructions."
-
"It is suggested that
it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important
developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means
available."
- Several years later, after
Admiral Kimmel had learned of all the information held in
Washington that could, and should, have been provided him, he
wrote:
-
"The Navy Department
thus engaged in a course of conduct which definitely gave me the
impression that intelligence from important intercepted Japanese
messages was being furnished to me. Under these circumstances a
failure to send me important information of this character was not
merely a withholding of intelligence. It amounted to an
affirmative misrepresentation. - - - . This failure not
only deprived me of essential facts. It misled me."
-
- The stage for the disaster
was set in April, 1941, by the Director of War Plans when he took
control of distribution of any intelligence that might prompt a
fleet commander to move forces. He did this with the concurrence
of the Chief of Naval Operations. It must be noted that this new
arrangement was without precedent. It represented a change in a
procedure that was doctrinal in nature. Nor was any explanation of
the change, or of the reasons therefore, made known to the fleet
commanders. The then subsequent failure to keep Kimmel properly
informed of obviously important intelligence was an error in
judgment of major proportion. This decision increased enormously
the responsibility of authorities
-
- -9-
- in Washington for any
consequent disaster if, as happened, the flow of essential
information ceased. The record is clear that very significant
information from codebreaking, essential to a proper exercise of
command, was denied Kimmel and Short.
-
- Commanders of forces then and
now have no choice but to rely on Washington for wide area
surveillance. During WWI "radio intelligence" first
exploited enemy use of radio transmissions for their control of
forces. This exploitation included codebreaking, which also had
great political import, so collection, analysis, security protection
and prioritization became located at seats of government.
Dissemination of information thus derived became the responsibility
of top level military authority. Since a commander can only make
sense in his force employment if he possesses related intelligence,
top commands at seats of government took on a shared responsibility
for force effectiveness and security. As noted above, this
obligation was ignored by the Director of War Plans and the Chief of
Naval Operations in the months preceding Pearl Harbor. Kimmel and
Short were denied, despite their many complaints, information they
needed to properly employ their forces.
-
- With regard to Kimmel's
state of mind, note that when the carriers Lexington and Enterprise
departed Pearl Harbor in the days preceding the Japanese attack
with reinforcements for Wake and Midway, Halsey placed his forces on
a full wartime basis, with authority to shoot. Every senior force
commander knows that a direction of this sort is done only with the
compliance, or by direction, of the next higher authority. No
complacency there! No indication there of an unlikelihood of attack
mentality!
-
- The Dorn Report criticized Admiral Kimmel for not using his cruiser based amphibious aircraft
to augment his search coverage. Consider the search problem. To
reach the Japanese air strike launch point 275 miles from Pearl
Harbor at daybreak, December 7th, the attacking group would be about
550 miles at sunset December 6th, and 800 miles at sunrise, December
6th. Presumably cruiser searches would have started November 27th.
There were few cruisers, their search capabilities very limited.
This would have presented severe logistical problems, and logistics
support was very limited, an impediment already to even sustained
local operations. The comment does reveal the lack of depth of
inquiry into the limitations that constrained fleet operational
activity represented by the researchers and preparers of the Dorn
Report.
-
- Dorn's assertion that
exclusive reliance on Washington for tactical warning was at the
heart of the failure at Pearl Harbor assumes adequacy of
reconnaissance resources when their availability was but a small
fraction of the requirement. To criticize the admiral for not using
his cruiser aircraft for long range search is reaching for straws.
-
- As to the likelihood of a
Japanese air attack against Pearl Harbor, as distinct from it's
expected effectiveness, throughout 1940 and until departure of
Yorktown in April, 1941, as a fighter pilot in VF-5, the Yorktown
fighter squadron, I personally flew dawn and dusk patrols against
that possibility of an air attack whenever the ship was in Pearl
Harbor. There was never any lack of "strategic warning" in
the sense used in the Report, nor of an awareness of the possibility
of a surprise air attack. An attribution otherwise is uninformed and
unwarranted. This failure, of course, presumes a degree of ignorance
of the intelligence process at top levels of navy command in
Washington that may not be true. There may be another explanation,
one having to do with the degree to which direct control of fleet
operational activity in both oceans was being exercised by
Washington. Given the course of international developments on the
one hand, and domestic political determination to avoid involvement
in the
-
- -10-
- conflict on the other, the
Director of War Plans action is understandable. What is not
understandable is his failure to then discharge the responsibilities
he so eagerly sought. The subsequent severity of the Pearl Harbor
attack made it indiscreet to admit this confused state of affairs.
The Dorn Report neither recognizes nor admits to this.
-
- A long time, common
practice, one that was increased in numbers of units involved in the
weeks before the disaster, was protection from submarine attack
while warships egressed or ingressed Pearl Harbor. Detection
equipment in those days was technically weak, especially as to
reliability of identity of contacts. As a result, more whales than
submarines were reported as submarines and destroyed in the early
days of the war.
-
- There is another facet to
the problem of balancing risk versus maintenance and training, in
which dependence is placed on incoming intelligence. One must
understand that deployed naval forces are fully occupied 24 hours a
day, seven days a week, in numerous "housekeeping" chores,
including maintenance, and training in pursuit of mission
assignment. Nor must command neglect the mental and physical needs
of personnel that include athletics and recreation after periods at
sea. A command, thusly, is always engaged in more or less essential
activity, defined in operating schedules, from which one departs as
made necessary by incoming intelligence or direction from above. A
commander of deployed forces is continuously and directly involved
in assessing the significance of incoming information to the end
that "harmful" disruptions of ongoing activity within the
force occur as seldom as a changing situation warrants or avoidance
of surprise mandates. We all know the loss of confidence in command that attends "cry wolf" nervous Nellies. We who served in
warships moored in Pearl Harbor in the late thirties before air
conditioning came along also know why ships were not buttoned up to
resist until evidence existed of a high probability of an attack. In
sum, incoming intelligence triggers operational initiatives in a
dynamic process on a twenty-four hour, seven days a week basis. The
Secretary of the Navy message providing strategic warning simply
acknowledged something Pacific fleet commanders had known for
several years. For that matter, so did I.
-
- So, what was known in
Washington that Kimmel needed to know, but didn't? There follows
information known in Washington, but not sent Hawaii, from October 9
to December 7, 1941. Some of them highlight Japanese interest in
detailed information regarding ships in Pearl Harbor. They can be
compared for completeness with that presented in the Dorn Report
(page 111-18).
- - Dorn
cites the "bomb plot" message, translated October 9th, as
available in Washington but not in Hawaii. Dorn makes no further
reference to this important indicator of interest in detailed
information needed by Japan to plan air assaults against ships in
port there. Nor does Dorn mention other related information held in
Washington. The first such evidence originated with
"Tricycle", a German double agent. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation informed Navy of Japanese interest in harbor details
and warship locations in Pearl Harbor. Navy responded with
information then passed to "Tricycle" by the FBI to
preserve his credentials as a spy working for the Axis powers.
Kimmel was not informed of any of this information exchange. Details
are provided in Exhibit D.
- COMMENT: The bomb plot message
was sent September 24th, 1941 to the Japanese
consul-general in Honolulu. It divided Pearl Harbor into five areas,
and specified that reports were to be made regarding identity of
ships within each area, including those at anchor, those that were
moored and those moored alongside others. This information was of a
specificity that made plain it's
-
- -11-
- purpose - planning
for an air attack! When Admiral Kimmel learned to this message years
later, he remarked to his family that with this knowledge, given his
limited force availabilities, he would have been much more forceful
in his dealings with the Navy Department.
-
- November
15th J-19 code # 111 (translated 12/3) Tokyo to Honolulu states as
relations between Japan and the United States most critical make
ships in harbor report irregularly at least twice weekly.
- November
18th J-19 code #113 (translated 12/5) Tokyo to Honolulu Special report
on ship locations requested.
- November
18th J-19 code #222 (translated 12/6) Honolulu to Tokyo Reports
additional ship locations
- November
29th J-19 (Navy translated 12/5) Tokyo to Honolulu We are getting your
ship movement reports.
Now report even when ships not moving.
- See Exhibit E for text of
decoded messages revealing sustained and detailed interest in Pearl
Harbor, and the identity and location of major warships when moored
in the harbor. Their timing in relation to the "purple"
diplomatic traffic increases their significance, a point also missed
by the preparers of the Dorn Report. In this regard, a factor in
assessing the significance of information contained in any intercept
is the review of earlier, related information and consideration of
other activity that is ongoing in the same time frame as the
intercept being read. This observation of a thought process is so
obvious that it is a given that Washington based analysts using the
intelligence intercepts then available were doing just that. It is
in this context that the most significant of all the intercepts, the
14 part message received December 6th and in a separate message, it's delivery instructions, should be interpreted. An attack on
Pearl Harbor early on the morning of December 7th was highly
probable.
-
- While these messages were
being decoded and distributed, so were other messages then being
sent to Japanese embassies world wide directing destruction of codes
and provision of alternative methods for providing information.
-
- A second category of
Japanese message traffic, that being sent the Japanese Ambassador in
Washington in the Purple, or diplomatic code, was being translated
by our Army and Navy codebreakers and distributed, but only in
Washington. None of these were provided Kimmel or Short. As noted
above, when viewed in the context of the other intercepts held in
Washington, the diplomatic code messages clearly indicated the time
and place of the surprise attack. The more significant ones follow.
-
- November
5th Purple (Diplomatic) code #736 (translated 11/5) Tokyo to
Washington states that because of various circumstances, it is
absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this
agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.
- November
16th Purple code (translated 11/17) Tokyo to Washington Refers to #
736 above Advises "--- In your opinion we ought to wait
and see what turn the war takes (refers to German assault on Russia)
and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the
situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the
solution to these negotiations in 736 (i.e., 25 November) and there will
be no change" and "You see how short time is, therefore do
not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations
any further. ---".
-12-
COMMENT: The implications of this message must be
assessed knowing that the Japanese are witnessing the buildup of our
B-17 bomber forces In the Philippine Islands, and that this change in
military posture is very recent...
- November 22nd # 812 purple code Tokyo to Washington
Another reference to #736 "It is awfully hard for us to consider
changing the date we set in my #736. --- There are reasons beyond your
ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations
by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can (settle
satisfactorilly) we have decided to wait until that date."
"This for information of you two ambassadors alone".
COMMENT: Reasons beyond your ability to guess? and, in
the preceding message above "---. therefore do not allow the
United States to delay the negotiations any further." Something
big is imminent. Look for clues!
- November 30th #985 purple code instructs the
Japanese ambassador to inform Hitler of British and American
provocativeness, and that the Empire faces a "grave situation and
must act with determination"., that there is extreme danger that
war may "come quicker than anyone dreams" and that this
information must be held in the most absolute secrecy.
- December 1st Purple #865 (translated 12/4) Tokyo to
Washington Situation continues increasingly critical however, to
prevent U. S. from being unduly suspicious, we advising press and
others in Japan negotiations continue.
COMMENT: "However, to prevent the United States
from becoming unduly suspicious--" Suspicious? of what? We
(Japan) will employ deception for "reasons beyond your ability to
guess"
- December 2nd Purple #867 (translated 12/3-4) Tokyo
to Washington directs specific code destructions.
- December 6th Purple #901 (translated 12/6) Tokyo to
Washington Extremely sensitive message in 14 parts coming. Await
specific instructions by separate message as to when to present it.
- December 6th Purple #902 first 13 parts (translated
12/6) Tokyo to Washington. This message reviews entire sequence of
negotiations, notes the hardening of the U S proposal of November 26th
"as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain,
Australia, The Netherlands and Chunking", concludes these nations
are as one in ignoring Japan's
position.
COMMENT: When read by the President and close advisor,
Harry Hopkins about 07:30 on the evening of December 6th, the
President exclaimed: "This means war"
- December 7th Purple #902 14th part (translated by
Navy about midnight 12/6) Tokyo to Washington States U. S. and Britain
conspired to thwart Japan. Not possible to reach agreement through
further negotiations.
- December 7th Purple #907 (translated by Army during
night of 12/6-7) Tokyo to Washington Directs Ambassador to present 14
part message to Secretary of State at 1300 Washington time, December
7th.
The Japanese decoded message traffic is taken from the
appendix in ‘Pearl Harbor, Final Judgment" by Clausen. The
complete messages from which the above are listed are provided in
Exhibit F.
-13 -
Another mishandled, significant indicator of an early
surprise attack by the Japanese against either the Philippines or
Hawaii was the so-called Winds Instruction message, translated
November 26th and provided to Admiral Kimmel, not by Washington, but
by the Commander, Asiatic Fleet, and the Winds Execute, or enemy
identification message. The Winds Instruction message alerted various
Japanese authorities of a possible initiation of hostilities against
either Russia, the British and Dutch or the Americans, the choice to
be indicated later in the form of a plain language weather report.
This arrangement assumed previous orders to destroy codes will have
been implemented. This message was intercepted November 19th, J-19
code numbers 2353 and 2354 and translated Nov 26th and 28th. The Dorn
Report indicates that Kimmel was informed of this advisory of a
soon-to-be-sent identity of who the enemy would be. In an
overstatement of it's
significance he records as an error of judgment and evidence of an
unacceptable state of cooperation between Kimmel and Short, Kimmel's
failure to pass this information to General Short.
More interesting, and far more significant, is what
occurred following receipt in Washington of the execute message in
which the United States was identified as the enemy. Why was that
information not provided Kimmel and Short? This second message, the
Winds Execute message, was erroneously claimed to have not been
received in Washington. We now know that the Winds Execute message was
intercepted by Naval Communications Station Cheltenheim late on
December 4th and immediately relayed to the Navy Department. It made
it's
way partially through the Navy bureaucracy, and then
"disappeared". Details and sources are described in
CRYPIOLOGIA in Exhibit G to this presentation. Confirmation was also
provided by Army Brigadier General Clarke, an intelligence specialist,
who saw the message. Admiral Kimmel was not. informed of this
development, nor was General Short. This message stated that the
outbreak of hostilities would occur against American territory and/or
forces. If Kimmel's
failure to inform Short of the earlier Winds Instruction message was a
significant error in judgment, what harm resulted from that failure?
How much more grievous is Washington's
failure to inform either Kimmel or Short of the execute message?
At least one principle cause of the extent of the
Pearl Harbor disaster was clearly understood to have it's
roots in Washington. There is a quite remarkable admission by Henry
Clausen and Bruce Lee in "Pearl Harbor, Final Judgment"
since their comments otherwise are the most critical of Admiral Kimmel
in any book on that subject known to me, in an astonishing
inconsistency, they attribute the disaster to the foulup in and by
Washington in managing highly sensitive, relevant intelligence
information, and conclude that had the intelligence been properly
handled, the disaster could have been prevented. Their comments are
provided in Exhibit H. Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, also suspected
the real cause to be mishandled intelligence information. In
"Marching Orders" author Bruce Lee states that on January
19, 1942, Stimson charged Alfred McCormack, a trusted associate, to
recommend new procedures for handling and disseminating information
derived from breaking enemy codes, overruling army opposition in the
process. Referring to the decoded message traffic disseminated within
Washington prior to Pearl Harbor, (but not sent Kimmel) McCormack
writes Stimson that ‘it became apparent that the event had been
clearly foreshadowed in the Japanese traffic of 1941". By his
action Stimson makes clear his concerns regarding management of
decoded messages.
Also in "Pearl Harbor, Final Judgment"
author Clausen cites Stimson in equating Kimmel and Short to sentries.
Stimson used that analogy in describing the magnitude of delinquency
he attributed to the two Hawaiian commanders. But, who were the real
sentries, the ones with eyes to see and ears to hear? They were the
code breakers in Washington.
- 14 -
- Why, then, did Stimson later
refer to Kimmel and Short as sentries? The reason is clear. Stimson
entertained two different explanations for the disaster; one for
political reasons given the gravity of the military situation we
then faced, the other to prevent additional disasters.
-
- REALITIES IN COMMAND
RELATIONSHIPS. CONSTRAINTS ON COMMAND AUTHORITY
-
- Another major contributing
factor to the disaster was, as noted earlier, a migration of
authority from the fleet commanders-in-chief to the Directorate of
War Planning in the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations
commensurate with the President's assumption of a more detailed
control of fleet operations. Again, no problem, that is, until
something goes wrong, for the President was very personally engaged
in the two-pronged, dangerous endeavor of constraining Japan in it's
aggressions while continuing to provide the greatest possible direct
support to Britain. When the President replaced Admiral Richardson
(no kin) in the fall of 1940, for attempting to move the Pacific
Fleet away from Pearl Harbor, where it had been basing since about
March, 1940, every fleet and force commander knew that the President
was now exercising a degree of personal control over fleet activity.
Henceforth, any significant force movement would, first, have to be
cleared with Washington. By his action the President also
transferred a degree of responsibility for fleet security from
Hawaii to Washington. This is not an error in judgment by the
President. As noted previously, the decision to keep the fleet in
Hawaii was a move calculated for it's political effect. The
potential for disaster arose later, with the subsequent movement of
three battleships and the carrier Yorktown to the Atlantic in April,
1941, an action that substantially weakened the Pacific Fleet,
especially in air power. As noted, these movements left Japan with a
substantial advantage in air strike power and Admiral Kimmel with
fewer operational options available to him. This was a risk taken,
later proved to be an error in judgment, with it's origin in
Washington in the administration.
-
- Senior Navy force commanders
were further reminded of the migration to Washington of an increased
degree of operational control by another event that occurred in
January, 1941. "A Well Kept Secret" is an article written
by Admiral Robert B. Carney published by SHIPMATE in the June, 1983
issue. The admiral (then a commander) recounts receiving a telephone
call from BUPERS on January 31st, 1941, advising that he would
receive orders within hours detaching him from Executive Officer of
the battleship California, in Hawaii, to report to the Chief of
Naval Operations in Washington "without delay". Asking to
detour via Coronado to see his wife, he was told "no".
Upon his arrival, Admiral Bristol, to whom the CNO directed Carney
to report, informed him that (Exhibit I):
-
"the President had
decided to form a special force for protection of shipping in the
Atlantic, and that certain ships and aircraft would be allocated
to the force. Because of still-existing popular aversion to U.S.
involvement in the war, the innocuous title of Support Force was
assigned. Bristol would be responsible to the President, not to
the Navy's Atlantic Command - a most unusual
arrangement."
- When Carney submitted to
Bristol a budget proposal for $10 million, Bristol replied:
-
"We would spend that
in a week: we will seek $100 million". Thereafter
"we" applied the Bristol Factor - multiply by
10".
- Thus, in the immediate
aftermath of the firing of Richardson, we have the President taking direct
control of the soon to be "engaged" naval forces in the
Atlantic. Control was moved
from the commander-in-chief in Norfolk, VA, in this
-
- -15-
- specific instance to
Washington. Domestic opposition to an involvement in the European
war' was strong. This arrangement likely could better assure
accommodation to domestic political realities. And, of course,
assumption of control of distribution of significant current
intelligence, i.e. operational, or tactical intelligence, by the
Director of War Plans in Washington to avoid unanticipated
initiatives by a fleet commander, as noted earlier, further
diminished the authority of Admiral Kimmel, limiting his operational
options or freedom to act.
-
- OBSERVATIONS AND ASSESSMENTS
-
- Having explained that
operational options are identified and/or implemented depending upon
the degree of knowledge available at the time, is it not ironic that
literally within minutes of the time Kimmel and his staff were
engaged in assessing his situation in Honolulu, the President in
Washington, upon completing reading the Japanese 13 part message to
Nomura, remarked; "This means war", then upon return to
his dinner guests, "We will be at war tomorrow". See Exhibit S.
What possible supposition can explain Washington's failure to advise
the Hawaiian commanders of an appraisal of this magnitude, based on
information available in Washington but not in Hawaii? On the basis
of diplomatic message codebreaking alone the likely location of an
attack was indicated at about midnight, December 6th, when the 14th
part of PURPLE was received, as were instructions for delivery. The
Japanese choice of time for effecting delivery when assessed in the
context of the decoded J-19 and Purple message traffic recorded in
this presentation, surely indicate an enormous likelihood that war
will commence at about 07:30 AM, Hawaiian time. The Japanese
penchant for initiating combat with a surprise attack was fully
understood by military officers. And time was a strong indicator of
place.
-
- Diplomats, if anything, are
knowledgeable about and deferential to the well known habits of
their counterparts. Thus, Washington's knowledge that Ambassador
Nomura was receiving instructions to seek a meeting with Secretary
of State Cordell Hull at 1:00 PM, Sunday, December 7th, did, indeed,
raise very loud alarm bells. That was 07:30 Hawaiian time. Given the
then widely known capabilities of carrier based aircraft - that
launches took place at first light to accomplish join up, and so
that as much time remained during daylight to increase extent of
damage - identified Hawaii as the likely target of a surprise
attack. As we would now say, it takes no rocket scientist to draw
that conclusion. So here, again, the failure to notify Kimmel and
Short immediately was another grievous error in judgment. There
exists evidence that a meeting of principal advisers with the
President took place in the White House around midnight on the 6th.
Navy secretary Knox expressed surprise to Admiral Kimmel during his
visit to Pearl Harbor following the attack that he had not been
alerted to the events of December 6th, an item presumably discussed
during that meeting. However, for whatever reasons, Kimmel was not
informed.
-
- An anomaly among many, one
that appears to reflect the tightness of control being exercised in
Washington over fleet activity, occurred at about 10:30 Sunday
morning, two and a half hours before the attack. The CNO, Admiral
Stark, was being briefed on the 14 part Purple message and it's
delivery instructions. The briefer pleaded with Admiral Stark to
pick up the phone and call Admiral Kimmel. Stark picked it up,
thought a moment and put it back down, saying he would "call
the President instead". Had he called as requested, Kimmel
would have had what he needed to implement his one remaining
operational option - setting General Quarters, an action that
can be completed in fifteen minutes.
-
- -16-
- In his statement to the
attendees assembled in the Senate Armed service's Hearing room on
April 27th, 1995, Admiral Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, notes the strange behavior of the Chief of Staff, U
S Army General George C. Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Stark, during the night of December 6th and the following
morning. Seemingly, neither was available at a time both they and
the President well knew was exceedingly dangerous. (Exhibit A, pages
32, 33.) Admiral Moorer notes that in his view Admiral Kimmel used
the forces available and the capabilities available to their
extreme. On another occasion he has stated that if Nelson and
Napoleon had been in command in Hawaii, the results would have been
the same. Admiral Moorer stated to the assembled group:
-
"So I think in all
justice, anyone that has to make a decision on this problem should
make certain that they are completely aware; A) of the military
situation in Hawaii and the Pacific Ocean and B) the political
situation and the information that was available here in
Washington. And I believe if one really gives that a thorough
look, and uses common sense in his judgment, he will see that the
fair thing to do is to restore the rank of 4 stars to Admiral
Kimmel."
- COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE
TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN WASHINGTON
-
- A too often overlooked
parallel to the relationship of intelligence to military initiatives
is it's relationship to initiation of diplomatic actions. Diplomatic
initiatives can also be taken in the course of evolving situations
in reaction to incoming intelligence. We had a situation
that December 6th where the President and his military leaders in
Washington had an operational option, an initiative available to
them, that Kimmel, lacking that information, did not. It matters not
that Stark was at an opera and Marshall was who knows where - the
intelligence judged by the President as indicating war was available
in Washington sixteen hours before the attack. The President could
have directed notification of the Japanese embassy, or the Japanese
in Tokyo, of his "suspicions", thereby eliminating in
Japanese minds any benefit to be derived from surprise. Such
notification could have been accomplished in ways that would not
have involved a breach of security. His other option was to make
sure Kimmel knew. He did neither.
-
- COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE
TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND GENERAL SHORT
-
- The Dorn Report asserts that
the fact that others were also at fault does not absolve Admiral Kimmel
and General Short from accountability. If Kimmel and Short
were derelict, as the Robert's Commission judged, or used faulty
judgment as the Dorn Report claims, that issue is properly resolved
by considering the courses of action (operational options) available
to Kimmel and Short but not used, or not properly used. Where was
judgment faulty, and what resulted there from? Did failures by others
create or lead to faulty decisions by Admiral Kimmel and General
Short? Was it within their combined capabilities to have initiated
actions that would have thwarted the Japanese attack, or
substantially reduced the scale of deaths and damage? Is not this
the crux in an assessment of their blame?
-
- Both aircraft carrier battle
groups, the Enterprise and Lexington, departed Pearl during the two
weeks prior to the surprise attack pursuant to orders from
Washington with reinforcements for Wake and Midway Islands. When not
engaged in gunnery and other fleet exercises at sea, units of the
fleet were moored in Pearl Harbor. When in port, crews were
required to be aboard in
-
- -17-
- adequate numbers day and
night to set General Quarters and to man all (repeat, all)
antiaircraft guns. Ammunition was placed in ready ammunition boxes
at all AAA gun sites. The orders in effect required one fourth to
one half of the antiaircraft guns, depending on the type of ship, to
actually be manned at all times when in port. Small ships had the
lower requirement. The specified condition of readiness required
that ships watertight integrity be maintained except where necessary
for regular access by the crew. Is it not noteworthy that
these orders remained in effect throughout the year following the
surprise attack? These arrangements assured that the full defensive
capabilities of the ships in Pearl Harbor could be employed, a
fourth to a half of the ship-based anti-aircraft guns instantly, the
balance in minutes. Admiral Inglis testified that on the morning of
the attack, all (repeat, all) antiaircraft batteries were manned and
firing within four to seven minutes.
-
- The 3:00 PM Saturday staff
meeting convened by Admiral Kimmel reviewed the general situation
and current fleet status. In the absence of air support, ordering
the ships to sea would be unwise, pointless. Apart from his plans
for conducting surveillance, his only option was to set General
Quarters, thereby making his ships more resistant to damage from air
and submarine attack. For this he needed indications that an attack
was imminent. The discussion during the 3:00 PM meeting that
referred to the lack of knowledge of the location of the Japanese
aircraft carriers did not warrant any initiative beyond that
indicated the day before, or the day before that. Nor was there
reason to take exception to General Short's interpretation of the
war warning message In the absence of indicators of imminent attack,
indicators that even then were being distributed and read in
Washington, and interpreted as "We will be at war
tomorrow".
-
- However, force commanders
remain responsible for making sound decisions governing their force
employment whether or not the available intelligence is adequate. To
further clarify what Kimmel could have done to greater advantage
December 6th, let us assume that Washington had kept Kimmel fully
informed, and Kimmel had concluded that an attack was likely the
next morning Or, assume that despite long
odds his reconnaissance aircraft had spotted the Japanese attack
force during daylight, December 6th. What could he have done that
would have defeated the attack, or reduced the extent of damage?
-
- If the admiral had ordered
the fleet to sea, what would have been it's purpose? To seek and
destroy, pitting battleships against carriers in a venture ad
absurdum? To hide? The prevalent professional view at the time was
that pitting 18 knot battleships armed with 15 mile turreted guns
against 30 knot aircraft carriers with 275 mile air strike ranges
was foolish. Given the six carrier strength of the attacking force,
even with full information the only prudent option available to
Admiral Kimmel was to remain in port and set general quarters at
sunrise in preparation for an attack. Presumably he would have done
that. Although we are dealing here with conjecture, the point is
that Admiral Kimmel did the only sensible thing, which was the same
with or without intelligence, and no one has yet identified what he
should have done differently that can withstand critical scrutiny.
That challenge stands open. Given the relative strengths of Japanese
naval forces and those available to Admiral Kimmel, it is clear that
the Japanese were in complete control of events. The idea that it
was within Kimmel's power to have somehow thwarted or overcome the
attack is nonsense.
-
- The Navy Court of Inquiry
convened in 1943 to inquire into the Pearl Harbor disaster was
composed of three very senior naval officers. Their reasoning was
that of experienced force commanders. The realities enumerated above
were
-
- -18-
- known, and their
significance understood, by these three gentlemen. This court found
Admiral Kimmel blameless. Pertinent also is the fact that this court
knew of the decoded Japanese messages, including those recorded in
this paper, that were distributed in Washington, but not sent to
Admiral Kimmel. Their finding, however, was reversed at the
political level, first by the CNO, Admiral King, who cited misuse of
Kimmel's surveillance resources as his reason, and by further
endorsement by the Secretary of the Navy, who cited misuse of his
patrol aircraft Kimmel's "most grevious fault". As
previously noted, Admiral King in a July 14th, 1948 letter to the
Secretary of Defense withdrew his endorsement.
-
- Also pertinent in this
regard is that in an earlier appeal by the Kimmel family, the then
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlyle Trost, relying on a
report by the naval historian who also cited misuse of Kimmel's
patrol planes, recommended against approval. Upon reading the
recent, thorough analysis of Admiral Kimmel's use of his patrol
planes by Mr. Gannon (exhibit T), Admiral Trost advised the
Secretary of the Navy that he no longer supported the position he
had taken, and requested that his adverse endorsement on the Kimmel family request be withdrawn. See Exhibit L. The Gannon analysis
convincingly demonstrates that Kimmel simply did not have aircraft
in anywhere near the numbers required for even sustained 180 degree
coverage. It is noted that Admiral Kimmel sought and followed the
advice of his top air commanders in employing his patrol aircraft.
His decisions were not arbitrary.
-
- It should be noted here that
all forces assigned the Pacific Fleet in war plans approved in
Washington were for employment at sea away from Pearl Harbor. War
plans at war's outset envisioned fleet operations toward Midway to
the northwest and the Japanese controlled Marshall Islands to the
west and southwest. Patrol aircraft would patrol this operating area
to permit a more secure and effective employment of Pacific Fleet
‘s three aircraft carriers (one of which was on the West Coast at
the time of the attack) and nine battleships in offensive and
defensive operations pending reinforcement. The pace of employment
of patrol aircraft prior to war's outbreak was constrained by the
needs of that operational readiness requirement.
-
- Ships of the fleet when in
Pearl were placed in Army plans for coordination of anti-aircraft
defenses, with the Commander 14th Naval District the designated
adviser to the Senior Officer Present Afloat in implementation of
those plans. The 14th Naval District Commander maintained liaison
with the Army in effecting those arrangements. Defense of Hawaii was
an Army responsibility. Readiness status of Army forces in Hawaii
were matters under control of Lieutenant General Short and General
Marshall in Washington. Here an error of significance occurred. The
war warning message to General Short was interpreted to mean the
principal danger was sabotage. Short ordered his fighter aircraft
placed in the center of his airfields, with guards to prevent their
being sabotaged and, as directed in the Army war warning message
(Exhibit J), reported the action he was taking to Army headquarters
in Washington. In subsequent testimony General Marshall admitted his
opportunity and failure in this instance. The Army Pearl Harbor
Board generally criticized the conduct of the Secretary of Army, the
Chief of Staff, the then Chief of War Plans Division and General
Short, but made no recommendations.
-
- Was Kimmel derelict in not
objecting to General Short's action? Had he been in possession of
the intelligence available in Washington and not done so, he would
have been. His interjection, however, would have been limited to
-
- -19-
- an expression of an opinion.
The authorities and responsibilities of force commanders in the
field were specified and allocated by the respective chiefs of
services in Washington, with approval by the President, not by
Admiral Kimmel, who was devoid of authority to change plans that
were arranged between Generals Short and Marshall.
-
- Despite the pledge by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense to "examine the matter without
preconceptions so that a judgment can be reached on the basis of
fact and fairness", it is obvious that the Dorn Report relies
instead primarily on information contained in earlier hearings and
inquiries that were designed to deflect criticism from Washington.
Statements and accusations that we now know are inaccurate, or
false, that appeared in the congressional inquiry reappear in the
Dorn Report, and are included with comment in exhibit M.
-
- CONCLUSIONS IONS
-
- 1. In summary, the disaster
at Pearl Harbor was rooted in and caused by:
-
A - The adoption in
Washington of a military strategy that weakened the forces
allocated to the Pacific Fleet substantially below those available
to the Japanese during a time and in an area of likely conflict,
while
-
B - Incrementally
increasing the economic, political and military pressures on the
Japanese government by limiting sales and shipment of scrap steel
and oil products, then shortly before the attack, adoption of a
hard line negotiating position including the demand that Japan
relinquish it's conquered territories on the Asian continent, and
-
C - For a variety
of reasons transfer of a degree of control over the operational
activity of fleet forces, taking it away from their titular heads,
the Commanders-in-Chief, to the Director of War Plans within the
office of the CNO. which he then exercised imprudently by denying
transmission to the fleet Commanders-in-Chief crucially important
tactical (as distinct from strategic) intelligence information.
-
D - The failure of
intelligence in Washington to collect information, analyze and
distribute throughout Washington and the fleets in the years
preceding the attack accurate threat assessments listing the
capabilities of Japanese military equipment and personnel
performance in combat, and lastly,
-
E - The
thoroughness of planning and excellence of execution by the
Japanese attack force.
- 2. The first three of the
above actions, possibly even including the failure to provide
current intelligence, were risks deemed required and acceptable by
our national leadership given the extent of deteriorating worldwide
political and military situations, complicated by our inadequate
force structure, in light of our President's overall strategic
objective, the defeat of Hitler.
-
- 3. There was no reasonable
course of action available to Admiral Kimmel during the several days
preceding the attack, other than to preset General Quarters the
morning of the attack, that would have enabled him to thwart the
Japanese attack, or limit the extent of damages, and there was no
lapse of foresight nor evidence of faulty judgment on his part.
-
- -20-
- 4. Washington's failure to
keep Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short fully and continuously
informed regarding Intelligence being derived from codebreaking was
a grievous error that may have prevented Admiral Kimmel presetting
General Quarters, and did eliminate fighter defense of Oahu. This
failure increased the scale and scope of damage to the fleet and to
other military objectives, with attendant larger losses in lives of
Army and Navy personnel.
-
- 5. Rear Admiral Kimmel and
Major General Short should have their reputations restored, and
should be advanced posthumously in retirement to their pre-Pearl
Harbor disaster ranks.
-
- THE STORY STILL UNFOLDING
-
- When asked do I believe
President Roosevelt knew that the Japanese were about to attack
Pearl Harbor, my answer is; "Yes. A qualified yes". To the
query "why the hedge", my answer is that while a
considerable body of evidence supports the view that he knew, it
does not yet seem beyond reasonable doubt. It is my observation that
when a series of apparently dumb actions are taken across a span of
time by otherwise highly competent individuals, there is more to the
story. If a reason common to all of them can be deduced that makes
sense in light of the situations of the moment, then that reason is
likely the real reason. The two alternate reasons, protecting our
code breaking successes and bureaucratic bungling fit too few of
these troubling situations Then, some evidence is unequivocal.
-
- William Casey, a former head
of the CIA, in his book "The Secret War Against Hitler" makes the flat
out statement that Churchill had alerted Roosevelt of the impending attack. Note
the last sentence from the following quote, page 7 (Exhibit 0):
-
"The months before
Pearl Harbor showed the bureaucratic problems Donovan would
encounter. As the Japanese storm began to gather force in the
Pacific, the most private communications between the Japanese
government and it's ambassadors in Washington, Berlin, Rome and
other major capitals were being read in Washington. Army and Navy
cryptographers having broken the Japanese diplomatic cipher, were
reading messages that foretold the attack. The British had sent
word that a Japanese fleet was steaming east toward Hawaii".
- Casey does not explain the
basis for his claim.
-
- Joseph Leib was a reporter
for United Press in Washington, and a confidant of Cordell Hull.
Before he died, on numerous occasions he said that he was told on
November 28th, 1941, by Cordell Hull that the Japanese were planning
an attack on Pearl Harbor within a few days. He tried to get his
boss to publish that information, but his boss refused. He was able to
persuade an underling to do so. The only paper to pick it up was the
Honolulu Advertiser.
-
- Constantine Brown was a
reporter for the Washington Star. In his book entitled "The
Coming of the Whirlwind" he tells of a friend, whom he does not
identify, that came to see him on December 5th in a state of
ill-suppressed excitement. "This is it", he exclaims,
"The Japs are ready to attack. We've broken their code, and we've
read their orders". Brown states that he was referring to the
"Winds" execute message. The informant brought the word to
him in person because he did not trust a messenger. Brown considered
the story too hot to publish, reasoning that it might reveal
codebreaking
-
- -21-
- successes, and in any event
it would already have been read by the President. According to
recorded testimony the Winds Execute message was first reported as
never having been received in the Navy Department. Later, in the
face of direct evidence to the contrary, the Winds Execute message
was declared "lost". It identified the enemy as the United
States. As noted elsewhere in this analysis, this is another
extremely important message that was not provided Admiral Kimmel or
General Short. The Winds Execute message did not indicate a time for
attack. The time of attack was strongly implied by the delivery
instructions that accompanied the 14-part Purple diplomatic code
message broken around midnight, two days later, on December 6th.
-
- Brigadier General
Elliott Thorpe was a military attaché in Dutch-controlled Java in
1941. Admiral Layton in "And I Was There", advises that we
now know the Dutch were also reading the JN-25 Japanese Navy
operational code. According to the newspaper account of Thorpe's
death at age 91, (Exhibit Q) the Dutch informed Thorpe of the
impending attack against the Philippines, Thailand and Hawaii.
General Thorpe immediately cabled the information to Washington, but
his warning allegedly was not taken seriously. A week later the
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Admiral Edwin Layton was
Intelligence Officer first to Admiral Kimmel, then to Admiral Nimitz.
-
- Major General Bonner Fellers
in a letter to Admiral Kimmel dated March 6, 1967, (Exhibit P
replicates the entire letter) advised;
-
"About 10:00 AM
Friday, December 6th, 1941, I walked into the Royal Air Force
Headquarters in Cairo. Air Marshall Lonmore (spelling) who was
then in command of the RAF Middle East, sat at his desk.
Immediately he opened with: "Bonner, you will be in the war
in 24 hours." He continued: "We have a secret signal
Japan will strike the US in 24 hours".
- In letters to both President
Clinton and Senator Thurmond, Helen E. Hamman of Frankfurt, Ohio,
reported that her father, in 1941 head of Disaster Services of the
Red Cross, had been called shortly before the attack by President
Roosevelt, and told that his intelligence staff had informed him of
a pending Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor, and that her father
should be prepared to deal with expected casualties. I am advised
that a recent review of Red Cross files corroborates that story.
-
- Predominant in the many
inexplicable occurrences that continue to intrigue researchers is the
strange, out-of-character behavior of General Marshall, who seemingly, could not be reached the evening before, or found the
morning following the President's exclamations "This means
war" and "We will be at war tomorrow . His unavailability
compounded by his subsequent dilatory handling of the alert message
to the Hawaiian commanders suggest more at work than a casual state
of mind. If on the other hand, events were proceeding along an
anticipated course, with our leaders awaiting an expected event, it
made sense. His conduct suggests a desire to avoid initiating an
alert based on Purple Magic information received during 6 December.
-
- Marshall's behavior
continued to haunt those who were intimately involved with him
during that troubling time. On May 4TH, 1961 Brigadier General
Bonner Fellers had as his guests for lunch Brigadier General Carter
Clarke and a Dr. Charles G. Tansill. Dr. Tansill was a professor of history
at Georgetown, and an author of an excellent book about FDR's entrance into the war and
Pearl Harbor. General Clarke was a
central figure in War Dept. intelligence, directly
involved in the analysis and distribution of decoded Japanese
message traffic before and after Pearl Harbor. Clarke stated
(additional) confirmation
-
- -22-
- that the Winds Execute
message was distributed in Washington) that on December 4th, the
"East Wind Rain" message was received. As already noted,
this device to inform Japanese worldwide that war had been decided
upon, had been revealed by our codebreakers. "East" meant
war with America was imminent. Clarke noted that this information
was greeted with no apparent surprise, that senior Army and Navy
officers were seemingly unconcerned. This changed, taking on a comic
opera quality, according to Clarke, upon receipt of the Japanese
diplomatic traffic, December 6th. The record of the meeting is
contained in Exhibit R. The unstated but completely obvious
implication is that the senior officers to whom he referred knew
what was to be, but only on Dec. 6th did they know when. Since the
time of delivery of the diplomatic traffic was to occur on a Sunday
at 01:00 PM, i.e., 07:30 AM in Hawaii, that would be the optimum hour
to commence air strike operations. What is equally clear from this
report of meeting is that the over three thousand deaths at Pearl
Harbor were still very much on their minds twenty years later.
-
- The recorded views of as
well as actions taken by many who served on the staffs in Washington
of the chiefs of service in positions charged with analyzing,
distributing and briefing information derived from codebreaking in
the days prior to December 7th, make clear they understood the
meaning and significance of that intelligence. The idea that the
chiefs of service, the service secretaries, the Secretary of State
and other key advisers to the President did not understand is beyond
believability. Why would Admiral Stark not complete the call to
Kimmel he started to make at the urging of the briefing officer
three hours before the attack? The significance of the requested
01:00 PM meeting with the Secretary of State was not lost on Stark's
briefer. Why would he put the phone down, saying he would call the
President instead? (page 303, "And I Was There").
According to Admiral Layton the call was made, however, Stark was
told the President was occupied. What state of mind, or
administrative process, then prevented him from calling Kimmel? Does
this behavior pattern not resemble that of General Marshall? Again,
the purpose being served makes sense if the objective was to not
cause change in the flow of events at that point in time.
-
- The evidence is persuasive
enough that Churchill knew the time, probably the place, of the
attack. Several possible sources existed. Soviet agents under
control of Richard Sorge had penetrated top level Japanese
authorities including a member of the Imperial Family and the Moscow
and Bangkok Japanese embassies. Stalin had transferred seven
divisions of troops from the Far East to the defense of Moscow,
leaving that area defenseless, and was desirous of Japanese force
involvement elsewhere. Stalin is therefore a possible source.
Another possible source was British penetration of Soviet cipher
message traffic. Still another, and the most likely, British and
Dutch penetration of the Japanese JN-25 five cipher naval
operational code. According to "Betrayal at Pearl Harbor"
by James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, the British codebreakers in
Singapore succeeded in breaking the JN-25 code. Nave is credited as
having lead that effort. The code, itself, was not exceptionally
difficult, but success required collecting an unusually large
amount of radio transmissions. Singapore intercepted Japanese
message traffic being sent the Pearl Harbor Strike Force, was able
to decode and determine the strike force's mission, and so informed
London, with request that Hawaii be informed. According to Nave
"must climb Nitakayma on 8 December, Tokyo time", was the
final message sent. This was 7 December, Hawaii time. Nitakayma was
the highest mountain in the Japanese empire. What Churchill may have
told Roosevelt based on this and other sources remains conjectural.
Of interest Is the fact that the JN-25 code was also broken by Mrs.
Driscoll, a codebreaker in OP-20-G, working under Captain Safford,
but had not advanced to an exploitative stage by that time.
-
- -23-
- Eric Nave allegedly reported
to London that a Japanese fleet of 6 carriers, 2 battleships, 2
heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser and 9 destroyers had departed the
Kuriles for Hawaii and refueled December 4th. London was asked to
inform Hawaii. These figures are a match with those contained in the
alleged German decrypt of the Churchill/Roosevelt November 26th
conversation described by Gregory Douglas.
-
- The information that
Churchill advised Roosevelt that a Japanese naval force was enroute
Pearl Harbor, it's purpose to attack the fleet, is alleged in
"Gestapo Chief " The 1948 Interrogation of Heinrich
Muller" by Gregory Douglas, a specialist in intelligence
research. He states that this conversation took place on an AT@T
created scrambler radio-telephone known as the A-3 system that was
commercially available. This system was in use in Germany from
before the war. I am informed by a former high official in the
National Security Agency that the A-3 system was easily broken.
Douglas states that this conversation was descrambled and
distributed within Germany. According to Douglas, Heinrich Muller
brought it and many other intercepts with him to this country, where
he lived for 14 years, occupied at least initially, in informing the
U S what Germany knew about Stalin and the USSR. A copy of the
alleged intercept is provided as Exhibit W. Of special interest is
the Churchill question: "What about Chiang Kai-Shek? Is he not
having a very thin diet?" which appears elsewhere as well.
There is a view that this document may have been a fake, planted
after war's end in the German archives. If this were so, what
purpose was served, and why did not it's "planters" make
use of it? Why did it lay fallow for decades? We do know that the
Germans were efficient, successful codebreakers.
-
- Admiral Layton cites these
same words in indication that news of Japan's treachery had come
directly to the President from Churchill. The cover note to the
American Embassy in London of 26 November that enclosed Churchill's
"thin diet for Chiang Kai-shek" "telegram" was
marked Most Secret. It apologized for the lateness of the hour of it's delivery - yet nothing is contained, at least as it is
now presented, that could have warranted waking up top level embassy
personnel at 03:00 AM. Had it been sent at daybreak, it still would
have reached Washington early that morning. Layton believed that
another communication took place that date, one not in the record,
for which the "thin diet" message serves as a convenient
cover.
-
- Navy's chief codebreaker,
Captain Laurence Safford, expressed outrage that Admiral Kimmel was
surprised by the attack, exclaiming "But they knew. They
knew". When Safford anticipated that he would be called as a
witness in any Pearl Harbor investigation, he began looking for
relevant documents. It was then that he discovered that none of the
codebroken messages had been sent Admiral Kimmel. He became incensed
then, on February 22, 1944, went by train to New York, met with the
admiral and acquainted him with the contents of those messages.
-
- Safford was called before
the Admiral Hart Inquiry where he testified as to the existence and
substance of the decoded messages. He was not asked for and did not
provide copies to the Hart Inquiry. It became necessary for Admiral
Kimmel to request permission of the Secretary of the Navy to provide
to the Navy Court of Inquiry the decoded messages. Secretarial
stonewalling of his request ended when Admiral Kimmel threatened to
hold a press conference to publicize the fact that the Navy court
was being denied important information.
-
- -24-
- Later, in his appearance
before the Army board, after Admiral Kimmel had asked if he had
further information relating to the disaster, Kimmel then revealed
to them the information derived from codebreaking, leaving them
"astonished". There were rumors, according to an Army
Board member, that such messages existed and that they
had been purged from Army files. But for the coincidence of Captain
Safford's desire to refresh his memory, their removal from their
proper location in Navy files as well by Commander Kramer would have
prevented their being seen by Admiral Kimmel's designee, Captain
Lavender. Why Kramer did this improper and unusual action is
conjectural. It does, however, suggest a coordinated attempt higher
up to prevent these messages from being made known to both Army and
Navy Inquiries.
-
- The date of November 26th,
1941, continues to intrigue many inquirers into the circumstances
leading to the disaster. Chapter 18, entitled "Negotiations
Off" in Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton's book, "And I Was
There" addressed most issues surrounding that date, both known
and as yet unexplained. Pertinent paragraphs are replicated in
exhibit N. Why, he asked, did Secretary of State Hull confront the
Japanese ambassadors on the afternoon of November 26th with the
hardline position the Japanese referred to as an ultimatum when,
until then, the agreed strategy was to seek accommodation until the
buildup of our forces in the Philippines could be completed? Why
would Secretary Hull declare the sudden shift in strategy in the
course of it's implementation as his decision when there was no
doubt whatsoever that the President was in direct control of all our
actions then being taken? In Hull's memoirs he claimed as his reason
for so advising the President that even a temporary modus vivendi
with Japan would undermine Chinese morale, and quotes an extract
from a communication from Churchill to Roosevelt that states:
"What about Chiang Kai-shek? Is he not having a very thin
diet?" How frequently we encounter these words!
-
- Of interest is an extract
from the report of a recent symposium held at the Admiral Nimitz Foundation in
Fredericksburg, Texas, as reported in Naval Intelligence Professionals
quarterly, entitled "The Gathering Storm", page 4: (Exhibit V) which states;
-
"In mid-November
Stimson abandoned his hard-line position because of continual
warnings from Marshall and Stark -- . Tokyo would not
endure three more months of diplomatic procrastinations while
their oil reserves drained away. --- On 17 November Hull
and Secretary of the Treasury, Morganthau proposed a six months
truce in the oil and rice embargo, provided Japanese troops left
IndoChina. On 25 November Stimson, Knox, Stark and Marshall agreed
to a new "modus vivendi" with Japan. But If they do not
accept this compromise, said Roosevelt, how then can we get them
to make the first aggressive move? (on that same day a Japanese
task force put to sea for Hawaii). Two days later Hull gave
Ambassador Nomura and Special Envoy Kurusu an uncompromising
ultimatum. We do not know why this came about. We know only that
Hull did it with the greatest reluctance, and he did it on
instructions from Roosevelt."
- There was, indeed, a mindset
that a Japanese attack in SE Asia was imminent. Navy's war warning
message specifically mentioned the Philippines, Kra Peninsula, or possibly
Borneo as likely choices for an amphibious assault. Army's war warning message
stated that if hostilities could not be avoided,
- the United States desired
that Japan commit the Japan
commit the first overt act. The expected
-
- -25-
- amphibious attack, however,
did not rule out a concurrent attack against Hawaii. Nor can it be
ruled out that despite evidence to the contrary, Roosevelt just
refused to believe the Japanese would attack Hawaii. There is
another possibility. He may have underestimated Japanese air strike
effectiveness, as did many at that time, and reasoned that an attack
against Pearl Harbor would have had only minor success, and would
have served his purpose. In that case the surprise at Pearl Harbor
was the extent of damages received.
-
- The altogether regretful
thing is that because damages in Hawaii were so extensive, the issue
became politicized. Admissions of Washington miscalculations would
not only become indicators of presidential incompetence, but would
also jeopardize all that he had risked in pursuing his objective -the
defeat of Hitler. The consequence is misjudgment of all three
principals, President Roosevelt, Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
-
- President Roosevelt went to
war personally about the time of the fall of France. Aid to Britain
in his view was a mandatory first step, our entry into the war an
essential later action, and it was clear that an initial offensive
combat action by Germany or Japan was prerequisite. His actions
taken in defense of his authority and effectiveness before this
nation entered the war should be judged in light of his objective -
the defeat of Hitler, and of his immediate purpose - to
induce an attack on our forces or territory in order to get us into
the war. To remind us of the magnitude of the problem he faced, we need only recall that our rearmament after
war's outbreak in Europe
passed in the congress by a one vote majority. The are numerous
examples of presidential deceptions. In war deception, when
successful, is a virtue. The many initiatives he subsequently took,
both political and military, the deceptive among them, were designed
to achieve his wartime aims while hampered by our own vastly
inferior forces.
-
- The Dorn Report asserts that
"The official treatment of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was
substantially temperate and procedurally correct". Now,
withholding significant information, or attempting to do so, in a
duly constituted judicial procedure, if not criminal, is most
certainly prejudicial to achieving a just outcome. There is simply
no question but that there was a consistent, concerted effort to
keep knowledge of the existence of the vitally important
intelligence derived from codebroken Japanese messages from the many
inquiries into the Pearl Harbor disaster. Was it for the purpose of
maintaining security of this capability that was of such crucial
importance to the conduct of military operations? Not believable.
The fact is we were more open with our British allies than with our
own senior military officers designated to head the Army and Navy
courts. In 1941 we gave the British two "purple"
diplomatic code deciphering machines that had been purchased for
Admiral Kimmel's use, and did not reorder. Another decoder was given
the Commander, Asiatic Fleet. Given this background, and the
intimacy of our mutual codebreaking arrangements with the British,
security could not be the real motivator for the denial to the Army
and Navy courts. Then what was? The real reason was the desire to
hide the fact that crucially important information held in
Washington had not been provided Kimmel and Short. Withholding
information on the one hand, while employing "substantially
temperate treatment" of the Hawaiian commanders by avoiding
sworn testimony in courts martial that would inevitably reveal
information embarrassing to the administration on the other, is
anything but substantially temperate treatment.
-
- -26-
- Many senior naval officers
during and after the war knew that Admiral Kimmel and General Short
had been scapegoated. Two references serve to make that point.
Admiral Raymond Spruance answered naval historian Samuel Elliot
Morison who had written him regarding the disparate treatment meted
out to Kimmel and Short as compared to that of General MacArthur.
MacArthur's delinquencies included a direct disobedience of orders
from General Marshall plus loss of his aircraft to Japanese attack
nine hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor because he refused to
allow General Brereton to launch them against Japanese forces in
Formosa. Admiral Spruance replied:
-
"I have always felt
that Kimmel and Short were held responsible for Pearl Harbor in
order that the American people might have no reason to loose
confidence in their government in Washington. This was probably
justifiable under the circumstances at that time, but it does not
justify forever damning those two fine officers.
-
"The point you raise
about General MacArthur is well taken; but the Army would have
lost a very able man if MacArthur had been dealt with as Kimmel
and Short were."
- Admiral Halsey expressed
similar views in a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel. Admiral Halsey
and Admiral Spruance were Navy's most experienced and honored naval
combat commanders in World War II.
-
- It is pertinent also to note
that both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner, particularly Admiral
Turner in numerous combat actions as the Amphibious Force commander,
served with distinction throughout the war. Admiral Turner's
resoluteness in his landing of Marines on Guadalcanal, and in his
many support and resupply operations were enablers of our victory
there. Although both were at the center of pre-war bungling in the
Navy Department, they were significant figures in our subsequent
victory, and were so recognized. Admiral Kimmel and General Short
were denied further roles.
-
- -27-
- EPILOGUE
-
- Divers initially engaged in
rescuing entrapped personnel within compartments of ships sunk by
bombs and torpedoes during the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor, and in salvaging those ships, describe the murky conditions
in the surrounding waters caused mainly by oil on the surface, some
of it still burning as they worked. Numerous authors and other
individuals who, for whatever reason, inquire into the events,
actions and explanations that preceded and followed that Day of
Infamy have also struggled with a murkiness brought about by the
potential political and military consequences that marked its
aftermath. As information that was once highly classified has been
released into the public domain, the popular belief that the
commanders in Hawaii were to blame for their inattentiveness has
steadily changed. Even though all pertinent information has not yet
been released, the record is now clear that the errors then
committed, and mistakes in judgment then being made, were being made
in Washington, not in Hawaii.
-
- In his oft repeated
observation, eloquent in its simplicity, Robert Burns got it right.
When dealing with uncertainty in military situations we see, or
think we see, clearly in hindsight what should have been done in
various combat actions. When assessing blame for what "Gang aft
a-gley" in some military encounter, we must examine whether or
not a commander was assiduous in his search for solutions, attentive
to the advice of his subordinates, or heedless or unreasonable in
one or more aspects of the encounter that were foreseeable. If a
commander's decisions were thoughtfully arrived at, but for some
unknown or even foolish action taken by an opponent, are seen in
retrospect to be erroneous, that commander did not fail his
obligations. A more perfect knowledge is the antidote, the
distribution and exploitation of which is the obligation of every
commander in a command chain. This is my basis for judging Admiral
Kimmel.
-
- My interest in the Pearl
Harbor disaster commenced in about 1982, when I purchased in an
estate sale a seven page, hand-written, letter by Admiral Kimmel to
the movie star, the Rose of the Silent Screen, Corrine Griffith,
which she then had mounted in a frame and displayed in her living
room. He and Mrs Kimmel had been invited to one of her parties. His
explanation in response to her question about what caused Pearl
Harbor was frequently interrupted as other guests came up. So, upon
their return home he wrote his explanation in the letter. In it he
mentioned Captain Safford, then Navy's chief cryptanalyst, as the
one who opened his eyes as to what had really taken place.
-
- At that time I was a member
of a subcommittee of the Naval Research Advisory Committee that
specialized in matters associated with highly sensitive naval
intelligence. This group was comprised mostly of scientists and
technical experts who were outside advisers to the Naval Security
Group, which is the offspring of Captain Safford's OP-20-G. I
presented the Kimmel letter to Rear Admiral Dillingham, then
Commander, Naval Security Group, for inclusion in the NSG museum in
honor of Captain Safford. As an experienced operational commander I
knew first hand comand need for and dependence on intelligence
support in applying force to greater advantage. As I inquired more
into the circumstances surrounding the Pearl Harbor disaster, it
became
-
- -28-
- clear to me that
political concerns, then and since, have served to preclude an honest appraisal of its
causes. The price we paid was enormous. The lessons we should have learned are
valuable as we look ahead.
-
- In earlier times I was a
fighter pilot aboard the carrier SARATOGA during the GUADALCANAL
invasion then, subsequently, in September and October of ‘42,
shorebased there on HENDERSON Field. I achieved four shootdowns of
Japanese aircraft, and was myself wounded and shot down. During the
Korean War I served as Executive Officer of a carrier with a Marine
airwing aboard engaged in direct support of Marine troops ashore.
During the Vietnam war I commanded the aircraft carrier task forces in
the Gulf of Tonkin in 1966-67. I am a graduate of the U S Naval
Academy, Class of ‘36, have also been a student at the Royal Navy
Staff College, Greenwich, England, and both a student and staff member
at our Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. My duties on the
staff involved preparation of critical analyses of combat actions
during WWII. I have served in the Strategic Plans Group on the staff
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in Strategic Plans and Policy on the
staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. These duties and combat
experiences have made clear to me that an accurate historical record
of our past political and military events and actions is a rich
heritage, highly useful as we work our way through future difficult
problems. The Pearl Harbor disaster is a perfect case in point for
pressing the need for a proper management and exploitation of
intelligence, by political as well as military authorities, and is the
yet to be officially recognized lesson to be learned from that
disastrous event.
-
- A second reason developed as I
became more knowledgeable of what had really transpired prior to
December 7th. When viewed in the context of operational realities, it
became clear that a terrible injustice has been done to the two Pearl
Harbor commanders and, consequently, to the historic account of those
momentous events. The record should be set straight.
-
- David C. Richardson Vice
- Admiral, U S Navy (ret)
- Julian, California
- August 4th, 1997
-
- -29-
|
|
January 2001 Letter From David Richardson to
Edwin Dorn
20 January, '01
- Mr. Edwin Dorn
- Dean, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs
- University of Texas
- Austin, TX,
Dear Mr. Dorn,
I write as the author of a critical analysis of the report of
December, ‘95 that carries your name that has since become the basic line of
reasoning prompting many of the initiatives that seek restoration of reputations
of the two Hawaiian commanders. It is central to the Kimmel family endeavor of
recent years. I write also in response to your recent newspaper article that
relates to Pearl Harbor.
I am a WWII fighter pilot, credited
with 4 kills, one flying from SARATOGA and three while shorebased on GUADALCANAL
during Sept. and Oct., 1942, during which time I was hospitalized with wounds
received in air combat. As a flag officer I was CTF-77, commander of our
carriers in Gulf of Tonkin, for one year (‘66-67), Commander SIXTH Fleet, ‘68-'70,
and Deputy CINC Pacific Fleet until my retirement in ‘72. I wish to impress
the point that my duty experiences taught me the dependence of command upon
timely intelligence in evolving situations if we are to avoid serious
consequences. Please read this letter carefully. It presents the situation from
a purely operational view. It is very important that we learn the lessons from
our disaster there if we are to avoid their repetition.
I am no kin to Admiral J. 0.
Richardson, Admiral Kimmel's predecessor.
There is a uniqueness to the Admiral Kimmel, Lieutenant
General Short Pearl Harbor controversy. World War II top level commanders
Admirals Nimitz, Halsey, Spruance and Roberts Commission member, Admiral
Standley, supported the two Hawaiian commanders, believing they were
scapegoated, necessarily scapegoated at that time, as Admiral Spruance wrote in
his reply to historian Samuel Elliot Morrison. There were also others of similar
mind of lesser statue in the wartime scheme of things. Latter day military
professionals of like view include two former chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Moorer and Crowe, three former Chiefs of Naval Operations, Admirals Zumwalt,
Holloway and Trost, and more recently two prominent army general officers,
Andrew Goodpaster and McCaffery, father of the drug czar. The uniqueness is the
caliber and quality of military professionals on one side of the argument and
some lawyers and some historians on the other. Neither of the latter categories
have found it useful to take into consideration "expert opinion" as
used in courts of law. To do so would demolish their arguments.
The case for restoration of reputations of Admiral Kimmel and
General Short rests on recognition of the situation in which they were placed by
our national strategy, their logistical limitations and an intelligence support
failure at the seat of government. Their performance must be judged in an
understanding of the operational options that were available to them at various
times, and what they did in light of the information they held.
The stage was set for all that later
transpired in April, 1941. Pursuant to a strategy that emphasized aid to Britain
in highest priority, the president ordered transfer of the carrier YORKTOWN,
three battleships and accompanying cruisers and destroyers to Atlantic patrol.
This transfer gave Japan a 2 to 1 naval strength advantage in the Pacific.
Shortly thereafter a corollary strategy, adopted to both assist CHINA and
prevent the Japanese from attacking Soviet Siberia, embargoed sale to Japan of
oil and steel needed for it's military purposes. A third strategy, a change in
emphasis from Britain first to permit strengthening our military structure in
the Pacific, was adopted in the fall, 1941, as decoded Japanese diplomatic and
consular messages revealed an increasing likelihood of war with Japan, the
result of our economic embargo. Now, within the last several years, we have
learned from VENONA, from Soviet dissidents and KGB files made available after
collapse of the Soviet Union, of direct Soviet involvement in President
Roosevelt's issuance of the equivalent of an ultimatum to Japan on November
26th, 1941, which action made war inevitable. This area of inquiry will become
more enlightening as to motivation and process with the passage of time. The
consequences are long clear.
One must understand at the outset that
from about noon, December 6th, the Japanese were in complete control over
subsequent developments. This operational fact of life was not factored into the
thinking of those who prepared the Dorn Report nor of any of the numerous
historical accounts that treat with this disaster. Yet, two major features of
the Admiral Kimmel's and General Short's situations were rooted in that fact.
These follow:
Kimmel had 7 operable battleships,
speeds 16 kts, weapons ranges 15 nm. and no aircraft carriers immediately
available. The Japanese had 6 (of 10) aircraft carriers, speeds 32 kts.,
weapons ranges 300 nm. Thus, their speed advantage was just short of 2 to 1,
their weapons range advantage, 20 to 1. Additionally, they deployed 29
submarines off Pearl Harbor entrance and in the waters around OAHU. Both had
assorted cruisers and destroyers. Kimmel's eighth battleship, the fleet
flagship, was in dry dock in Pearl, his ninth, on the coast. Japanese
submarine strength made them every bit as dangerous as their aircraft
carriers. Moreover, in view of Japanese carrier speed and weapons range
advantages, any analysis worth its salt must recognise that the Japanese
achieved full control over subsequent events dating from about mid-morning, no
later than noon, on the 6th, Hawaiian time. If Kimmel tried to escape, what
Japanese submarines missed Japanese aircraft could seek out and sink. Given
this disparity in forces and force capabilities, it is crystal clear that
Kimmel was without any viable operational action to either harm the enemy or
to save himself. I still await some historian or analyst to factor this
reality into their rationales.
The second major feature relates to
the character and magnitude of the search problem the surprise attack imposed.
The Japanese daylight launch of attack aircraft, essential to provide visual
joinups of squadrons and air strike groups of multiple squadrons, was about
0530, when 250 nm out. During the previous 18 hours the Japanese force
approached at 24 kts in order to reduce time in the area in which they could
be sighted. At 1800 December 6th the Japanese force was about 525 nm out from
Pearl. Kimmel's patrol plane air speed was about 100 kts. Thus his search
aircraft would not detect the Japanese during 11 hours of their flight time!
Probable
-2-
attack force approach routes extended
from 180 degrees through 270 to about 030 degrees. Kimmel's total patrol plane
resource was 49, with aircraft availability of 70%, ie, 35 operational. With
flight path separation of 5% outbound to search area, then parallel, this
would permit coverage of 170 degrees of the desired 210 degrees. There were no
radars for detection, only eyeballs. My recollection is a 15 hour flight was
max. If the admiral commenced an all out search on 28 November, by 2 December
he would have maybe half as many planes and air crews still operable, with
aircraft and aircrew availability trending sharply downward. His war plans
required PBY aircraft for anti submarine search and attack, and surface search
in defense of his own air and surface offensive task forces. Since he lacked
what Washington held, and should have understood, Kimmel had no reason to
mount long range air search, especially given the low likelihood of success.
Washington learned from decryption of the Bomb Plot Report
Plan, applicable almost exclusively to Pearl Harbor and Manila, that Pearl
Harbor was a likely target. That decrypt divided Pearl Harbor into sectors and
required the Japan consulate to report frequently the identity and location of
ships therein. Several days before the attack, in J-19 code, the consulate was
required to report "even when ships are not moving". Diplomatic code
decrypts during the week preceding the attack included "You see why time
is so urgent" -"war will come sooner than you think"
-"Negotiations are over, but we continue the effort to avoid arousing
suspicions". "East wind, rain", which we had learned from
decrypts to mean war with Britain and the US, was received in Washington
December 5th, and understood. They provide the context for assessing the
significance of the 14 part message and delivery instructions decoded and
circulated to the president and his military and civilian advisers the evening
of December 6th. That none of this crucially important intelligence was sent to
the commanders in Hawaii is simply inexcusable. It is in violation of long
standing practices and of the most basic responsibility of senior command to
a junior force commander. It is also
in violation of the promise of the CNO,
Admiral Stark, made to both Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel. The idea that a so-called war warning
sent 10 days before the above noted decrypts is sufficient in lieu is
operational nonsense.
The aggressor in surprise attacks has enormous advantages,
specifically so in this case, aided as he was by spies and a reporting system
regarding location of all ships in Pearl Harbor. He has full knowledge of the
location and identity of all potential targets, constraints imposed and
defensive measures in place. He chooses the time, place and circumstances of
attack, having made the necessary preparations. In any transition from peace to
war, the targeted force commander is a victim of a mindset based on what he knew
last month, last week and yesterday, and needs what is known as tactical
intelligence in evolving dangerous situations in order to avoid losing control -
in other words, he needs it to change his mindset. That this is universal truth
is attested to by the statement General Andrew Goodpaster wrote me, quoted
below:
"You speak of the aggressor choosing time, place and
circumstances of the attack. This caught my eye because it is exactly the
point I repeatedly made to NATO and US authority when I served as SACEUR. I
emphasize that because they, the Russians, could have the initiative. The
Soviets could choose the time, and place and mode of attack.
-3-
Powerful advantages which meant that I should be furnished
and be free to act upon the best possible intelligence to provide warning.
That is exactly what was not provided to Admiral Kimmel and General
Short".
As had General Goodpaster 28 years later, so had Admiral
Kimmel in June, 1941, specifically defined in a formal letter to Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, his requirement that he be kept fully
informed regarding all developments pertinent to his situation in Pearl.
Given his situation, Admiral Kimmel had only one sensible
operational option dating from about noon, December 6th. - To go to General
Quarters shortly after daybreak, Dec. 7th. General Short had two: 1)have some
pursuit planes airborne, others ready for launch, and 2) plan for and conduct
a flyaway of all other types of aircraft.
Why not go to General Quarters
routinely? I speak with first hand knowledge of life aboard steel boxes called
battleships moored in Pearl Harbor before air conditioning. We used windscoops
fitted in port holes to bring in air from the northeast trade winds to achieve a
small measure of comfort. These are removed during General Quarters, as is water
to toilets, and all access routes are closed. The ship is totally compartmented.
One does not order General Quarters lightly, or lacking specific information of
an attack. Personnel effectiveness is quickly lost when GQ is long lasting. Nor
were the ships undermanned for their need. Half of Admiral Kimmel's AAA was
manned, with ready ammunition, aboard his BBs during daylight hours when in
Pearl. The other half was blanketed, since the BBs moored two abreast.
I must remark upon a requisite
leadership quality. Before an outbreak of hostilities ship's crews spend time
ashore when in port, married personnel with their families, others ashore for
various recreational purposes. A sure way to destroy morale is to keep crews
aboard on hunches. Nervous Nellies loose effectiveness. A criticism by some
authors that because some commanding officers of ships were ashore, their ships
were without command guidance is sheer nonsense. Command Duty Officers are now
and were then, trained and competent to operate the ship in emergency
situations. In Pearl before the war (I was there for a year in ‘40-'41) crew
members ashore stayed aboard nearby shore facilities and engaged in athletic
contests, swimming, PX beer etc. They seldom went into Honolulu. Transportation
was scarce. Kimmel very much needed what Washington was learning from decrypts
the week before Dec. 7th, in order to modify his daily readiness status as well
as to readjust his ongoing operational activity as this threat situation was
seen developing. I only wish your report preparers had had some experience with
the realities of living under the gun in Hawaii, as it were, and as I did,
during the 20 months prior to the attack.
Short's flyaway planning, a massive
effort, would inevitably have become known immediately to the local Japanese spy
setup. It could have violated his war warning admonishment to avoid alarming the
citizenry, especially in light of the magnitude and nature of a flyaway of a
large number of civilian and military aircraft. And from what we now know about
Japanese preparations it would have, at the least, advised the Japanese that
surprise was lost.
-4-
Short reported his alert status to
Washington. The number of staff personnel who acted on that message and took no
exception indicates there was then general agreement that sabotage, not air
strikes, was the Washington expectation. General Marshall testified that he saw
but did not "correct" Short's interpretation of his war warning. The
record is replete with the views of interrogated key army and navy staff
officers, some of whom were in possession of PURPLE MAGIC information, that none
thought Pearl Harbor a likely target.
Dorn Report preparers note Washington's
intelligence support failure, but then accuse Kimmel for not using his cruisers
for searching. They neither considered the logistical problems that option
entailed nor the consequent adverse impact on his ability to implement his war
plan, which was directive. Kimmel had only 4 oilers capable of underway
replenishment. They were committed to the support of his two carrier task forces
engaged in reinforcing WAKE and MIDWAY and his amphibious force enroute Johnson
Island. Cruisers were refueled every 5 days, destroyers every 3. And there were
only 2 heavy cruisers not attached to the three task forces, not 12. A cruising
speed of 15 kts. outbound and in to conserve fuel translates to 70 hours, just
short of 3 days enroute, of the 5 permissible. One need not complete the math to
determine the very low probability for the high cost of this search option.
Lacking reference to operational experts, the superficiality of Dorn Report
suggested alternatives is not surprising.
In this general regard it is noted that
the LEXINGTON carrier task group departed Pearl Nov. 28th with fighters for
WAKE, ordered by Washington, the ENTERPRISE carrier task group for MIDWAY
December 5 and the Amphibious task group Dec.3rd. If Hawaii had been informed of
the decrypts then held in Washington, Kimmel would at least have been given the
opportunity to make changes in his Washington ordered carrier task force
operations to adjust his force employment in light of developing danger. These
later departures could have been modified to increase heavy cruiser numbers if
they were to be used for reconnaissance purposes. Also pertinent, and one of the
logistical constraints which influenced Admiral Kimmel's operational options, is
that he necessarily kept one battleship task group in port in order to avoid
depleting his wartime fuel reserves. One must also note that Kimmel's third
aircraft carrier, the SARATOGA, was on the West Coast for repairs.
Factors that influenced Kimmel's and
Short's thinking included Washington's orders on November 27th to transfer fifty
army pursuit aircraft (Short had 100) to reinforce WAKE and MIDWAY Islands. If
one disbelieves the conspiracy theory, then a transfer of 50 pursuit planes,
half of General Short's inventory, is another clear indication that Washington
thought an attack against Hawaii very unlikely. Kimmel substituted Marine
fighters because there was no way to offload the army planes, and sent one
carrier task forces to WAKE on 28 November, the second, on 5 December, to
MIDWAY.
The war warning (the sixth such that year) of 26 November
highlighted Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, Philippines, Borneo as likely Japanese
initial targets. The war warning and pursuit plane transfer directive from
Washington came within a day of each other. The evidence is very strong that
Washington did not expect an attack against Pearl when that transfer of fighter
planes was ordered.
At 3:00PM Saturday. December 6th,
Kimmel met with his staff to review their situation, and specifically inquired
re the location of the Japanese carriers. His Intelligence staff didn't know,
which was the case over the past year from time to time. That was about 8:30PM
in Washington, when Roosevelt, upon reading the first 13 of the 14 part decrypt
of instructions to Nomura, exclaimed "This means war." Then to his
dinner guests, all family, "We will be at war tomorrow" . No one
advised Kimmel or Short. Later, around midnight, the 14th part was decrypted
with delivery instructions to Sec State at 1300. Sunday, (0730 Hawaiian time.)
in those days carrier aircraft launched at dawn, formed up in large attack
groups and proceeded to targets, a process then requiring clear visibility. This
was a clear indication that Hawaii was a chosen target. Both navy and army
staffs fully understood the significance of the 1300 delivery time and pleaded
with both Stark and Marshall to "call" the commanders in Hawaii. Both
staffs were exasperated by their leaders unwillingness to do so. Admiral Stark's
briefer at 1030, December 7th urged Stark to call Kimmel. Stark
picked up the phone, then put it down and said a strange thing. "I
will call the president instead",
which he did, but wasn't put through.
Conclusion: A most fundamental responsibility in a command
chain is for a senior to keep his junior commander fully informed of evolving
events of possible
significance to him. Stark's reason for not doing so was a compelling
one, perhaps a presidential order.
When SecNav Knox arrived in Pearl Harbor several days later he
asked; "Didn't you get
the warning we sent you that Saturday night?" "No". He persisted, asking other staff members. The answer was
"no". None was sent. Since neither Stark nor Marshall could remember
where they were that night of nights, totally unbelievable, and both being
capable, assiduous persons, the only rational explanation is that they met with
the president together with other advisers around midnight. There is additional
evidence to that effect.
So, let's assume first Kimmel was fully
informed on or prior to December 5th, then that he was first informed around
midnight, Dec.6th (06:30 Hawaiian time) What might have happened? In the first
case, he had two options - retire - head for the west coast, or try to
reconstitute his
two carrier forces, to operate
somewhere near MIDWAY, a task that would have taken about 3 days. with or
without his battleships. His intelligence would have given Japanese carrier
strength as 4 to 6 aircraft carriers, but at that time we held low opinions of
the effectiveness of Japan's pilots. My point is that under this assumption,
Admiral Kimmel would have been in full charge of what he did, and Washington
would have had no control over his actions. And Admiral Kimmel stated that had
he so known, he would have been far more forceful with Washington. We can't
know, but given the mindsets of all top level commanders in Oahu, in all
likelihood Kimmel would have fought. And lost. Or Japan would have aborted. In
both cases Short would have placed his pursuit aircraft on alert, some airborne,
others ready for launch, and organized a flyaway of other than fighter type
aircraft, to be implemented upon detection of an incoming attack. Most likely
this would have made a difference in that Japanese losses would have been
greater and our damages less.
Now, my second assumption - Kimmel and/or Short were first
notified fully about midnight, December 6th. His best decision would be to stay
in
Port, but set General Quarters at daybreak, Dec.7th. My point
is that for whatever reason, or combination of reasons, what he actually did,
except for setting General Quarters, was his most rational course of action.
Those lawyers and historians who complain that he did nothing have never
identified any initiative that he might have taken that would have made any
difference in the outcome.
The fact is the decrypts we held
strongly indicated that war was imminent. To those who claim there were
ambiguities, then note that Admiral Nomura, the Japanese ambassador and chief
negotiator, requested and met secretly with Admiral Stark in which he advised
war was inevitable unless the US eased up on it's economic and military demands
of 26 November. None of this information was sent Hawaii. Washington knew,
Hawaii didn't. For whatever the reasons, Washington is to blame for what
occurred.
In summary, Washington's failure to
advise Hawaii of their "ultimatum" to Japan on November 26th and to
provide the intelligence in their possession during that November and early
December so pertinent to the status of the commanders in Hawaii denied both
Kimmel and Short the opportunity to make needed last minute adjustments that
would at the least have reduced the extent of casualties.
A previous CNO, Admiral Trost, reversed his earlier views in
these matters when he learned the advice given him, upon which he relied, by the
Navy Dept. historian was inaccurate. He then wrote the Secretary of the Navy
requesting that his adverse endorsement on an earlier Kimmel family request be
withdrawn.
I've not provided reference material
for my statements. If you have questions or disagreements, I would be happy to
treat with them.
Respectfully,
David C. Richardson
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