Among the material presented by Edward R. Kimmel
to President George W. Bush for consideration on January 22, 2001

"A Critical Analysis of the Report by the Department of Defense Dated December 1, 1995 Regarding Advancement of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short on the Retired List"

by Vice Admiral David Charles Richardson, USN(ret)

August 4, 1997


Included on this web page:

Summary of the major points made in the report, by Vice Admiral Richardson, (ret)

Exhibit M:  "Dorn Report Accusations Summary With Refutations"

Schedule of Exhibits -- list of materials accompanying the report, exhibits A - W

Preface -- Edward B. Hanify & B. R. Inman

The report

Vice Admiral Richardson's January 20, 2001 letter to Edwin Dorn


THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER
A SUMMARY OF MAJOR POINTS MADE IN THE CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DORN REPORT
by Vice Admiral, retired, David C Richardson
and
 

A CHALLENGE TO ANY AND ALL TO IDENTIFY WHAT ADMIRAL KIMMEL COULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY THAT WOULD HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE

DEPUTY SECDEF JOHN H. DEUTCH LETTER TO SENATOR STROM THURMOND PLEDGED;

".— we will examine the matter without preconceptions so that a judgment can be reached on the basis of fact and fairness --" and that "Like you, we seek to arrive at a closure that will be recognized as principled and fair."
THE SUBSEQUENT DORN REPORT FOUND (Inter alia)
"Responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; it should be broadly shared."
COMMENT:
The failure of the Dorn Report to identify errors made by others and to assess the impact of those errors on errors allegedly made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short precluded arrival at a "principled and fair" closure. Nor is a "principled and fair" closure achievable when highly significant, pertinent information, for whatever reason, is not taken into account.

 

A "fair" closure is Impossible when assessments are made by individuals who lack experience in the matter being assessed, command performance in this case, and do not obtain expert advice or explanation from acknowledged professionals.
RISKS TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT:
- Insistence on retaining the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii at force levels substantially inferior to those that Japan could bring there.
- Adoption of hard line policies toward Japan without adjustment or movement of Pacific Fleet forces.
- Issuance of an ultimatum to Japan (Nov. 26, ‘41) while implementing a strategy change to beef up air strike forces under MacArthur in the Philippines.
Transfer of control of major fleet activity in both oceans to Washington to more closely manage politically sensitive fleet operations, thereby inhibiting force movement by fleet commanders in adjustment to their perception of danger.
ERRORS COMMITTED IN WASHINGTON THAT AFFECTED DECISIONS IN HAWAII:
- In April, 1941, adoption of an Intelligence distribution policy that in denial of critically Important Intelligence information derived held in Washington and needed by Kimmel and Short In Hawaii.
 

- Unresponsiveness of the Chief of Naval Operations to the plea by Admiral Kimmel expressed in writing, with reasons, In June, 1941, that he be kept informed regarding policies and developments, including intelligence. (This Kimmel letter is a classic presentation of a major force commander's need for information for command decision.)
- Specific failure through inability from sending patrol aircraft to Britain to fulfill the 120 patrol aircraft commitment to Hawaii needed for air search.
- Naval Intelligence failures (1) to assess with any accuracy Japanese air combat effectiveness, and (2) misadvise the CNO and Kimmel egregiously regarding Japanese shallow water torpedo capabilities, thereby precluding provision of torpedo netting defenses.
 
- Failure to advise Kimmel or Short specifically of:
- Pearl Harbor bomb plot message and subsequent reporting orders,
- Receipt of winds execute message Dec. 4th that identified America as the enemy.
- The sequence of diplomatic messages that clearly foretold war, including the 14 part message December 6th that caused Roosevelt to exclaim "This means war" and "We will be at war tomorrow".
- Failure of War Department to correct General Short's interpretation of war warning message to mean greatest danger was sabotage.
- Admiral Stark's decision to "call the president instead" when urged to alert Kimmel by telephone the morning of Dec.7th.
ERRORS ATTRIBUTABLE TO KIMMEL
- He failed to increase readiness to the next level by ordering General Quarters, an error attributable to inadequate intelligence support from Washington. Dorn Report errors allegedly committed by Kimmel reflect ignorance of operational realities.
COMMENT:
- What Admiral Kimmel did, and for whatever reasons, the fact is that retaining the fleet in Pearl Harbor was his only sensible option, since he lacked air support, his 2 (versus 6 Japanese) aircraft carriers not having yet returned from reinforcing Wake and Midway. His battleship speeds were 18 knots, his striking range 15 miles. Japanese carrier forces speed was 30 knots, striking range 300 miles.
 
- My challenge to anyone to identify what Kimmel should have done differently that would have had a measurable Impact on the outcome stands.
ERRORS ATTRIBUTABLE TO SHORT
- lacking the intelligence available in Washington, he misinterpreted the Army war warning message to mean greatest danger was sabotage. He then dismantling his fighter air combat readiness, and as directed, reported his actions to the War Dept. who failed to correct him.

DORN REPORT SUMMARY WITH REFUTATIONS
EXHIBIT M
 
In a meeting conducted by Senator Strom Thurmond on April 27th, 1995, in response to the request by members of the Kimmel family, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John M Deutch, pledged that the proposal to restore their wartime ranks to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Major General Walter C. Short would be examined without preconceptions so that a judgment could be reached on the basis of fact and fairness. The report found that responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short: it should be broadly shared. There was, therefore, a need to identify errors in judgment that occurred elsewhere and to determine if the errors of others may have adversely influenced the Hawaiian commanders or caused the events that occurred. This was not done.
 
The report failed to consider other factors of major import, four of which can be classified as crucial. There is no identification of nor reference to highly pertinent, highly classified intelligence information then available in Washington but not sent Hawaii that only became available to historians and the general public in recent years. This deficiency reflects a lack of comprehension by the report preparers of the essentiality of intelligence in evolving situations so necessary to wise decision making. No mention is made of responsibilities for coordinating national policy and military force application inherent in national level leadership in Washington, nor of the effects of miscalculations there on what happened at Pearl Harbor. There is no recognition of the essential interrelationship that must exist between commanders at seat of government and those in command of military forces in the field. The report indicates no comprehension of factors that govern life aboard ship at sea and in port that relate to maintenance, training and personnel comfort that bear heavily when specifying conditions of readiness.
 
1. DORN: The intelligence available to Admiral Kimmel was sufficient to justify a higher level of vigilance than he chose to maintain.
 
COMMENT: Not so. This is the old argument that the admiral had not used his reconnaissance advantageously, an argument disproved by Professor Gannon's enquiries. Admiral Trost when CNO had adopted the old argument in his recommendation when responding to a Kimmel family request. Upon later studying the Gannon inquiry, he wrote the Secretary of the Navy that he was disavowing his earlier recommendation, and asked that it be withdrawn. In port state of readiness? Admiral Kimmel's standing orders placed a high state of readiness for all AAA batteries on ships when in port. On cruisers and battleships one half of AAA batteries were to be manned at all times with ammunition ready, with personnel available to man all when so directed. Few people then went off base when on liberty. When leaving ship most people remained on base or at nearby at athletic fields. When the two carriers left with reinforcements for Wake and Midway, they were placed on a full war footing. Anti-submarine patrols were maintained off the entrance to Pearl Harbor. Evidence exists in the form of a letter from a participant that in an engagement several months prior to December 7th, a Japanese submarine was sunk off the entrance. Admiral Inglis has testified that within 4 to 7 minutes of attack initiation all (repeat, all) shipboard AAA guns were firing.
 
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One must keep in mind that Admiral Kimmel's forces were substantially inferior to those available to the Japanese, especially in the all important aircraft carrier category, that his wartime initial mission, assigned by Washington, was to control the ocean areas along the islands to the northwest of Hawaii, that given what he knew that war could occur at any time, his readiness requirements for that mission constrained his day-to-day force employment prior to war and that defense of Hawaii was an Army responsibility. Fleet time in port was essential for maintenance, replenishment (underway logistical support forces were inadequate), training and recreation.
 
2. DORN: He knew that war was imminent. He knew that Japanese tactics featured surprise attacks. He knew that the U S had lost track of the Japanese carriers.
 
He had the resources to maintain a higher level of vigilance. He believed that optimum aerial reconnaissance required covering 360 degrees around Hawaii for a sustained period. The Navy clearly did not have enough planes for that. This does not mean, however, that Admiral Kimmel had to choose between ideal aerial reconnaissance and no aerial reconnaissance.
 
The fleet also had cruisers and destroyers that could have been used as pickets to supplement air patrol, but were not.
 
COMMENT: He knew the Japanese had a three for one advantage in aircraft carriers, and that he had none available to him due to orders from Washington to reinforce Midway and Wake the proceeding week. He did not know that Washington possessed the bomb plot message regarding ships in Pearl and related follow up messages evincing interest in kinds and locations of ships in port, the Winds Execute message designating the U S as the enemy, the sequence of messages in diplomatic code advising war "sooner than you think" and the 14 part denouement with delivery instructions to the Secretary) of State that foretold time and place of the attack. When one examines Admiral Kimmel's operational options, it is clear that even without the intelligence available in Washington he did the only sound thing - remain in port in a state of high readiness. Had he known what Washington knew, and what key intelligence people in Washington were urging Admiral Stark and General Marshall to tell him, he could have implemented his sole remaining option - setting general quarters at daybreak. Definitive knowledge was needed, was available in Washington, was not sent to either Admiral Kimmel nor General Short!.
 
One can get a sense of preparedness by reviewing Admiral Kimmel's plans and orders relative to the Japanese submarine threat in the vicinity of Pearl. The simple fact is that nothing Admiral Kimmel did could have made a change in what occurred except, had Washington alerted him, he could have preset general quarters, which would have reduced ship vulnerability by increasing its watertight integrity. No one has yet identified what Admiral Kimmel could have done differently during the preceding 24 to 36 hours that makes sense other than to pre-set general quarters.
 
Insofar as the intelligence information available in Hawaii was concerned, Sunday, December 7th, looked neither more nor less dangerous than the previous Sunday, November 30.  The idea that Admiral Kimmel should, or could, have mounted cruiser/destroyer surveillance, presumably dating from his
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November 27th war warning, given the distances inherent in achieving contact with the Japanese force during daylight, December 6th, is off-the-top-of-the-head stuff. The admiral's logistic support ships were insufficient in number to support any such sustained deployment. The benefit probability was negligible. The consequences, delay in implementing his assigned wartime mission.
 
3. DORN: Different choices might not have discovered the carrier armada and might not have prevented the attack, but different choices might have reduced the magnitude of the disaster.
 
COMMENT: Name one. My standing challenge to any one is to identify any such choice other than, given forewarning, to set general quarters, that would have reduced in any way the magnitude of the disaster. Given the disparity in strength in the all-important aircraft carrier category, the only sensible choice, to abandon the Pearl Harbor base for the West Coast upon receipt of the war warning, was an option available only to the President.
 
An error in judgment occurred within the Army command chain that might have made a minor difference. General Short interpreted, and so reported to Washington, his war warning to mean protect from sabotage. Washington, repositor of highly significant intelligence from codebreaking that identified the enemy, and time and place of attack, did not correct the Short interpretation, and so acknowledged in subsequent inquiries that were held in Washington. This error was not one within Kimmel's domain, although had he known what Washington knew, he might have approached General Short with his concerns. Specifically, it does not reflect a lack of coordination. Rather, it reflects the then established relationship between top field level Army commanders and their Army Chief of Staff.
 
4. DORN: In the certain knowledge that the United States and Japan were moving inexorably and ever more rapidly toward war but not knowing exactly where, when or how Japan would strike, what did Admiral Kimmel do to resolve his uncertainty?
Admiral Kimmel conducted no long range reconnaissance out of Oahu. Thus, on December 7th he could get warning only from Washington.
 
COMMENT: Resolve His uncertainty that war would soon come? The record makes clear just the opposite. Resolution of Kimmel's uncertainty with respect to it's imminence, time and likely place of first attack was a Washington capability. Washington held (and withheld from Kimmel) the Pearl Harbor bomb plot message and follow up messages, the identification of enemy message and numerous intercepted messages that foretold time and place of attack, the last of which was in hand about 12 hours prior to the attack. Admiral Stark had assured Admiral Kimmel that he would be kept informed. This we now know was not done. Also, as was well known in Washington, Admiral Kimmel's resources for search were totally inadequate. Navy Department plans specified 100 patrol aircraft for Hawaii area reconnaissance, but by December 7th had provided none. As to reconnaissance, the two carriers with reinforcements for Wake and Midway were tasked to reconnoiter the area west and south of Hawaii, toward the Japanese occupied Marshalls during return, which direction was thought the more likely route for any approaching forces.
 
5. DORN: This exclusive reliance on Washington for warning is at the heart of the failure at Pearl Harbor.
 
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COMMENT: No. The single at-the-heart failure that caused the disaster at Pearl Harbor or was pursuit of policies in Washington designed to force Japan to modify it's policies of aggression in China, the South Pacific and possibly against the Soviet Union while concurrently reducing Pacific Fleet forces by a fourth in April, ‘41. This reduction in force left the fleet substantially inferior to the forces available to Japan, especially in air strike capabilities. By this stance Washington limited severely the courses of action available to Admiral Kimmel, and presented Japan with a situation that was uncertain only in the degree of success that they could achieve in a surprise air attack. This criticism of Kimmel evades consideration of the essential interrelationship that must exist between senior command at seat of government and commanders of forces in the field. Since primary intelligence functions of necessity reside at seats of government, senior command have inherent obligations to keep commanders of forces properly informed. Dorn Report preparers appear unaware of the essentiality of a commander being kept fully informed regarding known, pertinent information in evolving situations so that he may take prudent, timely action.  No one now disputes that adequate and specific warning was available in Washington. Reference to his reliance on Washington for warning as an
Admiral Kimmel error in judgment reveals a mindset inclined to fault Kimmel despite doctrinal processes that were not followed.
 
6. DORN: Admiral Kimmel had sought and extracted from Admiral Stark a promise to provide all the warning available. Thus, as a practical matter, Admiral Kimmel placed total faith in Washington's ability to obtain and provide him timely and unambiguous warning from the Magic and other intercepts alone. This faith was not justified. It was not prudent to depend exclusively on Washington for timely and unambiguous information.
 
COMMENT: An act of misplaced faith? Yes. More to the point, it was a major system malfunction with it's roots in Washington. Since time immemorial heads of governments have been obligated to fully inform their admirals and generals in the field with all pertinent information. As already noted, Admiral Kimmel's resources were, and were known in Washington to be, extremely limited and unlikely to detect an approaching Japanese force bent on achieving surprise. Interestingly, we have here a major Washington blunder presented as an Admiral Kimmel error in judgment.
 
7. DORN: Admiral Kimmel had 49 Catalina long range patrol aircraft useful for reconnaissance. He also had a significant force of cruisers with embarked scout observation planes, destroyers and antiaircraft guns on ships in the harbor. If the Catalinas had been properly employed in an integrated and coordinated fashion at a reasonable state of readiness these resources might have made an enormous and perhaps critical difference in the events of December 7th.
 
COMMENT: These statements reflect the superficiality of inquiry into the nature of the search problem, the duration of time required dating, presumably, from receipt of the war warning November 27th, reconnaissance forces available, logistics support requirements and the readiness for wartime employment of fleet forces according to war plans. The recent Gannon research published in Naval Institute Proceedings portrays accurately this search problem.
 
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But let us suppose that his reconnaissance was successful, and did sight the incoming Japanese strike force some 500 to 700 miles out on December 6th, what options did he have? Would he put to sea without air cover, pitting his 18 knot speed battleships with 15 mile gun range offensive capability against 30 knot carriers with 300 mile air strike capabilities? Surely no. Or would he have remained in port? In that case his remaining option was to set general quarters at daybreak; He had no means to in any way turn aside or deflect the attack.
 
8. DORN: The use of destroyers and cruisers and their float planes in reconnaissance apparently was not considered.
 
COMMENT: We don't know. We do know that the complexity and magnitude of the problem, the logistical and other costs and the very low probability of success before radars were placed in small ships and aircraft would have made that proposal unattractive.
 
9. DORN: The air defense system was not coordinated between the Army and Navy.
 
COMMENT: Wrong! It was fully coordinated, including command connectivities and assigned responsibilities, in the case of Navy to the senior full-time in-port official, to assure that all navy combat units were in compliance with the agreed upon joint Army-Navy air defense plan whenever they entered port.
 
10. DORN: Training patterns could have been altered in response to heightened tensions
 
COMMENT: Meaning? The purpose for going to sea was training. Divisions and squadrons of ships practiced wartime maneouvers and conducted gunnery exercises, working to improve coordination. A limiting factor in time spent at sea was the shortage of logistical support, for which ships had to return to port. Weekends were usually for replenishment, maintenance, athletic activity and recreation for a portion of the fleet. This DORN Report observation is intended as a criticism, but there is no discernable connection to those events.
 
11. DORN: Anti-torpedo baffles or nets could have been used within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attack. These items were not furnished Admiral Kimmel, but they might have been requested.
 
COMMENT: An obvious area for inquiry. But not found was the reply by the CNO, Admiral Stark, to the Secretary of the Navy, forwarded as information to Admiral Kimmel, in early 1941 in response to the secretary's concern. Admiral Stark noted the heights, speeds, distances to arm torpedoes and depths of water required for successful drops. He concluded that Pearl Harbor water areas and depths were such as to make use of torpedoes unreasonable, citing the specific figures thought to pertain that supported his conclusion. The sad truth is, as we later learned time and time again throughout the first year of combat action, Japanese torpedoes, both airborne and ship based, were far superior to ours, and warrant designation as a secret weapon. Stark also noted that there were practical difficulties connected with how cumbersome nets were that would limit their usefulness in Pearl Harbor. In those circumstances Admiral Kimmel saw no need, and had no basis, for a request for torpedo nets.
 
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12. DORN: Barrage balloons could have been used in selected areas to restrict the most dangerous air approaches to "battleship row".
 
COMMENT: Air strike approaches for bombing runs are wind driven for greatest accuracy. They commence at high altitudes. The prevailing winds in Pearl Harbor, known as the trade winds, are strong and are from the northeast. Low pressure atmospheric conditions bring winds and rain from the south. Usefulness of balloons would have to be tested to be known. Opinion then held no such defense was needed to protect against torpedoes when in Pearl.
 
13. DORN: Advocates for Admiral Kimmel argue that the failure of Washington officials to provide the critical intercepts to the Hawaiian commanders excuses any errors made in Hawaii. It does not. Placing exclusive reliance on Washington for warning of air attack was an act of misplaced faith
 
COMMENT: Apart from several peripheral findings of fault, which are refuted herein, there are two basic criticisms alleged by Dorn. The first is that Admiral Kimmel should not have placed "exclusive reliance" on Washington for warning, and the second, and related criticism, that he failed to employ aerial and ship reconnaissance. Now, had he been provided the dozen or so critically important (Dorn identifies them. as well, as critical intercepts) codebroken messages available in Washington, commencing with the bomb plot message and related follow up messages plus those translated dating from November 27th, he would have had the opportunity to insist that Washington authorities recognize his vulnerabilities and agree to alleviating measures in a time frame when they would have made sense. He was well aware that his force in the aircraft carrier category was one third that of the Japanese, (one half if Enterprise could be returned to Pearl in time). And , again, we await someone to point out what he could have done differently during the last 24 or so hours, with or without reconnaissance information, that would have made any real difference in the outcome. His sole option was to set general quarters, for which he needed to know what was known in Washington.
 
14. DORN: Admiral Kimmel was the highest ranking commander at Pearl Harbor; it was appropriate to subject his actions to closer scrutiny and accountability than those of his superiors.
 
COMMENT: Closer scrutiny initially, but not exclusively, as in this case.. Subsequent to war's end the entire record of mistakes made, given the numerous loss of lives that was entailed, should have been identified so as to not foolishly repeat those same mistakes at some future time. That this did not happen was due to envisioned domestic political ramifications. Is it still so?
 
15 DORN: The decisions affecting Admiral Kimmel were tailored to his individual situation; what did or did not happen to others is not an appropriate consideration.
 
COMMENT: What did or did not "happen" to others may not have been an appropriate consideration, but what others did or did not "do" that caused or contributed to the disaster certainly merit identification and consideration.
 
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SCHEDULE OF EXHIBITS TO ANALYSIS OF THE DORN REPORT
 
EXHIBIT
A -- Transcript of April 27, 1995 meeting of Kimmel family and friends with DOD officials and Senator Thurmond
B -- The Dorn Report
C -- The Dorn Report Executive Summary
D -- FBI Report Regarding Double Agent Called "Tricycle"
E -- Pre Pearl Harbor Message Intercepts re Ships in Pearl
F -- Pre Pearl Harbor Intercepts Japanese Diplomatic Messages
G -- The "Winds" Messages according to "Cryptologia"
H -- "Pearl Harbor, Final Judgment" excerpt
I -- "A Well Kept Secret" by Admiral Robert B Carney
J -- Navy and Army War Warning Messages
K -- Wartime CNO, Admiral E. J. King, Withdraws Endorsement
L -- Former CNO, Admiral Carlyle Troste, Withdraws Endorsement
M -- Dorn Report Accusations Summary
N -- "And I Was There" by Admiral Layton, extracts
O -- Former Director CIA alleges Roosevelt Forewarned
 P -- General Fellers Report of Information Provided him in Cairo
Q -- Elliot Thorpe Report from Indonesia
R -- Record of Meeting of General Bonner Fellers, General R Carter Clarke and Dr Charles Tansill, May 4th, 1961
S -- Geraldine Weeks Letter to Admiral Kimmel
T -- Air Search at Pearl Harbor Setting The Record Straight
V -- Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly October 1994
W -- German Interception of Churchill/Roosevelt Radiophone conversation of November 26, 1941 According to G. Douglas

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATED
DECEMBER I, 1995, REGARDING ADVANCEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E.
 
KIMMEL AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT ON THE RETIRED LIST
 
by
 
DAVID C. RICHARDSON
 
VICE ADMIRAL, U S NAVY (ret)
 
JULY 21, 1997

PREFACE
July 7th, 1997
 
A determination of the causality of the Pearl Harbor Disaster depends upon a competent analysis of how Command Responsibilities by professional members of the armed forces were performed in a time of grave crisis. The basic question is:

"Was vital intelligence with respect to the plans and prospective action of the potential enemy effectively collected, carefully evaluated, and it's significance accurately and promptly conveyed by the High Command in Washington to the Pacific Fleet based in Pearl Harbor, particularly when the Pacific Fleet was known not to have available the secret source of that intelligence?"

This is a variation of the familiar question: "What was known, when was it known?" with the critical addition: "What was done, and by whom, to communicate what was known to those who did not have, and needed the knowledge?" These questions and related subsidiary questions are for the expert witness.
 
In March, 1944, as a Lieutenant (junior grade), U S Naval Reserve, I was assigned by the Navy Department to assist Admiral Kimmel's Chief Civilian Counsel, Charles B. Rugg, in various investigative proceedings arising from the Pearl Harbor disaster. Thereafter I heard all the testimony given before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel's testimony before the Army Board of Investigation, and the testimony of witnesses before the later Congressional Investigation. During the intervening half century, I have read the principal books and articles, and seen the various media programs, dealing with Pearl Harbor. I consider Admiral Richardson's "Critical Analysis" to be a unique and invaluable contribution to the understanding of the causality of the Pearl Harbor disaster. On this subject he is the qualified "Expert Witness" whose opinion is both required and considered in our current legal system.
 
For more than five decades after my service in the Navy, I have been a lawyer actively involved in the trial of cases. Frequently litigation involves the issue of whether conduct by one practicing in a profession or specialized field of human knowledge (Doctor, Lawyer, Educator, Engineer, Architect, Fiduciary, Investment Advisor, and others) conforms to or departs from the current standard of care and skill practiced by the average member of his Profession or Specialty.
 
In this area, the Law admits opinion testimony of the expert witness whose qualifications by reason of study and experience are approved by the court. In the absence of such expert testimony, frequently it is not possible to adjudicate a contested issue involving professional conduct.
 
Certainly an Officer in the Armed Services entrusted with High Command Responsibilities is a "Professional". His conduct involves not the fate of an individual client or patient, but the lives of thousands of men and women who serve under him, as well as the fate of his nation. Hence his conduct deserves to be reviewed and analyzed by a qualified expert witness of Admiral Richardson's experience and attainment in the same profession.
 
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Admiral Richardson has preeminent qualifications. In time of war he has exercised grave Command Responsibilities during extremely important naval operations. Through the years, he has also been a tireless and devoted student of Command Responsibilities with respect to the collection, analysis and distribution of critical Intelligence. He has emphasized the need for accurate communications in timely fashion of the significance of that intelligence, including appropriate Orders and Directives, to those directly responsible for our nation's effective response to enemy attack.
 
In the supporting Staff Memorandum submitted with the Dorn Report, the conviction is expressed that in our society the Final Judgment with respect to the causality of Pearl Harbor will and should be entrusted to the academic historian. There are, of course, historians well recognized and competent outside the groves of Academe. In any event, the Darn Report because of it's official character will probably be consulted by historians. Any such consideration must be accompanied by Admiral Richardson's "Critical Analysis" if History is to be faithful to Truth.
 
Edward B. Hanify
Boston, Mass.
July 31st, 1997
 
1 had the privilege during almost 31 years of service with the U. S. Navy to observe operational intelligence usage from the level of strike task forces to the most senior levels of government. Only a handful of commanders demonstrated that they fully grasped the value and optimum use of timely operational intelligence.
 
I have been aware of Vice Admiral David Richardson's distinguished background in Naval Aviation through command of squadrons and an aircraft carrier. But he first came directly across my screen when he was Commander of Task Force 77 during Vietnam while I was head of Current Intelligence for the Pacific Fleet. I subsequently tracked his progress as Commander, Sixth Fleet, and then as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet while I was Intelligence Officer for the Commander Seventh Fleet.
 
Admiral Richardson's use of operational intelligence to optimize the conduct of air strikes in North Vietnam became the model for all his successors. His creation of new organizations and processes while commanding the Sixth Fleet greatly improved warning and collection opportunities against a dramatically increasing threat. His support from the Deputy CINCPACFLT vantage point was critical in over-hauling the peacetime peripheral reconnaissance programs in Asia as well as improving warning and operational development of the Seventh Fleet, even as the final stages of the Vietnam war were being executed.
 
The Dorn Report by the Undersecretary of Defense, Edwin Dorn, of December, 1995, is the latest pronouncement by the Defense Department on the subject of Pearl Harbor responsibility
 
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Through those operational responsibilities and subsequent consulting! advisory roles after he retired, he demonstrated a unique ability to )comprehend the differing roles of the national command authority and commanders in the field. If operational intelligence is derived from extremely sensitive sources and methods, the national command authorities must ensure its rapid dissemination in usable format while providing requisite protection. Commanders in the field must add information gained from collection by their resources and ensure optimum use of their forces. Admiral Richardson should be very proud of the advances he fostered in these critical areas.
 
B. R. Inman Admiral,
U. S. Navy(ret)
 
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But, Mousie, thou art no thy lane
In proving foresight may be vain:
The best laid schemes o' mice and men
Gang aft a-gley.
An' lea' e us nought but grief an' pain
For promis'd joy.
 
--Robert Burns
 
Oh, what a tangled web we weave
When first we practice to deceive
 
--Sir Walter Scott
 
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A Critical Analysis of the Report by the Department of Defense Dated December 1, 1995 Regarding Advancement of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short on the Retired List
by
Vice Admiral David Charles Richardson, USN(ret)
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Acting on the request of the surviving sons of Admiral Kimmel, Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, held a meeting in the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing Room on April 27th, 1995 to permit the Kimmel family to present to the Secretary of Defense reasons why their father, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, should have his four star rank restored to him posthumously. Senator Strom Thurmond conducted the meeting. Representing the Department of Defense were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John M. Deutch, Secretary of the Navy, John H. Dalton and Navy General Counsel Steven S. Honigman. Those present in support of the Kimmel family were former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer; former Chief of Naval Operations, James L. Holloway III; Admiral Harold E. Shear, Rear Admiral Donald M. Showers, Captain Edward L. Beach, author; John Costello, historian; Michael Gannon, historian; Mr. Anthony DeLorenzo, representing the Pearl Harbor Survivor's Association; Counsel for Admiral Kimmel, Edward Hanify; the sons of Admiral Kimmel, Edward R. and Captain Thomas K., Edward's son, Manning M. IV and Thomas's son Thomas K. Jr. Navy General Counsel Honigman presented the case against posthumous advancement. The attendees accompanying the Kimmel family spoke in favor of advancement. The Kimmel family spoke in favor of General Short. The outcome was a pledge by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to Senator Thurmond to review the matter of posthumous advancement objectively, and make a report. A transcription of remarks made in meeting is attached as Exhibit A.  [see document] The report by the Under Secretary of Defense dated December 1, 1995, (the Dorn Report) is appended as Exhibit B. [see document] The executive summary of the Dorn Report is Exhibit C.
 
Shortly after the meeting in a letter to Senator Strom Thurmond dated 10 May, 1995, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch, stated:

"As I pledged at the meeting, we will examine the matter without preconceptions so that a judgment can be reached on the basis of fact and fairness and the right action can be taken without delay. Like you, we seek to arrive at a closure that will be recognized as principled and fair."

COMMENT: In order to arrive "at a closure that will be recognized as principled and fair" Secretary Deutch's pledge "that a judgment can be reached on the basis of fact and fairness" is a pledge to identify what the errors in judgment were and when and by whom they were committed. To what extent did errors in judgment that occurred at seat of government impact on judgment errors that may have occurred in Hawaii? More specifically, were those that may have been committed by Kimmel and Short of a severity to affect in any significant way the outcome of the surprise attack, or warrant destruction of their reputations?
 
This paper will reexamine the events and related information that we now know was then available in Washington and in Honolulu, present an assessment of their significance when viewed in an operational context, and identify errors in judgment by the parties to that disaster. An additional purpose is to provide for the record information not previously known or, for whatever reasons, not permitted to be included in the several inquiries. The intent is creation of a contextual record of fundamental considerations that should apply in force commander relationships as revealed by errors committed in the days, weeks and months prior to Pearl Harbor in order that we not suffer needless losses in lives in future perilous situations.

In the Dorn Report an administration acknowledges for the first time that blame for Pearl Harbor does not rest solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Others were also to blame. The others remain unidentified, their blame unexplained. The Dorn Report asserts that although neither commander is guilty of "dereliction of duty", as initially asserted in the Robert's Commission Report, both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were guilty of faulty judgment. They must therefore continue to bear blame for the disaster. But then, the Report notes, military commanders serve at the pleasure of senior command and may be relieved for no reason other than a loss of faith in their judgment. For this reason alone, the Report states, posthumous advancement of Kimmel and Short is inappropriate. The point is made that since the Pearl Harbor commanders' retirement in their permanent ranks are facts of history, violate no laws and are in accord with common practice they should stand.
 
It is, indeed, true, that military commanders serve at the pleasure of senior command. They may be relieved for any number of reasons. But we have here a major disaster, with enormous military and political consequences, and an issue of historical significance regarding which we need to set the record straight in order to not repeat past mistakes. The Dorn Report also notes the scope and depth of national criticism directed particularly at Admiral Kimmel. It makes clear that Kimmel's relief in particular was driven by considerations other than loss of confidence in his judgment. In this regard the Report states;

"It is important to remember that the state of the allied cause in both the Atlantic and Pacific was extremely perilous in the dark days of early 1942. The greatest national need at the time was to prosecute the global war against both Germany and Japan."

COMMENT: The implication is clear. The nation's leaders at that critical juncture quite rightly feared the loss of confidence that would follow an admission that Washington authorities were in some degree at fault, an admission that in the context of the then existing military situation would have been irresponsible. Nor for several weeks did the extent of blame attributable to the mishandling of intelligence become increasingly apparent to those knowledgeable of the contents of that intelligence. There were needs to both preserve the secrecy of our codebreaking successes and our national political stability.
 
The public mood in the aftermath of the disaster was bitter, frightened. How could this happen? The view of the general public was that laxity and inattention by Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had left the American fleet vulnerable. The public perception of life in Hawaii contributed to this suspicion. The reality was quite different, apparent to those of us who served there during 1940-41. As the war progressed, with victory clearly in sight, military reasons for blaming Kimmel and Short ceased to exist. But political reasons remained. Requests for posthumous advancement in rank of the Hawaiian commanders have been interpreted by some as an attack against the reputation of President Roosevelt. Is this consideration valid? While other injustices of that time have since been rectified, as for example, restitution made to Japanese Americans who were incarcerated in encampments during the war, the injustice done Kimmel and Short remains unadmitted. If then in the national interest to shoulder the Pearl Harbor commanders with the blame, does that interest apply today? Given that the attack was a Japanese initiative, and by any known measures American intervention a prerequisite to Hitler's defeat, is there a valid basis today for reasoning that the reputation of President Roosevelt would be tarnished by an admission that blame for the damage inflicted lay in Washington? The circumstances then existing saw Great Britain, it's army devastated in it's retreat to and recovery from Dunkirk, fighting alone for survival against Hitler, Mussolini, Japan and, until the spring of 1941,
 
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Stalin’s Soviet Union in uneasy alliance with Hitler.
 
Recorded history accurately notes the all out effort by President Roosevelt, supported by his key advisors, to assist Britain and, later, the Soviet Union in their defense against Hitler's aggression. The American public, on the other hand, was seemingly determined to avoid involvement, certainly not in a combat role. The President first initiated a buildup of our military strength and an increasing supply of military equipment to Britain. After Hitler's assault on the Soviet Union, and evidence that Stalin might succeed in his defensive efforts, Roosevelt initiated economic constraints designed to hold Japan in check to permit the Red Army to transfer military forces from Eastern Siberia for defense of Moscow. These constraints created conditions that the Japanese deemed unbearable. To the Japanese way of thinking, allied as they were to Hitler, achieving the Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere and it's promise of economic freedom made war with America a necessity. On the other hand, the President knew that if America went to war, that could only occur if America were first attacked. Now this had come to pass. A well planned, superbly executed attack by six Japanese aircraft carriers stunned America and the world by the severity of damage the attacks achieved. In these circumstances an undermined national leadership would exacerbate an already dangerous situation. The course of action to be taken was clear and simple. Let Kimmel and Short shoulder the blame. This came naturally from pre-war mindsets and political self interest. Nor was it then clear that they weren't to blame.
 
Vice Admiral Frank E Beatty, ret, Aide to the late Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, in an interview by U. S. News and World Report, date unknown, (enclosure X) states:

"I can say that prior to December 7th it was evident even to me, as I was reading the "magic" messages, that we were pushing Japan into a corner. I believe that it was the desire of President Roosevelt and of Prime Minister Churchill that we get into the war as they felt the allies could not win without us, and all our efforts to cause the Germans to declare war on us had failed. The conditions we imposed on Japan - to get out of China, for example - were so severe that we knew that nation could not accept. We did not want her to accept them. We were forcing her so severely that we should have known that she would react toward the United States. All her preparations in a military way - and we knew their overall import - pointed that way."

Although Admiral Beatty did not believe that Roosevelt knew of the impending attack, there is considerable evidence to the contrary. It is not conclusive, but not all the pertinent information has yet been released into the public domain. The evidence now known will be summarized, However, the matter of achieving justice for Kimmel and Short does not depend on any information beyond that now known. The known evidence is adequate.
 
DORN REPORT MAJOR DEFICIENCIES
 
The Dorn Report findings are;

1. Responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; it should be broadly shared.

2. To say that responsibility is broadly shared is not to absolve Admiral Kimmel and General Short of accountability.

3. The official treatment of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was substantially temperate and procedurally proper.

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4. History has not been hostile to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

5. There is not a compelling basis for advancing either officer to a higher grade.

 
While this presentation is directed at deficiencies in the Dorn Report, it is only fair and proper to point out that the Report, while lacking comprehension in some salient features of military operational life, is nevertheless exceptional in it's objectivity. While it has failed to include some highly pertinent and significant information that more thorough research would have revealed, we are nevertheless especially indebted for a presentation that permits a point counterpoint treatment of the case for posthumous advancement in rank for the two Pearl Harbor commanders. The Dorn Report is commendable also for recognizing that this subject cannot yet be put to rest. It states:

"On the other hand, sober analysis in the years since the publication of the Joint Congressional Committee's Report has produced a number of works of nuanced and balanced scholarship which constitutes the beginnings of the verdict of history. Those works, based on a careful reading of the entire record of the Joint Congressional Committee and of other primary sources that have come to light in the intervening years, are creating a responsible and increasingly accurate and just understanding of the tapestry of failure at Pearl Harbor. Ultimately, in a free society this must be the function of the academic community, and it is one that the academic community is performing well in this case."

COMMENT: An "increasingly accurate and just understanding" of the disaster's causes depends upon recognition of the essentiality of continuous intelligence inputs for effective command functioning and of the mutuality of command responsibility, one commander to another, in the command chain. As we shall see, Secretary Dorn reflects the general inability of non-professionals to distinguish between strategic intelligence, or statements of general warning applicable across a span of time, and tactical intelligence which provides minute-by-minute, hour-by-hour information updates that indicate change in the likelihood of a specific event occurring. This facet of the problem was clearly not understood in preparation of the Dorn Report.
 
Only recently has the general public learned from "other primary sources" the extraordinarily valuable information derived from codebreaking that inferred both time and place of the forthcoming attack. The importance of this information to Admiral Kimmel and General Short, but not provided them, as we shall see, was not comprehended in preparation of the Dorn Report. There are other basic faults. Given the risks being taken, both political and military, the President thought it expedient to take a more direct control of fleet operations. Dorn failed to take into account the added responsibility incurred by Washington as a consequence of that assumption of authority. More importantly, Dorn failed to recognize the essential relationship that must exist between conduct of foreign policy and employment of military force if we are to avoid disastrous consequences. The report's rationale with regard to important realities that guide and constrain force commanders in their conduct of operations is seriously flawed. Finally, in an assessment of fault, one must examine the operational options that were available to Kimmel and Short before the attack, and whether or not the arrangements that, they made in the context of the information available to them reflected either bad judgment or omissions. That was not done.
 
Although we now have in the public domain much of the information available in Washington, but not in Hawaii, there remains one possibly crucial bit of evidence not yet released - the secure telephone conversation in which Churchill called
 
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Roosevelt early in the morning of 26 November, 1941, that may be central to the radical and sudden change in Roosevelt's attitude toward the then ongoing negotiations with Japan. Information from Secretary Stimson concerning Japanese troop movements to the south most likely accounts for the war warning message sent Kimmel and Short November 27th. The coincidence of timing suggests this Churchill/Roosevelt conversation may also have played a role. Be that as it may, the case for restoring the reputations of Admiral Kimmel and General Short does not depend upon the content of that conversation.
 
WE MUST UNDERSTAND SOME BASIC PREMISES AND FUNDAMENTAL OPERATIONAL REALITIES
 
The commander assigning a mission to a subordinate commander is obligated to assign forces required for mission accomplishment. If force availability is deemed inadequate, the mission should be modified. The practice, and reality, in peacetime is that a force presence signifies intent, or will. Relatively small forces placed in harms way, when backed by clearly discernable national will, enjoy a degree of security and exercise influence beyond that inherent in the force itself. This can create a dangerous situation, however, when basic national interests are at issue, as was then the case with respect to Japan who imported 90% of it's oil from the United States.
 
Admiral Kimmel's forces were inferior to those available to the Japanese, substantially so. His predecessor, Admiral J. 0. Richardson, was relieved of his command because of his unwillingness to keep the fleet stationed in Pearl Harbor because of it's vulnerability to surprise attack. Even so, several months after replacing Richardson with Kimmel, the President reduced Pacific Fleet forces a further 25 percent by transferring an aircraft carrier, three battleships, cruisers, destroyers and support ships to the Atlantic. Our President's strategy centered on providing all possible aid to Britain, including warship patrols in the western Atlantic. Since our military buildup was then in early stages, the President accepted the additional risk in the Pacific inherent in the transfer of major forces to the Atlantic.
 
Military events in the fall of 1941 caused the President to modify his strategy. The German Army was notably successful initially in it's invasion of the Soviet Union. The President foresaw a need to transfer Russian forces stationed in the Far East westward to assist in defense of Stalingrad and Moscow. To offset the possibility that Japan might attack a weakened Russian rear, he directed a strengthening of Army and Army Air Force forces in the Philippine Islands, diverting some forces otherwise destined for Britain. The B-17 bombers arriving Hickam Field, Oahu, the morning of December 7th were enroute the Philippines. These force movements themselves involved considerable chance taking by our national high command, since they could precipitate hostilities in the circumstances. No problem with that. The point is simply that in event of a miscalculation, a reverse or a defeat, a substantial amount of responsibility resides with the political and military leadership at the seat of government, since only that authority can orchestrate the necessary political and military interactions to reduce risks. If a miscalculation occurs, and for various (and good) reasons an admission of responsibility is unacceptable at the time of a disaster, acceptance is an obligation when those reasons no longer apply. The Dorn report took no account of the effect of force inferiority, especially in air power, and it's constraints on the operational options or initiatives that Kimmel could take. Dorn did not acknowledge that American policies and actions emphasizing support of Chunking and protection of the Soviet Union eastern provinces together with constraints on exports of oil served a strategic purpose, and were deciding factors in Japan's decision to initiate war with a surprise attack on the Pacific Fleet.
 
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Admiral Kimmel was concerned at the weakened condition of his forces. He protested the transfer of the three battleships and the aircraft carrier Yorktown Battle Group to the Atlantic. Particularly significant was the loss of the Yorktown, as it left the Japanese navy with six large operational aircraft carriers a sizeable advantage in air strike power. Only three remained to Kimmel, the early carriers Lexington and Saratoga, and the more modern Enterprise. Implicit in this transfer of forces was the degree of faith, existing in Washington, misplaced as we later learned, that Japan would not attack the Hawaiian Islands. Adoption by the administration soon thereafter of hardline policies toward the Japanese, as events soon proved, placed the Hawaiian commanders in untenable positions. A commitment further complicating, if not potentially compromising the President's domestic political situation, was his promise to the British and Dutch to come to their aid in event the Japanese initiated attack against their territories in the South Pacific. These actions were either miscalculations in Washington regarding the relative strengths of naval forces in the Pacific, a misplaced faith that the Japanese would not attack in Hawaii, or the President was willing to accept the risk of a Japanese attack somewhere in the Pacific.
 
I repeat for emphasis - the transfer of three battleships and an aircraft carrier to the Atlantic in the spring of 1941 left the Pacific fleet appreciably weaker than the Japanese fleet, especially in the all important carrier air strike aircraft category. This transfer severely constrained Kimmel's force employment options from that date forward.
 
THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY FORCE
 
In all the books I have read about the disaster I find a common deficiency -they do not reflect an understanding of the essential interaction between fleet activity and operational intelligence. This is a major weakness in the Dorn Report as well. Even in "And I Was There" that interaction is taken for granted.  It is not explained. The reason is that assessing the significance of intelligence, then exploiting it, is a commander's responsibility, as is targeting of intelligence collection resources. The continuous presentation of intelligence, on the one hand, and exploiting it by redirecting ongoing fleet activity, on the other, makes clear that an extraordinary intimacy must exist between operations and intelligence. Smart command decisions depend upon an inflow of good, timely intelligence information.
 
One must understand the command need for a continuous accumulation of information from many sources for creation of a fund of knowledge that enhances command ability to function effectively. Within that information flow there is a category of time sensitive, operationally significant information (called opintel) that is pertinent to one's own situation and status at points in time. This "coin" has two sides: what one currently knows about a possible threat, and what one wants or needs to know, but doesn't. New information is continuously assessed in the light of other related information. A continuous appraisal is made of evolving situations in light of one's own activity as well as in the context of political developments and military activity elsewhere. The objective is to identify what to do in time so as to not lose control over evolving events, the imminence of which may be measured in minutes and hours. Often, information seemingly benign to recipients elsewhere, is viewed as quite significant when weighed in the context of other related information locally available and one's own activity at the time. For example: A submarine sighting near a port is interesting. If warships are about to depart, it is worrisome. In applying this process force commanders seek to control adversity by modifying ongoing operational activity to counter new developments. The demands of this process are why Admiral Kimmel held a meeting of key staff personnel at 3:00 PM,
 
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Saturday, December 6th, and asked the question about Japanese aircraft carrier locations that most authors mention.
 
A military historian whose name I have forgotten wrote that battles are won by commanders who make fewer mistakes. Mistakes occur when foresight is inadequate. At all points in time evolving military situations are characterized by uncertainty. Knowledge is imperfect. Seemingly minor occurrences are often seen in retrospect to have set in motion a sequence of events that heavily influenced the outcome. The antidote to uncertainty is knowledge. Clearly, and importantly, Admiral Kimmel's 3:00 PM meeting that Saturday afternoon, December 6th, was in search of a more perfect knowledge of the current situation, revealed by his comment about the location of the Japanese aircraft carriers. The story then unfolding in Washington, viewed in the context of intelligence from codebreaking during the previous several weeks, clearly foretold the likelihood of air attack against the fleet in Pearl Harbor that Sunday morning. But all of that information was withheld from Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
 
The central weakness of the Dorn Report is it's failure to understand the necessary intelligence/operational intimacy, and the potential consequences when lacking. Items two to ten, pages 111-7 to 111-11, inclusive, provide accurately what was known to Kimmel and Short. It does not identify operationally significant, time sensitive intelligence known in Washington, but not sent to Hawaii, that indicated both time and place of likely attack. Nor does it take into account the responsibilities of the Director of Naval Intelligence to ascertain and advise regarding possible enemy functional capabilities. Two quotes from the Dorn Report highlight this weakness.

- "Despite this mass of evidence, the practical difficulties of conducting an aerial attack may have caused Admiral Kimmel and General Short to minimize its likelihood." (page 111-10).

COMMENT: The practical difficulties referred to in this first quote, and the failure of naval intelligence to accurately assess the likely effectiveness of Japanese naval men and materials did, indeed, create an opinion that an air attack against Pearl Harbor might be damaging but not disastrous. This failure is attributable to the Director, Naval Intelligence, in Washington. As to the views of Kimmel and Short, any force commander is determined to defeat any attack, whether major or minor. The record is replete with information that neither Kimmel nor Short minimized the likelihood of an air attack. As to the "mass of evidence", the evidence that was both valid, timely and precise remained in Washington in intelligence withheld, as we shall soon see.
 
There is no evidence that any military officer, Army or Navy, minimized the likelihood of a surprise air attack against Oahu. Throughout the 30's major fleet exercises drove that point home, and were the basis for the requirement for 120 B-17s for General Short (12 provided) and 100 naval patrol planes (none provided) for the Commandant, 14th Naval District. There is implied evidence that our civilian leadership in Washington minimized that likelihood in establishing national political and military priorities. All shared the belief that such an attack would have limited success. For example, of the two air weapons, torpedoes and bombs, and general recognition that torpedoes had the greater potential for damage where they could be used, that specific threat was dismissed. In response to Secretary of the Navy Knox's concern regarding a torpedo attack similar to that delivered against the Italian Navy, noting the greater depth of water in the south of Italy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, in Washington in early 1941 provided detailed technical advice to the Pacific Fleet and the Commandant, 14th Naval District as follows:
 
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"Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T(anti-torpedo) baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo attack. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of the water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition, the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practibility of the present type of baffles - -. - a minimum depth of water of 75' may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150' of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250'. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. The desirable height for dropping is 60' or less. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed but this may be altered."

Given the dimensions of water in Pearl Harbor, with depths less than 40', it was Washington's assessment that discounted that danger. Nor was there capability in Hawaii to remedy that deficiency if Kimmel had reason to think otherwise.
 
The second Dorn Report quote states:

"This exclusive reliance on Washington for both tactical and strategic warning is at the heart of the failure at Pearl Harbor, and of the debate about the failure. The record suggests that officials in Washington believed they had provided strategic warning with their messages of November 27th; neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short read the messages that way. The debate over the handling of Japan's 14-part message on December 6th and the morning of December 7th is about tactical warning. Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not get tactical warning."

COMMENT: This quote captures succinctly the single most significant area of disagreement in allocating blame for the disaster and does, indeed, go to the very heart of the problem. If, in fact, it is true that Washington thought it's responsibilities discharged by this last of several strategic warning messages, then we have an example of an egregious degree of ignorance by senior naval professionals that is hard to believe, hard to attribute to bureaucratic bungling, especially given the letter Admiral Kimmel gave Admiral Stark in June, 1941. The earlier assumption of authority by the Director of War Plans over distribution of intelligence, then his subsequent failure to assure that this intelligence went out was a most grievous error the net effect of which was to mislead Admiral Kimmel, and directly affect his assessment of the situation in the days and hours preceding the attack.
 
A more reasonable explanation for assertions that providing "strategic" warning was adequate is that it served the political purpose of diverting criticism. As to the Dorn Report, this quote also assumes adequacy of patrol plane resources and other long range surveillance means that simply were not available to Kimmel or to Short, but which means were, in fact, available from codebreaking in Washington. This quote drives home the point that Dorn has no understanding of the role of tactical intelligence in the operational decision process, which lack has also appeared in a number of books written about Pearl Harbor. As will be noted, Admiral King stated a misuse by Admiral Kimmel of his patrol plane resources in his endorsement opposing the findings in the report by the Navy Court of Inquiry. That criticism provided a convenient device to avoid a public relations debacle while the war was still in progress. It was also an endorsement Admiral King later retracted. See Exhibit K.
 
No one has stated the case better for complete and timely support by Washington regarding policy and intelligence updates than Admiral Kimmel himself. Having been informed by Vice Admiral Wilson Brown in February, 1941, that there was "confusion" in Washington regarding responsibilities for keeping him advised
 
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regarding intelligence, and having received in personal letters from Admiral Stark information that could have come only from codebreaking of Japanese message traffic, Admiral Kimmel handed the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, a letter during his visit in Washington in June, 1941, that contained the following:

"The Commander-in Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition that directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

"It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid development in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions."

"It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available."

Several years later, after Admiral Kimmel had learned of all the information held in Washington that could, and should, have been provided him, he wrote:

"The Navy Department thus engaged in a course of conduct which definitely gave me the impression that intelligence from important intercepted Japanese messages was being furnished to me. Under these circumstances a failure to send me important information of this character was not merely a withholding of intelligence. It amounted to an affirmative misrepresentation. - - - . This failure not only deprived me of essential facts. It misled me."

 
The stage for the disaster was set in April, 1941, by the Director of War Plans when he took control of distribution of any intelligence that might prompt a fleet commander to move forces. He did this with the concurrence of the Chief of Naval Operations. It must be noted that this new arrangement was without precedent. It represented a change in a procedure that was doctrinal in nature. Nor was any explanation of the change, or of the reasons therefore, made known to the fleet commanders. The then subsequent failure to keep Kimmel properly informed of obviously important intelligence was an error in judgment of major proportion. This decision increased enormously the responsibility of authorities
 
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in Washington for any consequent disaster if, as happened, the flow of essential information ceased. The record is clear that very significant information from codebreaking, essential to a proper exercise of command, was denied Kimmel and Short.
 
Commanders of forces then and now have no choice but to rely on Washington for wide area surveillance. During WWI "radio intelligence" first exploited enemy use of radio transmissions for their control of forces. This exploitation included codebreaking, which also had great political import, so collection, analysis, security protection and prioritization became located at seats of government. Dissemination of information thus derived became the responsibility of top level military authority. Since a commander can only make sense in his force employment if he possesses related intelligence, top commands at seats of government took on a shared responsibility for force effectiveness and security. As noted above, this obligation was ignored by the Director of War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations in the months preceding Pearl Harbor. Kimmel and Short were denied, despite their many complaints, information they needed to properly employ their forces.
 
With regard to Kimmel's state of mind, note that when the carriers Lexington and Enterprise departed Pearl Harbor in the days preceding the Japanese attack with reinforcements for Wake and Midway, Halsey placed his forces on a full wartime basis, with authority to shoot. Every senior force commander knows that a direction of this sort is done only with the compliance, or by direction, of the next higher authority. No complacency there! No indication there of an unlikelihood of attack mentality!
 
The Dorn Report criticized Admiral Kimmel for not using his cruiser based amphibious aircraft to augment his search coverage. Consider the search problem. To reach the Japanese air strike launch point 275 miles from Pearl Harbor at daybreak, December 7th, the attacking group would be about 550 miles at sunset December 6th, and 800 miles at sunrise, December 6th. Presumably cruiser searches would have started November 27th. There were few cruisers, their search capabilities very limited. This would have presented severe logistical problems, and logistics support was very limited, an impediment already to even sustained local operations. The comment does reveal the lack of depth of inquiry into the limitations that constrained fleet operational activity represented by the researchers and preparers of the Dorn Report.
 
Dorn's assertion that exclusive reliance on Washington for tactical warning was at the heart of the failure at Pearl Harbor assumes adequacy of reconnaissance resources when their availability was but a small fraction of the requirement. To criticize the admiral for not using his cruiser aircraft for long range search is reaching for straws.
 
As to the likelihood of a Japanese air attack against Pearl Harbor, as distinct from it's expected effectiveness, throughout 1940 and until departure of Yorktown in April, 1941, as a fighter pilot in VF-5, the Yorktown fighter squadron, I personally flew dawn and dusk patrols against that possibility of an air attack whenever the ship was in Pearl Harbor. There was never any lack of "strategic warning" in the sense used in the Report, nor of an awareness of the possibility of a surprise air attack. An attribution otherwise is uninformed and unwarranted. This failure, of course, presumes a degree of ignorance of the intelligence process at top levels of navy command in Washington that may not be true. There may be another explanation, one having to do with the degree to which direct control of fleet operational activity in both oceans was being exercised by Washington. Given the course of international developments on the one hand, and domestic political determination to avoid involvement in the
 
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conflict on the other, the Director of War Plans action is understandable. What is not understandable is his failure to then discharge the responsibilities he so eagerly sought. The subsequent severity of the Pearl Harbor attack made it indiscreet to admit this confused state of affairs. The Dorn Report neither recognizes nor admits to this.
 
A long time, common practice, one that was increased in numbers of units involved in the weeks before the disaster, was protection from submarine attack while warships egressed or ingressed Pearl Harbor. Detection equipment in those days was technically weak, especially as to reliability of identity of contacts. As a result, more whales than submarines were reported as submarines and destroyed in the early days of the war.
 
There i